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Abstract
Computer networks are complex - they are a heterogeneous environment in
which numerous services, such as electronic mail, web browsing, voice and
multimedia data, traverse the globe daily. The needs and demands of end
users continuously change, and to meet these, new technologies are being
incorporated into this mega digital infrastructure at a phenomenal rate. In
addition to ensuring that necessary functionalities are provided, it is vitally
important to ensure that network performance is always at its optimum.
Fundamentally, networks are an environment where data, mostly in the form
of TCP and UDP, are being propagated end-to-end between the sending and
receiving nodes. There are numerous avenues of network performance that
can be exploited in order to improve its performance. Research in this area is
multi-faceted, and in this thesis the focus is on evaluating the behaviour of
TCP and UDP end-to-end on networks in three scenarios, namely, networks
with transition mechanisms, wireless based networks, and in the context of
using virtual private network technologies as security protocols.
This thesis will give insights into the behaviour of common protocols on real
networks. Therefore, performance metrics related to networks have been
gathered from test-bed implementations. The collected data has been pre-
sented in graphs and heat maps, which have been evaluated to ascertain
network related characteristics. In particular, key metrics have been identi-
fied, networking techniques within each context have been ranked, specific
observations related to each network environment have been made, and fi-
nally, the impact of either version of the Internet Protocol or an operating
system has been evaluated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information technology networks are at the core of communication in soci-
eties today. With the advent of the World Wide Web, social networking, mul-
timedia streaming and similar, the Internet has become a global phenomenon
allowing seamless, global communication and information sharing. On a mi-
cro scale, there has also been explosive growth in the number of small-scale
networks, such as intranets and extranets, mainly resulting from increased
business activities and continuous changes to the nature of conducting busi-
nesses. The way consumers purchase goods is also changing remarkably, as
global interconnectivity has given rise to borderless economies. The unprece-
dented increase in its scale of establishment and its complexities, irrespective
of the size of the actual network, has led to several challenging research prob-
lems in improving and enhancing network performance.
The fundamental manner in which networks are created have also evolved
dramatically. It all started as a small collaborative network with a limited
number of nodes created by researchers at the US Defence Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency. The networks of today are vastly different, but they
still are based on that original distributed packet-switching technology which
facilitates data transmission end-to-end on communication links. That same
basic building block, originating in the early 1980’s, continues to dominate
the networking arena in the 21st century, however it incorporates a num-
ber of new, necessary technologies. Some key developments are mentioned
herewith.
• The version of the Internet protocol that is used widely has limitations,
and this has necessitated a new version. Although this solves a num-
ber of the fundamental problems of its predecessor, uptake of the new
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version has been extremely slow. Also the two versions happen to be
incompatible. This has given rise to a number of interim solutions,
known as transition mechanisms, which facilitate co-existence of the
two versions on one network. It is important to understand the impli-
cations for implementing these.
• Wireless based technology plays a dominant role in all networks to-
day. It boosts productivity and facilitates increased mobility, leading to
increased effectiveness and improved responsiveness in business envi-
ronments. Wireless, at the implementation level, is excellent as it min-
imises cabling, allowing networks to be easily expanded/reconfigured
cost effectively. However, most networks today are an amalgamation
of both wired and wireless counterparts. The back-end of the major-
ity of network infrastructures are generally purely wired, while the last
mile data delivery to a client node is mostly wireless. Currently this com-
bination works well since it allows incorporation of fast cabled data
transfer technologies, like fibre optics, and new standard twisted pair
cables with wireless technologies. This gives rise to wired-to-wireless
type networks.
• There has been substantial development in maximizing network secu-
rity in recent times due to a profileration of cyber-crimes, as funda-
mental networking technologies are insecure by design. A network
needs to be secure at all different levels of operation, and this can be
achieved by securing all entities (software and hardware) at granular
level. Implementing security enhancements on a network downgrades
performance, therefore the correct choice of technique and optimal con-
figurition are of the uttermost importance.
• With the emergence of technologies, there is now a plethora of differ-
ent network traffic types traversing communication pathways. While
they may be using the same fundamental communication protocols as
traditional data types, networks nowadays are experiencing increased
traffic. Voice, multimedia streaming, games traffic and similar all have
to be appropriately prioritised so that they can coexist on cables, to-
gether with traditional data forms.
7In order to move with the times many other aspects of networking have un-
dergone both incremental and significant change since the early 1980s. The
evolutionary nature of networks poses a number of challenges and ques-
tions, and of interest to the work in this thesis are the questions related to
network performance, particularly in the context of communication proto-
cols on infrastructures implemented with new technologies.
Network performance has always been a hot topic for both academics and
practitioners. Its significance on a global scale is highlighted in Figure 1.1
(data date: December 2014), where it can be clearly seen that network per-
formance in various parts of the world are different. This is indicated by
dissimilar performance index values, where a higher value is indicative of a
comparatively better performing network. To enhance network performance
so that end-users get the best experience on information technology infras-
tructures, network practitioners and academia continually research, redesign
and upgrade networks.
asfafas
Figure 1.1: Global network performance index
Source: http://www.internettrafficreport.com
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In this thesis, two commonly used transport layer protocols, the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), have
been evaluated for network performance in three different network scenar-
ios, namely, networks with transition mechanisms, wireless based networks,
and in the context of using virtual private network technologies as security
protocols. In each of the three contexts, various networks have been imple-
mented on test-beds and then performance related metrics were measured
and analysed with a view to evaluating the network behaviour of the two
protocols. It was envisaged that this undertaking would lead to a better un-
derstanding of the two protocols’ network performance behaviours.
1.1 Thesis Objectives
The primary focus of this thesis is to evaluate network performance char-
acteristics of transport layer protocols in three different scenarios. In each
of the three contexts, various networks have been implemented to evaluate
protocol behaviour. Thus the core objectives of this thesis are:
1. To exploit TCP and UDP traffic behaviour on networks that have var-
ious IPv4/IPv6 transition mechanisms implemented. Dual stack, transla-
tion and tunnelling mechanisms have been analysed with different trans-
port layer data types to ascertain if there are any performance difference
between some commonly used mechanisms.
2. To analyse TCP and UDP traffic behaviour on wireless networks imple-
mented with various IEEE802.11 standards. Here the objective is to eval-
uate wireless environments configured with different wireless standards
(IEEE802.11g,n,ac) and security protocols so that each environments net-
work behaviours can be differentiated for the two traffic types.
3. To evaluate TCP and UDP network behaviour on networks with var-
ious virtual private network security protocols. There are a number of
technologies that can be used to secure data in motion on a network. The
degree by which they impact on network performance when transport
layer traffic crosses through these implementations will be analysed.
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4. To ascertain if the choice of operating systems influences the behaviour
of TCP and UDP traffic types. The goal here is to empirically determine if
the network operating system used has any effect of the network perfor-
mance on traffic types.
5. To determine, based on different performance metrics, which specific
technology, in each of the three different contexts, gives the best network
performance. Subsequently this will lead to an ordinal ranking of the
specific technologies that are commonly used within each context of focus
in the thesis.
Accomplishing the above thesis objectives will enhance knowledge related
to the two protocols’ behaviour on networks. This will be very useful for
professional practitioners who may be making decisions related to the choice
of technology they are to implement on network infrastructures.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
This thesis is a culmination of work undertaken in the arena of network
performance over a number of years. Subsequently, three journal articles
and more than 20 IEEE international conference papers have been published
(see List of Publications). The focus of each of these research publications has
been on a different aspect of network performance evaluation, and details re-
lated to performance metrics in that particular context have been presented
in those peer, blind-reviewed research outputs. The common theme in all
publications is performance of TCP and UDP traffic types analysed on test-
bed implementations.
Following on from that, the purpose of this doctoral undertaking is to bring
together all those prior works into one cohesive thesis on network perfor-
mance evaluation. The thesis will enhance professional practice knowledge
in the area of network performance. As stated earlier, networks continue
to evolve, and the contents of this thesis will enable network practitioners
to make informed decisions when changing or incorporating technologies,
such as transition mechanisms, wireless, or virtual private networks into the
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infrastructure. The presented contents will be beneficial for those wanting to
get the best performance out of a network infrastructure.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides background informa-
tion on key concepts relating to the topic and finishes off by highlighting
other research work with a similar focus. In Chapter 3, the thesis methodol-
ogy is presented with an emphasis on detailing the test-bed schematic em-
ployed. Data collection and analysis process have been outlined. Following
that, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain intricacies related to the three network con-
texts namely, transition mechanisms, wireless and virtual private networks
respectively. In each of these three chapters, the technical details related to
the context are provided, followed by test-bed details specific to the technol-
ogy. At the end of each of these chapters, empirical results from the test-
bed analysis are presented. The results presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are
analysed and discussed in Chapter 7 collaboratively, and finally, conclusions
related to network performance behaviour of TCP and UDP are drawn in
Chapter 8. Thesis contributions have also been stated in the final chapters.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
   
Content Chapters 
Chapter 5: Wireless 
 
  802.11 is an IEEE standard that 
indicates wireless. 
  802.11 have different standards that are 
currently available in the market, 
which are: a, b, g, n, and ac.  
Chapter 4: Transition Mechanism 
 
  Different transition techniques that can 
be implemented; namely, DSTM, 
Teredo, ISATAP, NAT-PT, NAT64, and 
6over4. 
Chapter 6: VPN 
 
  VPN extends private networks across a 
public network (internet). 
  Types of VPNs are remote-access and 
site-to-site VPNs. 
  VPNs can be implemented in either 
layer 2 or 3 of the OSI model. 
Chapter 2: Background 
   
Chapter 3: Methodology 
   
Chapter 7: Discussion 
   
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
   
Figure 1.2: Thesis layout overview
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction and Motivations
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the network performance be-
haviour of TCP and UDP traffic types in various network scenarios, espe-
cially that of networks which are wireless, or have either transition mech-
anisms, or security enhancements related to data transmission. End-to-end
data delivery was revolutionised by Cerf and Kahn (1974) in their landmark
paper which detailed the TCP and outlined concepts related to encapsula-
tion, datagrams, and functions of a gateway. By transferring the responsi-
bility of error correction in communication from the Interface Message Pro-
cessor (IMP) to the host machine, the Advance Research Project Agency Net-
work (ARPANET) network became the focus for all communication devel-
opment (Neigus, 1972). Then in 1977, a network consisting of ARPANET,
packet radio and packet satellite was successfully demonstrated, thus giving
rise to a new era in modern communication.
Thereafter, TCP/IP was split into two distinct protocols: TCP and Inter-
networking Protocol (IP) (Postel, 1981b). With this, split datagram routing
was handled by IP, while TCP performed tasks like segmentation, reassem-
bly, and error detection. The new internetworking protocol became TCP/IP,
which was later incorporated into computer network systems like UNIX
(K. Kim, Sung, & Lee, 1997). By 1981, TCP/IP was formalised and its in-
clusion as networking software in computer operating systems gave rise to
data communication on desktop computers (Socolofsky & Kale, 1991). Even-
tually the original ARPANET protocol was abolished and TCP/IP became
the standard for various networks, and the Internet. The protocol has been
in use, and in continuous development, for more than three decades; what
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started off as experimental communication technology has now become the
powerhouse of the most used and complex network in the world.
In this chapter, background concepts related to common network protocols
and network performance are discussed. In this context, the different mod-
els commonly used to compartmentalise and understand networks are first
presented. This is followed by a discussion on the two communication pro-
tocols at the core of this thesis, their different characteristics are detailed, and
finally the Internet protocol versions are discussed. Intertwined in these dis-
cussions, some key research undertaken in the area of network performance
are mentioned. The actual context in which the protocols have been perfor-
mance evaluated will be presented in later chapters. In summary, this chap-
ter mainly presents the intricacies of TCP/IP important to know, in order to
understand network performance.
2.2 A Layered Structure
Networks and the Internet are extremely complicated systems, since there
are numerous components working together to provide a platform for end-
to-end communication. Applications, software, protocols, operating sys-
tems, switches, routers, link level media, and more, are all supposed to work
together to seamlessly facilitate connectivity. Given this immense complex-
ity, network architecture has been organised in layers. This aligns with the
basic principles and philosophies of the Internet architecture design, which
in summary states that complexity must be controlled if one hopes to effi-
ciently scale a complex problem (Bush & Meyer, 2002). By doing so, func-
tions of communication systems have been split into abstraction layers, giv-
ing rise to standardisation in data transmission. Functionality at each layer
relies on the services offered by the layer directly below.
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2.2.1 OSI Reference Model
There are two prevailing models that exist as the foundation for the lay-
ered structure in communication. The International Standards Organisa-
tion (ISO), established in 1947 and responsible for agreements on interna-
tional standards, introduced the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model
in the late 1970s (Forouzan, 2001). OSI enables one to understand and de-
sign a network architecture that is flexible, reliable, and interoperable, allow-
ing end systems to communicate regardless of their underlying architecture
(Staalhagen, 1996) (Day & Zimmermann, 1983). The second model, known
as the TCP reference model (originally known as the Department of Defense
(DoD) model) was developed prior to the OSI model. The TCP model has
interactive modules, each providing a specific functionality in communica-
tion, although each module is not necessarily interdependent. However, in
the OSI model, functions belonging to specific layers rely on the working
of the other layers, while in the TCP model, since it uses relatively inde-
pendent protocols as various layers, modules can be mixed and matched to
suit the needs of the system. Nonetheless, both OSI and TCP models provide
mechanisms by which complex heterogeneous environments can be sensibly
segmented. The two models are detailed next.
The Physical Layer
The physical layer (layer 1) is mainly responsible for coordinating transmis-
sion of bit streams over the physical medium between the end nodes. It
defines the rules that transmission media follow in relation to moving data
bits (zeros and ones) on a circuit (Staalhagen, 1996). The protocols in that
layer are link dependant, that is, it relies on the actual details of the trans-
mission medium (i.e. fibre-optics, twisted-pair copper wire etc.) (Heller, Hei-
dinger, Schneele, Fischer, & Klose, 2010) (Xia, Bataineh, Hassoun, & Kryzak,
1999). Following are the concerns at this layer: characteristics of the inter-
faces between the devices and the transmission medium are defined; data
bits are encoded into electrical or optical signals; the transmission rate is de-
fined; sender and receiver clocks are synchronised; either a point-to-point or
a multi-point link between the devices are established; and finally the direc-
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tion of transmission between the devices (simplex, half-duplex, full-duplex)
is defined.
The Data Link Layer
The primary task of layer 2 is to ensure that the raw data received at the
physical layer is transformed into a circuit that appears error free to the up-
per layers of the OSI model. This is done by masking the real errors, and is
accomplished by breaking the sender data into data frames, and then trans-
mitting the frames sequentially. This layer also adds a header to the frame
to define the physical addresses of the sender and receiver nodes (Postel &
Reynolds, 1988) (Staalhagen, 1996). The main responsibilities of the data link
layer are: to divide the data stream into frames of manageable size; physical
addressing of the frames to include sender and receiver addresses; impos-
ing a flow control mechanism that will prevent overwhelming the receiver;
adding reliability to data transmission by implementing a mechanism to de-
tect and retransmit lost or damaged data; and controlling access on links
where two or more devices are connected to the same link.
The Network Layer
This layer is responsible for source to destination moving of network layer
packets, known as datagrams, possibly across different networks. The data
link layer is responsible for transportation within a network, while the net-
work layer ensures that each packet reaches its final destination, even if it is
across multiple networks (Hornig, 1984) (Staalhagen, 1996). So at this layer
a header containing logical addresses of the sender/receiver is added to the
packets coming from upper layers. On completing that, the datagram starts
the process of being routed to the destination by determining the next net-
work node the message should be sent to, so that the best possible route
(depending on the implemented routing protocol) is found (R. Hong, 2011).
The network layer contains the IP protocol and numerous routing protocols,
however this layer is simply referred to as the IP layer.
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The Transport Layer
The fourth layer of the OSI mainly deals with end-to-end connectivity is-
sues, such as determining the procedures that have to be followed for data
entering and departing various networks. The previous network layer is re-
sponsible for end-to-end delivery of individual packets without realising the
relationship between the packets - the transport layer, on the other hand,
ensures that the entire message arrives at the destination intact, and in the
correct sequence (R. Hong, 2011). That is, it is responsible for both error
control and flow control for the entire transportation process (Staalhagen,
1996). This layer: adds a header with a service-point address (port address)
allowing a network node to get the entire message to the correct process on a
destination computer; segments a message into transmittable segments and
appends a sequence number (later uses this information to reassemble the
message); maintains a connection control mechanism; maintains flow con-
trol end-to-end; and finally, ensures error free (damage, loss or duplication)
delivery by using retransmissions when necessary.
The Session Layer
This layer is the network dialogue controller since it is responsible for initiat-
ing, maintaining, and terminating interactions between the communicating
systems. The managing and structuring of sessions, during which session
participants undertake activities, like logging onto equipment, file transfers
and performing security checks, are all done at this layer. At the end of the
communication process, the session is also terminated by mechanisms at this
layer, however, if there is a premature session termination, in-built redun-
dancies are able to re-establish the session (Staalhagen, 1996). In summary,
the session layer allows the two systems to enter into a dialogue, and adds
checkpoints (for synchronisation purposes) into the data stream.
The Presentation Layer
The lower layers of the OSI, mentioned above, are mainly responsible for
moving bits around a communication infrastructure - the presentation layer
is concerned with the syntax and semantics of the information exchanged
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between the communicating devices. It formats the data for presentation to
the user so that different interfaces on various communications devices, and
applications on computers, need not worry about data formats, that is, it is
concerned with displaying, formatting, and editing user inputs and outputs
(Staalhagen, 1996). Specific responsibilities of the presentation layer include:
translating data so that the sender-dependant data format is changed into
a common format, which at the receiving end is changed into a receiver-
dependant format; data encryption, so that sensitive information can be car-
ried across systems; and finally, data compression, where the number of bits
contained in the information is reduced.
The Application Layer
This is the upper most layer (layer 7) of the OSI reference model. At this
layer, a variety of protocols that are commonly utilised by end users are pre-
sented, facilitating network access via services such as electronic mail, file
transfers, database access, and similar (C. Nguyen, Vialatte, & Rieu, 1989).
Other network-centric applications, such as network monitoring and net-
work management facilities, are also available at this layer.
2.2.2 TCP Reference Model
The OSI model has been used as the underpinning mechanism to explain net-
work concepts for a long time; however, underpinning the OSI model is the
reference model used in the ARPANET project. The TCP reference model,
initially described by Carf and Kahn (1974), and later refined by Braden
(1989) has only four layers (Renbo & Xiong, 2009), brief details of which are
presented next.
The Link Layer
The link layer is mainly concerned with the relationship between hosts and
the transmission links. Early material relating to this model had little infor-
mation related to this layer, however requirements at this layer led to the
choice of packet-switched network technology based on concepts of a con-
nectionless layer running across multiple networks. So, this layer describes
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what links, like serial lines or Ethernet, must do to meet the requirements of
the next layer up, the Internet Layer.
The Internet Layer
In the TCP/IP reference model, the Internet layer corresponds closely to the
network layer in the OSI model. This layer is crucial to the architecture of a
network since it enables network hosts to initiate communication by inject-
ing packets into any network, facilitating their travel to the destination, po-
tentially via different network routes. Arriving at the destination, the higher
layers in this architecture will rearrange and assemble the packets. That is,
the Internet layer is responsible for delivering IP packets to any location that
it is destined for.
The Transport Layer
Like in the OSI model, the transport layer is designed to allow communicat-
ing source and destination nodes to carry on a conversation. To do this, there
are two protocols defined at this layer: TCP and UDP. TCP is the connection-
oriented protocol that enables error free data transmission, while UDP is the
connectionless protocol that can be used by applications not requiring checks
and balances commonly found in TCP type connections.
The Application Layer
The application layer in the TCP/IP model is the highest layer, and in addi-
tion to containing the higher-level protocols required by a user of a network,
it also includes session and presentation functions that exist on discreet lev-
els in the OSI model. Incorporating the functions of all three layers into one
is worthy, since session and presentation layers generally are of little use to
most applications. In the application layer, there are numerous protocols that
are typically used on networks, including the Terminal Network (TELNET),
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Domain Name System (DNS)and the like.
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2.2.3 OSI and TCP Reference Model Comparison
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Figure 2.1: Different network models and their corresponding layers
The functionalities at the layers in both the OSI and the TCP reference mod-
els, as shown in Figure 2.1, are roughly similar. Layers up to, and including
transport, provide end-to-end network independent transport services for
communication, while layers above transport are application-oriented for
the users. However, there are some key differences between the two models.
First, the OSI model makes a very clear distinction between services, inter-
faces, and protocols, unlike the TCP model (Muskinja, Tovornik, & Terbuc,
2003). Here, services define the semantics of a layer, interfaces are related to
informing the processes above the layer of what parameters are, in relation
to interaction between the layers, and protocols relate to how a layer exe-
cutes instructions within the layer to achieve desired goals. By separating the
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three, OSI is able to fit in well with the modern concepts of object-oriented
programming. However, in the TCP model, these boundaries between the
services, interfaces, and protocols are blurred. Second, the OSI model is
generic and not biased towards any particular routered protocol like TCP/IP.
This is mainly due to the fact that the model itself was delineated well before
the designing of any particular protocol. This was not the case for the TCP
model: the model came first, followed by the protocols. From a design point
of view, protocols like TCP/IP are a perfect fit into the TCP reference model.
Thirdly, in relation to connectionless versus connection-orientated commu-
nication, the OSI model supports both at the network layer, but at the trans-
port layer it only supports connection-oriented communication. However,
the TCP model supports only connectionless at the network layer, but both
at the transport layer - this matters since transport layer services are visible
to the end user, so this gives TCP model users a choice. Finally, the lack of
distinction between the physical and data link layer in the TCP model is of
concern. The physical layer communication characteristics of copper wires,
fibre optics, or wireless and data link layer issues related to start/end frames
and desired degrees of reliability are distinct sets of characteristics that are
only differentiated in the OSI model.
2.2.4 The Internet Model
Historically, OSI is the most common model used to describe network ac-
tivities. However, a more simplified, five-layer model dominates current
hardware and software designs. This model runs from a physical layer, up
through the link, network and transport layers to the application layer. The
details of each layer are discussed herewith.
The Physical Layer
Activities at this layer are link and media dependant. Here, individual bits
within each frame, handed down from the link layer, are moved from one
node to the next. The Internet model does not define any specific protocols
at this layer, however, it supports all the standard and commonly used pro-
prietary protocols.
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The Link Layer
At this layer, routing activities take place whereby datagrams can be moved
through a series of routers between source and destination nodes. The ser-
vices provided at this layer are dependant on specific link-layer protocols
that are employed over the link. So if the specific protocols have details about
reliable delivery of data, the link layer will ensure that such is achieved.
Since data traverses several links in the path from source to destination, a
datagram may be subject to multiple link-layer protocols at different links
along the path.
Network Layer
Here, datagrams are moved between hosts. The multiple links that exist in
networks and between networks are combined at this layer so that data can
be successfully sent between distant computers. Paths between the nodes
are found and protocols, like the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Re-
verse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP), Internet Control Message Pro-
tocol (ICMP)(Postel, 1981a) and Internet Group Message Protocol (IGMP)
(Fenner, 1997), also exist at this layer (Renbo & Xiong, 2009). The Internet’s
celebrated IP protocol is included here.
The Transport Layer
The transport layer is responsible for transporting application-layer mes-
sages between the endpoints of applications used by the nodes. This is done
using the two transport layer protocols, TCP and UDP, either of which is
capable of transporting application-layer messages. This layer also strength-
ens the delivery guarantees of the Network Layer, and provides delivery
abstractions, such as reliable byte streams to match the needs of different
applications.
The Application Layer
In OSI model application, the presentation and session layers activities are
combined into one layer called the application layer in the Internet Model.
Applications that make use of the network reside at this layer, some of which
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are HTTP, SMTP and FTP. In addition to these, network specific services,
such as DNS, are also present. Protocols used at the application layer may be
distributed across multiple systems in the path of communication between
the sender and receiver.
Application Application Protocol Transport Protocol Port Number 
File Transfer FTP TCP 20 and 21 
Secured Shell SSH UDP/ TCP 22 
Remote Terminal 
Access 
Telnet TCP 23 
Electronic Mail SMTP TCP 25 
Name Translation DNS Typically UDP 53 
File Transfer TFTP UDP 69 
Web HTTP TCP 80 
Mail Transfer POP TCP 109 and 110 
Web HTTPS TCP 443 
Simple File Transfer SFTP TCP 115 
Address Allocation 
DHCP UDP 67 and 68 
DHCPv6 UDP/ TCP 546 and 547 
Streaming 
Multimedia 
RTSP UDP /TCP 554 
Internet Telephony Typically proprietary UDP/TCP  
Network 
Management 
SNMP Typically UDP 161 
Routing Protocol RIP Typically UDP 520 
 
Table 2.1: Different applications for both TCP and UDP, and their corre-
sponding port number(s)
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The three reference models discussed earlier have multiple services and pro-
tocols at different layers. The five-layer Internet model will be used as a basis
in this thesis, and of interest are some of the protocols at network and trans-
port layer. In particular, the TCP and UDP protocols’ network performance
analysis is a common thread in this research. TCP and UDP protocols are
commonly used by Internet applications [see Table 2.1] and are discussed
next.
2.2.5 The UDP Protocol
The Internet model has both TCP and UDP at its transport layer, and of the
two UDP is the simpler protocol. It is a connectionless (RFC 768)(Postel,
1980), unreliable protocol that provides a mechanism for applications to send
encapsulated IP datagrams, without the need to establish a connection be-
tween the communicating nodes (P. Liu, Meng, Ye, & Gu, 2002) (Brownlee &
Claffy, 2002). UDP does not have a flow control mechanism and lacks func-
tions related to acknowledgement of received packets (Gopinath, Kumar, &
Sharma, 2013) (R. Hong, 2011). Error checking is not a prevailing feature: if
it detects an error, the packet is dropped silently. UDP can be described as a
no-frills, bare-bones transport protocol.
A transport layer protocol has to provide a mechanism for connecting pro-
cesses between the communicating nodes. Connecting processes entails es-
tablishing a connection between the sender and receiver, segmenting the
packet stream into transportable units, numbering them, and then sending
one by one, from sender to receiver. At the receiving end, the transport layer
waits until all the different units common to a process arrives, checks them
and then passes the error free entities to the process as a stream. However,
UDP does not perform any of the activities mentioned here - it just receives
a data stream for a process and delivers it unreliably. So UDP is the simplest
of the transport protocols, providing process-to-process communication in-
stead of a host-to-host complete process.
In spite of the drawbacks of UDP and its inherent disadvantages, it is a
widely used communication protocol due to some of its integral advantages.
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It is a simple protocol that has only 8 Bytes overhead per segment. If a sender
needs to send information, and reliability is not a concern, UDP is the pro-
tocol of choice (Cai, Zhang, & Song, 2010). UDP will immediately package
data inside a UDP segment and swiftly pass it to the network layer. Also
the interaction between the sender and the receiver is at a bare minimum,
that is, there are no preliminaries at the beginning of the process. UDP does
not establish and maintain a connection state, which includes entities like
receive and send buffers, congestion control mechanisms and acknowledge-
ment and sequence number parameters.
The UDP segment structure was originally defined in RFC 768. It has a
header of 8 bytes, fixed in size, which is followed by the payload (Renbo
& Xiong, 2009). As shown in Figure 2.2, the source and destination nodes
are identified by the ports, and when a packet arrives, the payload is trans-
ferred to the process attached to the destination port (Partridge & Pink, 1993).
The port then delivers the embedded segment to the correct application. The
source port field is copied to the incoming segment so that a reply can be sent
via it to the communication origin is required (Akhtar & Siddiqui, 2011). The
UDP length field can be a minimum of 8 bytes (size of the header) or up to
65515 bytes. Header checksum field is an optional field that can be used for
adding extra reliability to the header information, or to the data itself.
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The UDP protocol is used in communication situations where error correc-
tion facilities are not needed, or where there is a need for a single short
message exchange between applications. However, in most communication
channels, reliable data transmission is warranted, where loss of even one
single bit cannot be tolerated (i.e. transactions related to a customer’s bank
details). In such situations, TCP is the favoured protocol, as discussed next.
2.2.6 The TCP Protocol
The TCP protocol, unlike UDP, is a connection-oriented protocol that trans-
fers data between the source and the destination reliably, traversing unre-
liable internetworks. In 1981, the US DoD standardised the protocol, prior
to which there were nine earlier additions of ARPA TCP (R. Hong, 2011)
(Brownlee & Claffy, 2002). The importance of the TCP protocol as the basis
for today’s communication infrastructure is highlighted by the number of
subsequent RFCs written after RFC793 (Postel, 1981c), each suggesting im-
provements and fixes for errors and inconsistencies. The full collection of all
RFCs related to the protocol has been road-mapped in a separate RFC doc-
ument, RFC 4614 (Duke, Braden, Eddy, & Blanton, 2006). The TCP protocol
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is dynamic, and capable of adapting to various properties of the communi-
cations infrastructure, whilst providing a robust environment for data trans-
mission.
There are a number of distinctive TCP features. One of its key features is
in its design, where it has been optimised for accurate and reliable delivery,
rather than a fast and timely delivery. Consequently, TCP data transmission
may be subjected to relatively long transmission delays due to corrections
related to transmission errors (Caceres & Iftode, 1995) (T.-H. Nguyen, Park,
Youn, & Jung, 2013) . Thus, TCP is not suitable for real time data transmis-
sion applications, such as Voice-over IP (VoIP). In addition, all TCP connec-
tions are full duplex, that is, data is transmitted in both directions during
the communications process. TCP is also a point-to-point protocol, implying
that it is a must that there are always only two end points in the communica-
tions process (for this reason the protocol is not suitable for applications that
utilise multicasting and broadcasting mechanisms). The use of sockets plays
an important role when communicating using the TCP protocol. The sockets,
being the end points on the sending and the receiving nodes, are given socket
numbers that can be used by multiple applications for connection purposes.
When establishing sockets, socket numbers for each end node point are cre-
ated, which consist of the IP address and a 16-bit local port number. Flow
and congestion controls are also prevalent in TCP data transmission. Here,
the transfer rates are managed by the receiver to ensure that data is reliably
received by the sender (this is done by the receiver continuously hinting to
the sender how much data it can receive in a given period).
When transmitting using the TCP protocol, each byte in the communication
process has its own sequence number. These 32-bit numbers are carried, to-
gether with the packets, in both directions of the transmission and are used to
ensure that all data in motion arrives at the destination intact (otherwise re-
transmission procedures are initiated) (Safa, Karam, Assi, & Mcheick, 2011).
When it comes to transferring data between the sender and the receiver, TCP
segments are used. These are made up of a fixed 20-byte header, which is
normally followed by some optional parameters. Generally the size of the
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entire segment will be governed by the amount of data it can carry, which is
restricted by two parameters: each segment has to fit into a 65535 byte pay-
load (header inclusive), and must fit in with the size of the Maximum Trans-
mission Unit (MTU). The actual structure of the TCP packet is discussed next.
The TCP packet, as shown is Figure 2.4, has an IP header and the TCP header.
In the TCP header, the first two fields are the port addresses of the source and
destination nodes, similar to that in UDP packet structure (Ahmad, 2001).
These two addresses are the end points of the communication channel to be
established. Following this is the sequence and the acknowledgement num-
bers, where the former is related to data transfer direction and the latter is
used in the reverse direction. Both these numbers relate to the position of
the actual octet in the complete message stream identifying either the posi-
tion of the first octet relative to the start of the data stream, or in the reverse
data stream. Next, the options field is a variable length field that can accom-
modate headers if they are of variable lengths.
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Figure 2.4: TCP packet structure
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The eight 1-bit flags follow next. The congestion window is a flag set by
the sender to indicate that it received a TCP segment and has responded
with a congestion control mechanism (Ramakrishnan, Floyd, & Black, 2001),
while the echo flag plays a dual role, depending on the value of the SYN flag
(Fukushima & Goto, 1999). Both these flags use Explicit Congestion Notifica-
tion (ECN) (Edwan, Guan, Oikonomou, & Phillips, 2010) (Ramakrishnan et
al., 2001) in the process of controlling congestion on a network. The urgent
field value dictates if the urgent pointer is being used, while the acknowl-
edgement field indicates if this field is significant. Data pushed through to
the application, activates the push field, indicating that upon arrival, the new
data does not need to buffer, but can go directly to the application. Fol-
lowing this, the reset flag can be activated if the connection between the
sender and the receiver needs to be reactivated, assisting the SYN bit with
re-establishment of the connection. The final flag (finish) is used to indicate
that no more data needs to be transmitted.
In TCP connections, the amount of data that can be sent before being ac-
knowledged is controlled using a variable-sized sliding window. The win-
dow size field manages this using the window scale option, to allow senders
and receivers to negotiate a window size. Following on, the checksum field
adds extra reliability to both the header and the data, while the optional field
can be used to provide extra facilities if required by the regular header. In
every packet sent is a timestamp value, which is echoed by the receiver. A Se-
lective Acknowledgement (SACK) option allows a receiver to tell the sender
about the range of sequence numbers it has received (Leerujikul & Ahmed,
2001). As described in RFC 2018 and RFC 2883 (Mathis, Mahdavi, Floyd,
& Romanow, 1996), (Floyd, Mahdavi, Mathis, & Podolsky, 2000), SACK en-
ables the sender to determine what data the receiver already has, and what
needs to be retransmitted (W. Xu, Xu, Wu, & Ou, 2011). The actual transfer of
data occurs only after session parameters have been negotiated, as discussed
next.
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TCP Connection Establishment and Release
At the beginning of the TCP data transmission process, a three-way mes-
sage exchange procedure known as a three-way handshake is performed. As
shown in Figure 2.5, the purpose of this procedure is to synchronise the con-
nection ends by negotiating the parameters that will be used during the TCP
session. The handshake mechanism also ensures that both sides are ready
for the transmission process, and that all transmissions will occur only after
a successful session establishment, and that transmission will stop at session
termination.
The actual session is setup when the sending node sends a segment with
a SYN flag, together with a proposed first sequence in the appropriate TCP
header field (syn=X) (Park, Lee, & Kim, 2003). On receiving this information,
the receiver takes a note of what has been sent and then returns a segment
with both the SYN and the ACK flags set with its own assigned values for the
reverse direction, for both the sequence number (syn=Y) and the acknowl-
edgement field (Shakkottai, Srikant, Brownlee, Broido, & Others, 2004). This
is sent together with syn=X+1 and Ack=X+1 to acknowledge that the initial
values from the incoming direction have been received. On the sender re-
ceiving the reciprocated information, it takes note of the Y value and sends
back an acknowledgement with the value Y+1 (H. Zeng, Peng, Li, Xu, & Jin,
2009) (Cardwell, Savage, & Anderson, 2000). After successfully undertaking
the three-way handshake, both sides in the communication channel are con-
figured and can start independently sending data to each other.
At the end of the communication process, the session between the sender
and receiver has to be terminated. This can be initiated by either of the com-
municating nodes by sending a TCP segment with a FIN bit, indicating that
there is no more data left to be transmitted (Shukla & Brecht, 2006). On re-
ceiving the FIN bit, the other end shuts down the communication channel
one way for any new data. However data may continue to flow in the oppo-
site direction. This reverse direction can also be shut down in a similar way
when a FIN packet is sent from the other node to its counterpart. So in total,
four TCP segments have to be sent to terminate a session.
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Figure 2.5: Three way handshake for connection establishment and termina-
tion
Congestion Control
One of the prevalent features of a TCP protocol is its ability to control conges-
tion. During data transmission, when there is more data than what the net-
work can handle, congestion builds up, creating network queues and result-
ing in performance degradation and packet loss (Nagle, 1984). This is essen-
tially due to a source node sending packets into the network unreservedly,
resulting in the receiver reacting to the event (Forouzan, 2003). At this stage
the network layer informs the transport layer of the situation, which reacts
by reducing the transmission rate (Shah, Bilal, Khan, & Rehman, 2007). The
role that TCP plays during data transmission is critical since it is the key pro-
tocol for controlling congestion on crowded networks.
To control congestion on a network, a number of algorithms and proce-
dures have been designed, some inbuilt into the TCP and other related pro-
tocols. RFC 5681 (Allman, Paxson, & Blanton, 2009) outlines TCP’s four
intertwined algorithms: slow start, congestion avoidance, fast retransmit,
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and fast recovery (X. Sun, 2012) (W. Xu et al., 2011). When these four al-
gorithms are used together, they are known collectively as the Additive-
Increase Multiplicative-Decrease (AMID) algorithm. The details of the four
key algorithms used for controlling network congestions are presented here-
with.
The slow start algorithm is used to control the amount of overloaded data
being sent into a network. As discussed by Abed, Ismail, and Jumari (2011),
it was designed primarily to control TCP’s aggressive start-up behaviour,
where the sender quickly flooded the communication channel to a maxi-
mum, which lead to data losses and buffer overflows, resulting in poor net-
work performance.
Here, in the first round-trip time, only one packet is injected into the network
by the sender, and on the destination acknowledging its receipt, two pack-
ets are sent in the next round, and then four, each after being acknowledged
by the receiver. A slow start works well, irrespective of the communication
channel’s bandwidth and associated round trip times (Arpaci & Copeland,
2000). This is possible since its mechanism uses an ACK clock to match the
sender’s transmission rate to that of the communication link. Slow start algo-
rithms can quite aggressively transfer data, resulting in a negative impact on
network performance. This behaviour is controlled using a threshold param-
eter ssthresh, which works together with the size of another variable, known
as cwnd (Khalifa & Trajkovic, 2004) (Abed et al., 2011). During transmission,
when the cwnd value exceeds ssthresh, the sending node instigates a conges-
tion avoidance algorithm.
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Figure 2.6: Representation of the slow start algorithm
The congestion avoidance algorithm is the primary mechanism for control-
ling congestion on the network. It is used by the TCP sender at a stage when
the network tolerance has been exceeded. The algorithm maintains a steady
state of data transmission by injecting new data streams into the network at a
rate equivalent to its ACK’s receiving rate (Arpaci & Copeland, 2000). Based
on the premise that any communication channel can take a little bit more
data, the congestion avoidance algorithm utilises any additional bandwidth
along the path to maintain a stable data stream. When the algorithm is in ac-
tion, the sender is able to dynamically adapt to any incidental changes in the
network path condition. During congestion avoidance, the value of cwnd is
increased by one segment per round trip time, on receiving every new ACK
for data sent (Shah et al., 2007) (Alcock & Nelson, 2011). This incremental
32 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
method allows the sender to gently search for any available bandwidths that
can be utilised whilst remaining fair to any other TCP sessions being used
by the same network link.
When a data segment is lost during a TCP sender’s transmission session,
that segment has to be retransmitted. Fast retransmit is the specific mech-
anism that manages this, and attempts to reduce time that a sender has to
wait before it can retransmit a lost segment (Qureshi, Othman, & Hamid,
2009). The basis on which fast retransmit decides how much to delay trans-
mission prior to sending lost segments again is Duplicate Acknowledgement
(DUPACK) (Karafillis, Fouli, ParandehGheibi, & Medard, 2013). On receiv-
ing three DUPACKs from the receiver (indicating lost segments), the sender
immediately retransmits what appears to be the missing segments, without
waiting for its timeout period (Waghmare, Parab, Nikose, & Bhosale, 2011).
Each time the fast retransmit algorithm is invoked, one single data segment
is sent, and immediately after retransmission is performed, the responsibil-
ity for further transmission is handed to the fast recovery algorithm.
In a situation where there is moderate congestion on a network, the fast re-
covery algorithm enhances data transmission rates, especially for large win-
dows. The algorithm drops the congestion window to 1 each time network
congestion is detected, and alleviates the problem by removing the slow-start
phase (Saini & Dhaka, 2009). This occurs when the TCP sender is in receipt
of DUPACKs, which informs that further packets have been lost (Stevens,
1997) and indicates there is still data flowing between the communicating
nodes and that there is no need to reduce the flow abruptly using the slow
start algorithm. The fast recovery algorithm is a major improvement to TCP
that has been implemented since the release known as TCP Reno. The algo-
rithm is normally used in conjunction with the Fast Retransmit algorithm.
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Figure 2.7: ”Saw Tooth” pattern produced by TCP congestion algorithm
The congestion control mechanism improves network performance of the
TCP protocol. A release known as TCP Tahoe uses the slow-start, congestion
avoidance and fast retransmit algorithms together to maximise data trans-
fer (Sikdar, Kalyanaraman, & Vastola, 2003). Tahoe works on the principle
of packet conservation, whereby it does not need to inject any further pack-
ets into the data stream if it is running at the maximum available bandwidth.
TCP Reno works on the same basic principles of Tahoe, however the way lost
packets are detected is more sophisticated, ensuring that the data pipeline is
not emptied each time packet loss occurs due to transmission (Waghmare et
al., 2011)(Sharma & Tyagi, 2013). Later it was found that a TCP sender often
had to wait for the timer to expire in order to recover from multiple packet
loss - this leads to unnecessary delays, and instigated the release of SACK,
which corrects this behaviour (Cong & Miki, 2000). However, at that time,
many TCP hosts were not supporting its use, which led to the release of a
modified Reno. TCP New-Reno (the successor of TCP Reno) has even better
packet loss capability since it has the ability to detect multiple packet losses
(Mathis et al., 1996). Thus in relation to TCP modifications, both TCP Reno
with SACK and TCP-New Reno are plausible solutions for tackling the same
congestion control problem.
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The TCP header has several pieces of information that are vital to estab-
lishment and use of a communications channel. In relation to TCP perfor-
mance issues, there are a few key fields, discussed here. At the initialisation
of the connection, the maximum-receive-segment-size option is used to inform
the destination of the maximum segment size (Postel, 1983) (Borman, 2012).
This option sets the sizes of both the maximum receive segment size, and
the size of the TCP window. So, this parameter will enable segments to pass
across without the need for fragmentation, thus enhancing network perfor-
mance. The window-scale option in the TCP header also plays a critical part in
enhancing network performance, as it addresses the issue of maximum win-
dow size, adjusting it as per transmission requirements (Jacobson, Braden, &
Borman, 1992). It allows the TCP sender to effectively change the window
size so that more data can be held in flight depending on the network band-
width and network delay parameters. These two parameters need to be ne-
gotiated at the start of the actual TCP session so that the entire session has the
largest possible packet size (avoiding fragmentation) and so that the window
size suits the bandwidth/delay attributes of the communication pathway.
 
TCP Algorithm Year Key feature(s) 
TCP Tahoe 1988 Slow-start, collision avoidance, fast retransmit algorithms 
TCP Reno 1993 Enhanced collision avoidance, fast recovery algorithm 
TCP SACK 1996 Selective retransmission 
TCP New Reno 2004 For TCP connections not able to use SACK. 
 
Table 2.2: Different TCP algorithms
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2.2.7 IP Header
In data transmission, to make a segment into a packet, the UDP, or the TCP
header, is preceded by the IP header. The IP header prefixes information re-
lated to the IP version, source/destination IP addresses and other similar in-
formation that assist with finding the path from the source to the destination
node. There are two versions of IP (and subsequently IP headers) currently
being used: version 4 and version 6. Figure 2.8 provides an overview of their
structure.
The IPv4 packet header is 20 bytes long and has 14 fields, of which one is
optional. The first field (4 bits in length) has a value of 4, indicating the ver-
sion of the header (Raicu & Zeadally, 2003) (Ahmad, 2001). The next field is
the Internet header field (4 bits), which indicates the length of the IP header
itself in 4-byte words, minimum value being 5, indicating a length of 20 bytes.
The Type of Service (ToS) field is 8 bits long and is generally used in sim-
ple implementations of Quality of Service (QoS) (Almquist, 1992), providing
the ability to effectively manage bandwidth and similar attributes. The to-
tal length field states the size of the total packet (in bytes), inclusive of the
packet header. Since only 16 bits are available for this, the maximum value
for this field is 65535, while the smallest is 20. The identification field in-
formation assists with reassembling a fragmented packet. Since each orig-
inal packet has a unique identification value, which is the same for each
fragment of the original, reassembly based on this information is possible.
To assist with fragmented packet reassembly, the next three bits are various
flags used in the process. Time To Live (TTL) is a value that governs when
a packet should be dropped from the transmission pathway by counting the
number of hops that a particular packet has taken, decrementing each step
by one. Next is the 8 bit protocol field identifying the header that follows the
IP header. The header checksum field value is used in calculations related to
errors and identification of changes to the packet. The next two fields con-
tain the source and the destination 32 bit addresses. These addresses may be
changed if either of the nodes is operating in an environment where the Net-
work Address Translation (NAT) is in use. The final field in the IP version 4
header is the options field - this is seldom used and can contain options that
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Figure 2.8: Structure of an IPv4 and IPv6 header
is related to security, routes, and time stamps.
The IPv6 header is a less complex version of its predecessor. There are a
number of fields that have been eliminated, while some have been moved to
the extension header (like the fragmentation and checksum fields), however
the entire IPv6 header is of 40 bytes fixed length (Raicu & Zeadally, 2003)
(Deering & Hinden, 1998). The increased header size is mainly due to the
move away from 32 bit to 128 bit addressing (Halsall, 1996). This four fold
increase in address size and accounting for every bit of IPv6 header undoubt-
edly has increased its size. Overall, the IPv6 header is comparatively simple,
and is, in theory, much more efficient than its counterpart.
In the main, the fields in the IPv6 header replicate some of the functions
of the IPv4 header (with some modifications). The version field, again, is
4 bits long and still specifies a value indicating IPv6 is being used (actual
value:0110). The traffic class (8 bits) field is similar to the IPv4 service field
and is capable of indicating traffic based on Differentiated Service Code Point
(DSCP) (Nichols, Blake, Baker, & Black, 1998). Information in this field is also
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used for congestion control purposes. Next is the flow label, 20 bit long field
that allows tracking of specific traffic at the network layer of the OSI. Payload
length indicates the length of the data portion, while next header indicates
the next field that will follow, similar to IPv4 operation. Hop limit is similar
to the TTL field in IPv4, where the maximum allowable number of hops for
a particular packet are indicated. Finally, source and destination addresses
(in 128 bit form) are stated.
2.2.8 Comparison of IPv4 and IPv6
IPv6 is the evolutionary successor of version 4 and has been designed to ad-
dress some of the major shortcomings of IPv4 network environments. Some
of these key features and how they alleviate IPv4 issues are discussed here-
with.
Extended Address Space
With its hexadecimal address structure, IPv6 has approximately 7.9x1028 times
more unique addresses than IPv4. The exponential growth of the Internet
has brought a new generation of products that are based on an embedded
IP reference model. This has rapidly depleted IP addresses, thus increasing
IPv6 address space is necessary for providing Internet gateway to products
like mobile platforms, hand-held devices, and similar.
In the IPv4 address space, use of Internet non-routable private IP addresses
has been prevalent. These IP addresses, together with NAT and Port Address
Translation (PAT), enable networks to connect to the Internet with the aid of
minimal public IP addresses (Zhou, van Renesse, & Marsh, 2002). However,
this type of access to the Internet has limitations. With IPv6, total end-to-
end connectivity from source to destination is possible, thus eliminating the
use of NAT and PAT type network translation technologies as a solution to
extend the address space.
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Efficient Routing
Increased address space in IPv6 allows organisations and Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) to advertise aggregated IP address prefixes. This is possible,
as with increased addresses, organisations need to utilise only one prefix
and as such they need to advertise just that. This leads to the creation of a
hierarchical network and route aggregation. Subsequently, entries in routing
tables on the Internets backbone routers dramatically shrink in size, resulting
in increased routing efficiency.
Autoconfiguration
IPv6 has inbuilt autoconfiguration capabilities. On large network sites, this
simplifies network node configuration by automating the process. This is
possible since stateless host automatic configuration is embedded in the new
version and this simplifies the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
configuration and administration (Narten, 1999). DHCPv6 is both a stateful
and a stateless protocol and in the latter form, does not need a DHCP server
on the network, since there is no state to maintain. As a network node boots
up, a local-link address is automatically created for each IPv6 enabled inter-
face (Mayer, Chan, Grillo, & Thomas, 2007). This occurs because the nodes
are using Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) (Thomson, Narten,
& Jinmei, 2007) , which is a component of the Network Discovery Proto-
col (NDP) (Narten, Nordmark, Simpson, & Soliman, 2007) (Rafiee & Meinel,
2013a). Autoconfiguration simplifies network administration since devices
that are plug and play capable can seamlessly integrate into any network
(Rafiee & Meinel, 2013b). Further, should a need to change IP addresses net-
work wide arise, it can be achieved effortlessly.
Neighbor Discovery
Network nodes use NDP to determine the link-layer addresses for neigh-
bours that reside on attached links, as specified in Narten et al. (2007). Us-
ing ICMP and solicited-node multicast addresses (Hinden & Deering, 2006)
a node can determine its neighbours on the local network (the local link)
(Narten, 1999). This IPv6 embedded technology, which has replaced IPv4s
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ARP, also enables nodes to find neighbouring routers that can be utilised
to forward traffic to some other networks (Xiaorong, Jun, & Shizhun, 2013)
(Narten, 1999). The node keeps track of other active nodes (including routers)
on the network, and searches for alternative routes should a need arise.
Improved Security
There are a number of security advancements/benefits in IPv6 that are fun-
damentally non-existent in the older version. One of the first actions of most
network attackers is to scan ports as a reconnaissance technique to gather
as much information as possible about a victim network. With IPv4, this
was easily achieved due to the availability of only a limited number of IP
addresses (some studies estimate that the entire IPv4 based Internet can be
scanned in approximately 10 hours). However, with IPv6, this time frame
is dramatically increased, thus negating security risks using port scanning
as the initial step. The use of Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
also contributes to better security in IPv6. Here, a public signature key is
bound to an IPv6 address allowing a user to provide a proof of ownership
when using a specific IPv6 address (Alsadeh, Rafiee, & Meinel, 2012) (Rafiee
& Meinel, 2013a) (Aura, 2005). This provides protection from IP spoofing
and facilitates messages to be signed using the sender’s private key (Shen,
Lee, Sun, & Jiang, 2011). IP Security (IPSec) is a mechanism to secure data
that is in motion between parts of a network, and its usage on IPv6 based net-
works is encouraged (Kent & Seo, 2005). Initially, IPSec usage with IPv6 was
mandatory (Kent & Atkinson, 1998) (Goode, 1998), however as from Decem-
ber 2011, the recommendation of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
has changed this from mandatory to recommended(Jankiewicz, Loughney, &
Narten, 2011). Nonetheless, IPSec improves security by providing authentic-
ity, integrity, confidentiality and access control to each IP packet traversing a
network. Finally, using SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) (Arkko, Kempf,
Zill, & Nikander, 2005) (Rafiee & Meinel, 2013a), as opposed to just NDP,
boosts security.
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2.2.9 Exhaustion of IPv4 addresses
IPv4 addresses have already been depleted. In February 2011, the last batch
of remaining IPv4 addresses was allocated by the Internet Corporation of
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to the five Regional Internet Reg-
istries (RIRs) (Goth, 2012). This did not mean that there were no more IPv4
addresses after that date, or an absolute end to version 4, however it did
mark a definitive point in time signalling the scarcity of IPv4 addresses. It
was an indication that there was an urgent need to plan and implement
strategies (that is, change over to IPv6) to continue business as usual, without
expecting to receive additional IPv4 addresses (Taggart & Rudolph, 2009).
Table 2.3: IPv4 address exhaustion statistics
Source: http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html
In spite of the near exhaustion IPv4 addresses, the uptake of IPv6 has been
slow (see Figure 2.9). An estimation of IPv6 usage globally has been con-
ducted by a number of organisations and researchers (Asia Pacific Network
Information Centre (APNIC), Cisco, Google etc.) (Courtney, 2012). In the
main, these estimates are based on monitoring aspects of traffic to websites
that are hosted on IPv6 networks, or have some IPv6 feature enabled. The
search engine, Google, estimates approximately 4.5% of traffic to its site (as of
4th quarter, 2014) is from IPv6 network - this is based on DNS AAAA records.
While most countries, in all regions of the world, are still early adopters of
IPv6 (usage between 0 and 1%), Belgium and Germany are the leaders, with
adoption rates of approximately 30% and 12% respectively.
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Figure 2.9: IPv6 address usage percentage per year
Source: https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html
2.2.10 IP Addressing
IPv4 addresses are 32 bits in size, grouped in four octets, each 8 bit long, and
separated by dots, and normally written in dotted decimal notation. Each
bit in the octet has a binary weighting, with the minimum being 0 and max-
imum being 255. In this representation, there are five classes (A,B,C,D,E), of
which the first three are for commercial use (Rooney, 2011) (Postel, 1981b).
As indicated in Table 2.4, classes D and E are for multicasting and experi-
mental purposes respectively. The actual class of the address is determined
by the value of the first octet, and associated with each class is a default
subnet mask. In each class there are public and private IP addresses. Net-
work nodes that are configured with public IP addresses are Internet capable,
while private IP addresses cannot be routed via Internet routers.
Class 1st Octet Leading Bit 
Default 
Subnets 
Private Addresses 
Number of 
Networks 
Number of 
Hosts per 
Network 
Class A 1 – 127 0 255.0.0.0 10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255 126 2563 - 2 
Class B 128 – 191 10 255.255.0.0 172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255 16,384 2562 – 2 
Class C 192 – 223 110 255.255.255.0 192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255 2,097,152 254 
Class D 224 – 239 1110 Multicast  N/A N/A 
Class E 240 - 255 1111 Experimental and Research N/A N/A 
 
Table 2.4: IPv4 classes and its range of addresses
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There are a limited number of networks and hosts in each class of network.
By default, class A has the least number of networks, while class C has
the most, but class A has the most number of hosts while class C has the
least. Using subnetting (classful and classless), a network can be divided
into smaller networks (or subnets). This is possible since subnetting allows
bits normally used by the host field to be designated for the network field.
In situations where there is a need for several networks to be combined into
a lesser number of networks, that is, to reduce the number of network IDs,
supernetting can be implemented.
IPv6 uses 128 bit addressing, requiring eight 16 bit hexadecimal colon-delimited
blocks. These addresses are not only longer, but they also incorporate letters
in addition to numbers. IPv4 addresses can be divided into unicast, broad-
cast, or multicast, however, IPv6 classes are unicast, multicast, and anycast.
Traditional IPv4 broadcast has been replaced with the use of multicast ad-
dressing. In each of the three mentioned groupings, the 128 bit addresses
are logically divided, and rules have been established for associating the bit
groups with special addressing features.
IPv6  
Notation 
Binary Prefix 
Fraction of 
Address Space 
Allocation 
::1/128 00… 1 (128 bits) 1/8 Special Unicast (Loopback) 
2000::/3 001 1/8 Global Unicast and Anycast 
FC00::/7 1111 110 1/128 Unique Unicast and Anycast 
FE80::/10 1111 1110 10 1/1024 Link Local Unicast 
 
Table 2.5: IPv6 unicast and anycast addresses
The unicast address in IPv6 is similar to that in IPv4, where it is used for iden-
tifying a single interface. In this category there are four types of addresses:
global, link local, unique local and special(see Table 2.5). Global unicast ad-
dresses are publicly routable and similar to IPv4 public addresses. The link
local addresses are private, non-routable, and confined to a single network
segment, so these can be utilised in setting up a small Local Area Network
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(LAN) seamlessly. Unique local addresses are also meant for private ad-
dressing, but being unique allows multiple subnetted network segments to
be joined without causing address conflicts. Special addresses, the fourth
unicast type, are basically loopback addresses.
The equivalent of IPv4 broadcast addresses in IPv6 is multicast. With multi-
casting, any data sent to the multicast address is delivered to every interface
in that particular group. The primary difference between this and traditional
broadcast is that with the latter, data is sent to every single host on a partic-
ular segment, but with multicast only hosts that are part of a particular mul-
ticast group will be the recipients. Also IPv6 multicast is routable, however,
routers that have the capability to forward multicast on a specific network
have to be members of the multicast group. With anycast (Hartman, 2006)
a single address is assigned to a number of network hosts, but the ultimate
destination is the first available node in that particular set. In the IPv6 envi-
ronment, this is particularly useful where there are Network Load Balancing
(NLB), or an automatic fail-over implementation.
IPv6  Notation Binary Prefix 
Fraction of 
Address Space 
Allocation 
::FFFF/96 
00… 1111 1111 1111 
1111 
1/8 
Prefix for embedding 
IPv4 Addresses 
2001:0000::/32 
0010 0000 0000 0001 
0000 0000 0000 0000 
1/8 Teredo 
2001:0DB8::/32 
0010 0000 0000 0001 
0000 1101 1011 1000 
1/8 Nonroutable Addresses 
2002::/16 0010 0000 0000 0010 1/8 6to4 
3FFE::/16 0011 1111 1111 1110 1/8 6Bone 
FF00::/8 1111 1111 1/256 Multicast 
 
Table 2.6: IPv6 global and multicast addresses
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IPv6 Address Structure
The structure of the IPv6 address is very different to IPv4. IPv6 addresses
are made up of three fields (Hinden & Deering, 2003). First is the global
routing prefix; information in this field is used by network routers to send
packets to local routers that service the networks specified in the global pre-
fix of the version 6 addresses. The subnet ID field indicates subnets within
the organisation and the interface ID designates the address of the source, or
the intended recipients interface address. There is also the concept of IPv4-
mapped IPv6 addresses. While these addresses are not routable on the Inter-
net, they are useful when implementing IPv4-IPv6 translation mechanisms
(discussed in Chapter 4). Use of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address is discour-
aged within an IPv6 packet on a communications link. The actual format of
the address is that the 32 bit IPv4 address is prefixed with 80 zeros and 16
one bits.
IPv6 Address form Abbreviation rule 
2001:0DB8:5F62:AB41:0000:0000:0000:0801 Original Format 
2001:DB8:5F62:AB41:0:0:0:801 
Leading zeros eliminated 
within nibbles. 
2001:DB8:5F62:AB41::801 
Double colon used to represent 
one or more consecutive sets of 
zero nibbles. 
 
Table 2.7: IPv6 standards for abbreviating zeros
2.2.11 TCP/UDP Related Research
A number of fundamental topics important to this thesis have been pre-
sented in this chapter and significant works of various authors have been
highlighted. Since the focus of this thesis is on the network performance of
the two protocols in selected network scenarios, research that emphasises
performance issues related to the topic are mentioned herewith. However,
network performance research pertaining to the three areas in which the two
protocols have been performance evaluated will be mentioned in appropri-
ate chapters later in this thesis.
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There are numerous researches related to the TCP and UDP protocols. Their
performance on various links is of interest: Benko, Malicsko, and Veres (2004),
Meyer (1999), Othman, Zakaria, and Ab Hamid (2007), and Wennstrom, Brun-
strom, and Rendon (2004) have evaluated it over a General Packet Radio Ser-
vice (GPRS) network, while Tsiknas and Stamatelos (2012), Omprakash and
Sabitha (2011), Martin, Li, Pressly, and Westall (2010), and D. Kim, Cai, Na,
and Choi (2008) have researched them in the context of the Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineer’s (IEEE) 802.16 Worldwide Interoperability
for Microwave Access (WiMax) technology. These researches have mainly fo-
cused on either measuring performance of the protocols on the specific link,
or on suggesting some improvement to the actual protocol that enhances
transmission attributes. Performance evaluation of various TCP variants has
also been undertaken by many. Yue, Zhang, Ren, Li, and Zhong (2012), and
Alrshah and Othman (2013) evaluated transport layer protocols on long dis-
tance links and high bandwidth connections, and established that the proto-
col is suited on such connections, and that the performance is acceptable.
Improving the performance of the protocols, especially TCP over multipath,
has also been of interest. Multipath is an extension of the actual TCP proto-
col, where multiple flows can be derived from a single TCP session. Research
in this area has mainly been in the application of this technique to differ-
ent scenarios especially live streaming of data ((Bui & Zhu, 2007), (Jurca &
Frossard, 2007), (Javed, Suchara, He, & Rexford, 2009), (D. Lee, Carpenter,
& Brownlee, 2010)) and in wireless implementations ((X. Chen, Zhai, Wang,
& Fang, 2004), (A. Singh, Xiang, Konsgen, & Goerg, 2013), (Lam, Chapin, &
Chan, 2011)). To improve multipath performance in such scenarios, reduc-
ing high bit error or drop rate centric improvements to existing algorithms,
or proposing new ones, is evident.
TCP protocol variances and their associated differences is of interest to a lot
of researchers. Early research has mainly focused on TCP Vegas, with em-
phasis on either comparing attributes of it with other next generation vari-
ants (mainly TCP Reno), or analysing its network performance on a partic-
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ular physical link type. Hengartner, Bolliger, and Gross (2000) specifically
compared Vegas with Reno, while S. Xu, Saadawi, and Lee (2000), S. Xu and
Saadawi (2001), Tandjaoui and Badache (2004) and Charalambous, Frost, and
Evans (1999) compared multiple TCP variances with TCP Vegas. Most au-
thors primarily found that a newer, improved TCP gives better performance
than the predecessor, some stating improvements by almost 30%. In recent
times, TCP variations in different scenarios, for example, with the Mobile
Ad hoc Network (MANET) Sharma and Tyagi (2013), with QoS Varshini
and Chaurasia (2010) and with mobile adhoc Bhanumathi and Dhanasekaran
(2010), Ahmed, Zaidi, and Ahmed (2004) have been evaluated. Testing new
releases of TCP performance on satellite links has also been of interest in
research: Obata, Tamehiro, and Ishida (2011),Luglio, Sanadidi, Gerla, and
Stepanek (2004) and F. Peng, Cardona, Shafiee, and Leung (2012) have anal-
ysed TCP Reno’s performance on satellite communication links while Jacob,
Srijith, Duo, and Ananda (2002) did the same with SACK.
Research in the area of congestion control techniques is also evident in liter-
ature. While TCP congestion research is present ((Kotsiolis, Antonopoulos,
& Koubias, 2010), (Nossier, 2004), (X. Sun, 2012)), recently, research in imple-
menting UDP congestion control techniques has become a hotspot ((Chowdhury,
Lahiry, & Hasan, 2009), (Sharma & Tyagi, 2013), (Shekhar & Ramanatha,
2010) and (Ullah & Khan, 2008)). In relation to UDP, end-to-end congestion
control semantics of TCP techniques are being applied to the protocol, with
the aim of improving overall reliability and throughput.
Chapter 3
Methodology
Measuring network performance has been an area of extensive research since
the days of early networking. The types of networks, and their associated in-
tricacies, have drastically changed over the years. Initially mainly research
in the context of wired networks was predominant, then came wireless, and
nowadays there is a focus on not just traditional networking, but also on con-
temporary technologies like enterprise networks, virtualisation and cloud
computing. As shown in the previous chapter, researchers are also keen to
experiment with performance issues at a more detailed level, evident by ex-
tensive research on the TCP protocol itself.
In relation to measuring network performance, there are a few approaches
that can be taken. Like the networks themselves, the techniques used to
evaluate network performance have also evolved over the years. The focus
of this chapter is to highlight the techniques used by researchers in this re-
search area. It will then outline the methodology employed in this thesis,
leading onto detailing the test scenarios and the data collection process.
3.1 Testing Networks in Realistic Conditions
There are a number of methodologies commonly employed to test networks
under varied conditions for entities like robustness, reliability, and perfor-
mance. Each of the techniques has its own strengths and weaknesses, and
they all aim to somehow represent the complexities of modern networks so
that such systems can be analysed. An alternative to using these techniques
is to perform tests on real networks, but this is scarcely done due to high costs
and availability issues (Krop, Bredel, Hollick, & Steinmetz, 2007). Repeating
exact conditions on real networks is a tall order, thus in situations where ex-
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act experiments have to be repeatedly run, real networks may not be ideal
(Judd & Steenkiste, 2005). Simulation, emulation and test-bed techniques are
predominantly used for testing networks.
3.1.1 Simulation
Simulation techniques have always been the platform of choice for perform-
ing tests on various aspects of networks. They strive to accurately model and
predict behaviour of real network environments in different scenarios. Sim-
ulation suites tend to offer an excellent set of features whilst providing a re-
alistic representation of network components. This method of studying net-
works facilitates researchers to evaluate aspects of the infrastructure in a con-
trolled manner, allowing them to seamlessly create different network topolo-
gies, incorporate operating system behaviours, send customised traffic pat-
terns, change network scenarios and to collect data for analysis. Study using
simulation solves problems related to repeatability, configurability, manage-
ability, and modifiability (Judd & Steenkiste, 2005). Thus, simulators provide
a rich environment yielding a number of benefits to researchers, like valida-
tion of network components, a platform to test new developments, and an
opportunity to study a large network infrastructure.
A number of simulators are currently prevalent in the network performance
research arena. NS-2/3 (Altman & Jimnez, 2012), OPNET (X. Chang, 1999),
MATLAB (Ali, Abdulmaowjod, & Mohammed, 2010), J-SIM Insane (Sobeih
et al., 2005), OMNeT++ (Wang, Liu, & Hu, 2005), GloMoSim (Ahvar & Fathy,
2007) and JiST/SWANS (Tippanagoudar, Mahgoub, & Badi, 2007) are some
of the open source suites that can simulate discrete events on networks. NS-
2 is commonly used for wired/wireless simulations, but its new release also
supports networks like MANET. It has a C++ core engine and is resource
hungry and platform dependent. NS-3, the successor of NS-2, addresses
some of the drawbacks of NS-2, however the new version is still platform
dependant and yet to realise its full potential. OpenSim is the other very
commonly used simulator that allows a wide range of network protocols
to be tested on networks. Commercial platforms, like OPNET, offer excel-
lent GUI and help facilities, however, it comes at a huge cost (Imran, Said,
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& Hasbullah, 2010). GLoMoSim is an example of a MANET simulator ca-
pable of multiplexing multiple simulated nodes. MATLAB suits network
protocol development and analysis and has good visualisation capabilities.
JiST/SWANS is a Java Virtual Machine based simulator which allows easy
development of simulation models based on network entity concepts. Barr,
Haas, and Van Renesse (2004) have shown that JiST/SWANS can outperform
its counterparts, however of them all, this is the least popular simulator.
Network simulators have limitations. Some see simulators as the artificial
offering of a synthetic environment (Go¨ktu¨rk, 2005) Simulations are gener-
alised representations which lack details present in real systems (Heidemann
et al., 2001), so results obtained from research using this may be skewed due
to a high level of abstraction. Therefore, simulation based studies are gen-
erally used for qualitative purposes only. There are issues related to their
accuracy and computational loading, which have led researchers to explore
other methodologies that can be used to represent real network situations.
 
Figure 3.1: Sample diagram of simulation environment using Cisco packet
tracer
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3.1.2 Emulation
Emulation is a hybrid technique that combines hardware devices with some
software whereby part of the network is implemented on hardware and the
rest are simulated. Emulation based research has a network scenario repre-
sented by a combination of one or more surrogate systems (Go¨ktu¨rk, 2007)
allowing one to conduct experiments using some real components and com-
bining them with simulations. Emulation retains advantages offered by sim-
ulation (repeatability, manageability, etc) in addition to having the advantage
of mitigating difficulties associated with realism.The emulation environment
offers researchers the advantage of observing a real-world network scenario
working in a controlled environment with a high degree of reproducibility.
Emulation techniques have numerous uses. They highly suit training en-
vironments such as medical training for surgeons, pilot training in avion-
ics, or nuclear power plant personnel training (Go¨ktu¨rk, 2007). In network
performance research, they provide a unique set of characteristics with re-
spect to the degree of abstraction, accuracy, and scalability. NS-2/3 can be
used for emulating network situations since they have an emulation inter-
face which allows network traffic to pass between real-world networks and
a simulated environment (Breslau et al., 2000). This provides a powerful
platform to analyse network behaviour in end-to-end systems. MobiNet is
a sophisticated environment that emulates a MANET, however, the setup is
complicated and there are scalability issues (Krop et al., 2007). NEMAN is
an emulator that can manage multiple network devices, where each device
represents a virtual node in the emulation. NEMAN offers the added advan-
tage of incorporating real software within the emulation. When emulators
are used in performance analysis studies, they are highly prone to what is
known as monitoring overhead problem (Go¨ktu¨rk, 2007) - this is where the
hardware and software probes being utilised have an effect on the actual
network being emulated.
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3.1.3 Test-bed Networks
Simulation and emulation attempts to represent a real world network sce-
nario, but the result is the creation of a system that reduces realism. Assump-
tions made regarding parameters of the actual network when setting up a
simulation, or an emulation, over simplifies the network traffic experiences
on a real physical network. The alternative is to research network perfor-
mance on real-world networks, however, there are some serious issues in do-
ing this. In addition to accessibility issues, there are significant repeatability
and control issues. This is mainly due to the behaviour at the physical layer
being tightly coupled with the physical environment and conditions under
which the actual research is being conducted (Judd & Steenkiste, 2005). Also,
with simulations and emulations, assumptions and simplifications may lead
to inaccurate final results(Imran et al., 2010). To solve these problems, phys-
ical test-beds strive to bridge the gap between simulation and real deploy-
ment. Test-beds are hardware based, so depending on their size and sophis-
tication, can be a pricey alternative to software environment based testing.
A high degree of configuration may also be required during the setup phase
and there will be a need to continuously monitor and maintain the environ-
ment during its usage phase. Depending on its size, provisions for remote
monitoring may also be necessary.
In relation to network performance, there are a number of large scale test-
beds developed specifically for this purpose. They provide environments
that can be accessed remotely to run and analyse network scenarios; some
common ones are MoteLab (Werner-Allen, Swieskowski, & Welsh, 2005),
SensorScope (Barrenetxea et al., 2008), Emulab (Johnson et al., 2006), Signet-
Lab (Crepaldi et al., 2007), GNOMES (Welsh, Fish, & Frantz, 2003) and OR-
BIT (Raychaudhuri et al., 2005). Use of some of these comes at a cost, while
some (like Emulab) are publicly available for free.
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of different experimentation approaches
3.2 Experimental Test-bed Architecture
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the network performance of TCP
and UDP traffic types in different network scenarios. These protocols were
originally designed for end-to-end data transportation using simple proto-
cols on fixed cables, on networks purely dedicated for this purpose. Nowa-
days the situation is different, where networks are more complex due to en-
tities like different IP versions and traffic types, diversification in physical
communications media with the dominance of wireless technology, and in-
troduction of additional protocols related to data security. As a result of these
added complexities (and more), it is necessary to gain accurate insights into
the performance of the two commonly used protocols in an heterogeneous
environment, as data traverses end-to-end during a communication process.
To undertake this study, the approach taken in this thesis was to utilise test-
beds.
The use of a test-bed in network performance evaluations is widely evident
in research. Actual test-bed centric network performance research will be de-
tailed in subsequent chapters, contextualised to network scenarios in which
TCP and UDP have been performance analysed. Here, however, is a sam-
ple of researches that have employed a methodology similar to that in this
thesis. Taank (2008) evaluated end-to-end behaviour of the TCP protocol on
a wired-to-wireless network. In this, a test-bed was employed, and evalua-
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tions of TCP senders over IEEE802.11 Wireless LANs (WLANs) were carried
out. Network performance of various operating systems is also a common
theme in test-bed based research. Go¨ktu¨rk (2007) has evaluated the network
performance of various operating systems, with the aim to compare the be-
haviour of one operating system with another. Test-beds with routers config-
ured with other networking devices representing real-world scenarios have
also been completed by Michalski (2012).
In the above mentioned researches, the idea was to evaluate network per-
formance end-to-end without delving into the details of the performance of
individual network components in the path of data transmission. Whilst
there are numerous researches that do evaluate network behaviour at a fine-
grained, component level, (most concentrate on a selected few attributes in
the communications pathway).
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the performance of the selected proto-
col holistically, in the context of the environment that it is implemented in.
In summary then, this thesis explores end-to-end performance issues when
data is transmitted using TCP or UDP via three different scenarios on a net-
work implemented on an in-house test-bed. This way, the data gathered
from the analysis is closer to performing a real-world test, rather than what
would be attained from other traditional methodologies.
3.2.1 Network Schematic
The schematic of the test-beds used in this thesis is shown in Figure 3.3. Two
network nodes, shown at the far ends of the diagram, act as senders and re-
ceivers of the TCP or UDP traffic that traverses the actual network housed in
the middle block. The aim is to retain this configuration of sender connected
to a middle block, with the receiver at the other end, whilst only making
changes in the middle block. Changes made in the middle block will be to
the network components and configurations, so that the different network
scenarios in which the two protocols are being tested can be implemented
on the test-bed. The intricate details of the network in the block will be re-
vealed in the subsequent three chapters of this thesis, however details of the
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Figure 3.3: Test-bed schematic
sending and receiving nodes will be discussed here. The purpose of the two
end nodes in the test-bed is to act as the sender and receiver of different types
of data traversing the test network.
They will also be utilised in measuring performance related attributes of the
network under test. In such a test, the aim is to flood the transmission path
with data and to measure network performance related metrics. This can
be conveniently done by employing one of a number of off-the-shelve traffic
generation software.
3.2.2 Traffic Generation Software
Traffic generation software are widely used on test-beds for network perfor-
mance evaluations. Traffic generation tools have been evaluated for func-
tionality, purpose and features in a number of similar studies (Narayan, n.d;
Srivastava et al., 2014a,2014b). The tools were implemented on a test-bed
and each tested under various conditions to ascertain their key differentia-
tors, some of the results obtained are presented in Table 3.1. Here it is seen
that although most of the tools basically perform the same task, facilitating
network performance testing by flooding various data types on networks
and then measuring metrics, their features and capabilities are highly var-
ied. At one end of the spectrum some tools are fully graphical and have an
interactive GUI, while others use CLI with a different set of features.
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Features D-ITG Netperf Iperf PRTG Tamosoft Net Stress 
Calasoft 
Capsa 
IP Traffic Test 
and Measure 
Evaluated 
Version 
2.8.1 2.6.0 2.0.5-2 13.4.6 1.0 2.0.9686 7.7.2 2.6.9 
Latest Released 
Date 
07/2013 06/2012 07/2010 10/2013 07/2013 01/2011 11/2013 04\2011 
Supported 
Platform 
Linux, 
Windows 
Windows, 
Linux 
  Windows, 
Linux 
Windows 
Windows, 
Linux 
Windows Windows Windows 
Network 
Protocol 
IPv4, IPv6 IPv4, IPv6 IPv4, IPv6 IPv4, IPv6 IPv4, IPv6 IPv4, IPv6 IPv4, IPv6 IPv4 , IPv6 
Transport 
Protocol 
TCP, UDP TCP, UDP TCP, UDP TCP, UDP TCP, UDP TCP, UDP TCP, UDP 
TCP,UDP, 
ICMP 
User Interface CLI, GUI CLI CLI GUI GUI GUI GUI GUI 
 
Open Source 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Cost Free Free Free 
US $2700/-
year 
Free Free 
US $995/- 
year 
Trial Version 
Reported 
Metrics 
Throughput, 
Jitter and 
Delay 
Throughput Throughput Throughput 
Throughput, 
Loss or RTT 
Throughput -- 
Throughput, 
Delay 
Measurement 
Metric 
Per hop 
Capacity 
Achievable 
TCP 
Throughput 
Achievable 
TCP 
Throughput 
End-to-End 
Capacity 
End-to-End 
Capacity 
Per-hop 
Capacity 
End-to-
End 
Capacity 
Per hop Capacity 
Sync Clock Yes No No No No No No Yes (optional) 
Table 3.1: Comparison of various network traffic generation tools
3.2.3 Traffic Generator
The primary traffic generation tool used in this research is D-ITG. In addi-
tion to generating popular TCP/UDP traffic, D-ITG emulates Telnet, VoIP
(three different CODECS), DNS and various games traffic (Botta, Dainott, &
Pescape`, 2012) . Traffic generated with this tool supports probability dis-
tributions such as Pareto, Exponential, Poisson and Gamma distributions
(Kolahi, Narayan, Nguyen, & Sunarto, 2011). D-ITG, on generating network
traffic, is able to measure common performance metrics and output the re-
sults to a coded file. This can ultimately be decoded into a text file, results
from which can be extracted into a spreadsheet for data analysis purposes.
D-ITG has the facility to incorporate a log server during network tests. This
server is optional, however, its use really simplifies file management. The D-
ITG Log server, as shown in 3.4, runs on a different host than the sender and
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receiver, and receives and stores log information from multiple senders and
receivers (Avallone, Guadagno, Emma, Pescape, & Ventre, 2004). The sender
component of D-ITG can operate in three different modes (single flow, mul-
tiple flow or in daemon), and in all tests in this thesis, single flow mode
was preferred. The receiver works concurrently with the sender, which ulti-
mately listens and receives data flow that traverses the network under test.
A manager node can also be implemented that can serve as a control station
for all tests - this was not used in any of the test-bed analyses in this thesis as
it was not deemed necessary to do so. Instead, the sender and receiver nodes
were manually handled. D-ITG is a widely used network traffic generation
tool used in research and engineering applications. It is a simple-to-use CLI
application that seamlessly tests a network for various traffic types and out-
put results as log files. Its developers (Botta et al., 2012) have listed approx-
imately 150 research and engineering undertakings that it has been utilised
in.
3.3 Performance Metrics
There are a number of parameters that can be measured on a network to eval-
uate its network performance. Irrespective of the type of setup they are mea-
sured on (simulation, emulation, or a test-bed), these measurements, known
as performance metrics, give quantifiable values that allows one to gauge a
particular network (Bradner & McQuaid, 1999). Some common performance
metrics are discussed herewith.
Bandwidth and Throughput: Bandwidth refers to a channel capacity in a
network communication pathway. Measured in Megabits/second, it is also
known as the net bit rate. This is the maximum amount of data that can the-
oretically travel on a communication pathway in a given time, however, in
practice, the maximum transfer rate will be lower. The actual achieved rate
of successful data transfer is referred to as throughput (FitzGerald, 2011).
Throughput on a network is controlled by the available bandwidth, signal-
to-noise ratio, and the available hardware and software. In summary, band-
width is the theoretical limit, while throughput is the practical limit of data
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transfer on a network channel.
Latency, Delay and Round Trip Time: Latency and delay are synonyms
describing the amount of time it takes for data bits to travel between two
network nodes (Bradner, 1991). This is generally indicative of the time it
takes for data to travel one-way between the sender and the receiver, com-
monly measured in milliseconds. Delay is generally caused by the distance
between the nodes, other network equipment in the pathway, error and er-
ror rectification, congestion, queuing, and the data processing capabilities of
the nodes involved. Round trip time is another such measure, however, this
is more of a two-way measurement since its measurement involves only one
node (Constantine, Forget, Geib, & Schrage, 2011). However, round trip time
measurements generally exclude the processing time at the destination node.
Jitter: Jitter is closely related to the previous metrics and describes the vari-
ation in delay in receiving packets (Demichelis & Chimento, 2002). It indi-
cates the time difference in packet inter-arrival time and generally is not a
major issue on data networks (TCP/IP protocol can counteract its effects).
However, in relation to VoIP and multimedia applications, jitter can play a
major role is communication quality. Jitter is normally caused by network
congestion, data queuing issues, and configuration issues.
To ascertain the network performance characteristics of TCP and UDP, through-
put, delay, and jitter were measured on different network scenarios. How
this was done on the test-bed, and the use of D-ITG is detailed next.
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                 Realistic Data
                 Log data to be stored
Figure 3.4: D-ITG mechanism with log server
3.4 Test-bed Data Collection
Figure 3.4 shows the generic form of the network that was setup to test per-
formance of the TCP and UDP traffic types. Here it is seen that the D-ITG
traffic generator has been incorporated into the test-bed, with the rectan-
gle depicting the actual test-bed. The details of this rectangle are the sub-
ject of the next three subsequent chapters, however, the manner in which
D-ITG has been incorporated into the test-bed, in principle, is the same in
all test cases. So on configuring the complete setup of a network in the rect-
angle, the D-ITG sender, receiver, and log server nodes were connected to
the test-bed in a manner ensuring that data really flowed from the sender
to the receiver, traversing the network under test. Once the connectivity of
the entire setup was positively tested, D-ITG traffic generation was initiated
and performance metrics measured. The command to send emulated traf-
fic types from the sender to receiver is shown in Figure 3.5. Here it is seen
that TCP emulated data was sent for 30 seconds (t=30000), at a rate of 20000
packets per second (C=20000), with packet size set at 1024 Bytes (c=1024).
In such tests it is necessary to ensure that the sample size is large enough
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(Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2011) to ensure that the links are tested to capac-
ity.The parameters chosen in the D-ITG command (t and C values especially)
ensure that the emulated traffic really floods the sender/receiver link. This is
necessary in ascertaining performance metric like throughput. For each net-
 
Figure 3.5: D-ITG sender command line interface
work scenario, both TCP and UDP traffic types were emulated and tested.
This was done for a number of packet sizes ranging from 64 to 1536 Bytes.
To ensure that all these tests were done efficiently, a batch file was created
as shown in Figure 3.6. This batch file was a handy automation tool in most
scenarios, however, in tests that experienced a high drop rate (especially on
wireless networks), each line in the test file had to be run manually.
The output file resulting from each run of the test is a D-ITG coded file saved
on the log server. In order to make sense of the contents of this, a decod-
ing process is necessary, the syntax of which is shown in Figure 3.7. Conse-
quently, a text file is produced (Figure 3.8) that contains performance related
metrics in readable form. For the purposes of data analysis and manipula-
tion, contents of each decoded text file was transferred into a spreadsheet.
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1.1 Testing Processes 
In this stage, the test-bed has been setup and ready to be implemented for network performance 
test. The logical design of the test-bed can be seen in Figure 3-10. 
ROUTING ROUTING
SYSTEM #1 SYSTEM #2 SYSTEM #4SYSTEM #3
RECEIVER:
Result Collected:
- Throughput
- Jitter
- Delay
SENDER:
Sending traffic :
- TCP
- UDP
- DNS
- VoIP (various codecs)
- Game (Quake3, Csi, Csa)
 
Figure 3-1: Testing Data Flow 
1. System #1 sent various traffic (TCP, UDP, DNS, VoIP, Games). Shown in the following figure 
the sample of the itgsend.exe program while it is running. 
 
Figure 3-2: Itgsend.exe Screenshot 
2. For time efficient in sending data, script / batch file can be used, as shown in the following 
Figure. 
 
Figure 3-3: Sending Sample Script 
0 
 
Figure 3.6: D-ITG sample sender commands
3. System #2 and System #3 routed the traffic to next hop. 
4. At the end System #4 (RECEIVER) received the traffic and generated log file. The following 
figure show the itgrecv.exe program while it is running. 
 
Figure 3-4: Itgrecv.exe Screenshot 
5. For time efficient in doing decoding, it can be used script / batch file as shown in the 
following sample. 
 
Figure 3-5: Decoding Sample Script 
6. Generated log file is decoded using D-ITG decoding program (itgdec.exe). In this project, the 
result of decoded file is text file, as shown in the following sample Figure 3-11. 
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Figure 3.7: D-ITG decoder sample command lines
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Figure 3-6: Decoded Sample 
7. Decoded files are imported into Comma Separated Values (CSV) file, using program created 
specifically for importing Average bitrate (throughput), Average jitter and Average delay. 
8. The CSV files are put together in Microsoft Excel sheets to be presented in graphical charts. 
The sample of the chart is shown in Figure 3-12. 
 
Figure 3-7: Sample Chart 
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Figure 3.8: D-ITG sample decoded data in text format
There were a number of test-beds that were implemented in the process of
this research, and consequently a great deal of primary data was generated.
Due to the chosen method of data collection (test-bed), it was necessary to
ensure that all results reported in the thesis were accurate and free from
anomalies. That is, a high degree of accuracy was necessary and this was
achieved by ensuing that multiple runs (number depending on the actual
context in which TCP/UDP was tested) of D-ITG with the same parameters
was performed for each value reported in this work. Due to the nature of the
technology, wireless based network analysis required a greater number of re-
peat runs in spite of taking all necessary precautions to minimise the effects
of external factors like signal interference. Overall, three to five repeat runs
were necessary (to attain 95% confidence interval) for each value reported in
this thesis. The reported value was the average of the readings taken after
filtering any outliers.

Chapter 4
TCP/UDP Behaviour across Transition
Mechanisms
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
The number of nodes connected to the networks is on an exponential in-
cline, with each node requiring a unique address. In the original scheme of
things there are only a limited number of these allocatable addresses, so it
is necessary to changeover to a new version that offers an increased number
of addresses. However, this changeover is complex and poses a number of
problems, including the need to make configuration changes to all devices
connected to the Internet. The sheer size of the problem, and incompatibil-
ity between the two versions, is delaying a complete switch over to the new
version, which in addition to providing an increased address space has a
number of other critical benefits.
The subject of this chapter is transition mechanisms. These facilitate coex-
istence of the two versions of the Internet Protocol. It is an interim solution
that will be in use for a long time, therefore network performance analysis in
such environments is important. In this chapter, commonly used transition
mechanisms are described mainly by dividing them into three distinct cat-
egories dual stack, translation techniques and tunnelling technique (Arkko
& Baker, 2011). Then literature in relation to transition mechanisms is eval-
uated, which is followed by identifying prior experimental based research
related to performance evaluation . Next, a series of test-beds are described
that were implemented to evaluate behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic type
across various transition mechanisms. Finally, performance metrics from the
test-beds are presented.
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4.2 The IP Addressing Problem
The original version of the IP was developed in the early 1980s. Today one
of the major concerns for network practitioners globally is how to change
over from IPv4 to IPv6. As early as 1994, the IETF was warned that the ex-
ponential growth of the Internet, would quickly lead to a be a global short-
age of IPv4 addresses (Bradner & Mankin, 1995) (Stallings, 1996) (Zeadally,
Wasseem, & Raicu, 2004). Theoretically, IPv4 has approximately 4.3 billion
addresses (Cerf, 2004); however, in practice it cannot support more than 250
million, uniquely addressed nodes (Zander, Andrew, Armitage, & Huston,
2013) (Postel, 1981b). This is mainly due to the hierarchical nature of the
Internet and the resulting inefficiencies in address assignment (RFC 1751)
(McDonald, 1994). To circumvent this problem a number of temporary solu-
tions were created including: implementing DHCP (Droms, 1999) (Alexander
& Droms, 1997) (Droms, 1997) to avoid permanent allocation of IP addresses
to nodes: implementing Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) (Fuller &
Li, 2006) removing fixed boundaries in IP addressing plans; implementing
NAT (Audet & Jennings, 2007); allowing nodes with Private IP addresses ac-
cess to Internet service; tightly controlling allocation of IP addresses by RIR;
and reclaiming unused IPv4 address space. However, even with the imple-
mentation of these temporary mitigations, IPv4 addressing cannot keep up
with the ever increasing demand for devices needing connectivity to the In-
ternet (Waddington & Chang, 2002). Since IPv6 offers approximately 340
undecillion addresses, ultimately it is necessary to change the entire Internet
infrastructure to be purely IPv6 based.
Running out of IP addresses in a communication network can pose massive
problems, and although there is a short supply of IPv4 addresses globally,
IPv6 adoption has been slow (Leavitt, 2011) .
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Figure 4.1: RIR IPv4 address run-down model per year
Source: http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html
The Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) exhausted its pool of unal-
located top-level addresses as early as 3 February 2011 (Boucadair, Grimault,
Levis, Villefranque, & Morand, 2009) (Goth, 2012) (P. Wu, Cui, Wu, Liu, &
Metz, 2013). Two of the five RIRs, APNIC and Rseaux IP Europens Net-
work Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), exhausted their addresses in April
2011 and September 2012, respectively (Housley, Curran, Huston, & Con-
rad, 2013). At the current rate of usage it is predicted that in the next few
years, the three other RIRs will also exhaust their allocations. The uptake
of IPv6 addresses has been surprisingly slow (Cerf, 2004). Google, which
tracks the number of clients connecting to its services from different IP ver-
sion based networks, predicted that as at mid-2013, a total of approximately
1.3% networks globally would be IPv6 based, and that only nine countries
in the world would see the proportion of IPv6 users rise above one. This
has been the case even though commonly used operating systems have been
IPv6 ready for a while. Microsoft, for example, have been making its operat-
ing systems IPv6 ready since mid-2000 (Ladid, 2001) while Apples Mac OSX
systems have had the capability since around 2006. The general view was
that in the initial phase, the uptake of IPv6 would be slow, but would later
gain momentum and accelerate along exponentially. This has not been the
case.
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The switchover from IPv4 to IPv6 is not that straightforward since the two
versions of the protocol are not compatible, and there is no deadline by
which the change must happen, unlike, for example, the Y2K problem. A
seamless changeover from IPv4 to a completely IPv6 based Internet would
be technically difficult to achieve. Until the entire Internet is purely IPv6
based, transition mechanisms will be the primary tools that will allow inter-
operability of both IP versions. That is, the changeover has to be done in
stages, and transition mechanisms will be used during the migration stage
so that IPv4 and IPv6 networks can coexist (Callon & Haskin, 1997), irrespec-
tive of how long the migration takes.
The Internet core will eventually change from IPv4 to IPv6. However, in
the initial stages IPv6 islands will appear in the IPv4 cloud and connectiv-
ity for IPv6 networks will be required not just to the IPv4 Internet itself but
also to other independent IPv4 or IPv6 islands. Towards the end of the mi-
gration process, the Internet cloud will predominantly be IPv6 based, and
at that stage the reverse of what is described above will be required. That
is, communication will have to be established between pockets of remaining
IPv4 islands with either the IPv6 cloud or the independent IPv4 or IPv6 is-
lands. For all communication channels that are to be established, transition
mechanisms can be employed.
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4.3 The Transition Mechanisms
Transition mechanisms allow interoperation between IPv4 and IPv6 networks
during the migration phase from pure IPv4 to IPv6 environment. There are
numerous such mechanisms, and this section will discuss the most com-
mon ones. Transition mechanisms can be divided into three categories (Dual
Stack, Translation Techniques and Tunnels).
4.3.1 Dual Stack
One of the most common straightforward techniques adopted for migrat-
ing to IPv6 networks is the Dual Stack Transition Mechanism (DSTM). This
technique enables communication between IPv4 and IPv6 networks (J. Chen,
Jia., & Li, 2011), where hosts and routers on the network are implemented
with both IPv4 and IPv6 protocol stacks (J.-M. Chang, Chao, Chen, & Lai,
2012). When a node needs to communicate with an IPv4 node, it uses the
IPv4 protocol stack, and reverts back to establishing communication via the
IPv6 stack when it needs to communicate with an IPv6 based node (Wei,
Zhang, & Zhang, 2009). This setup enables a node to support both IPv4 and
IPv6 based applications and services on a network.
Dual stack architecture is based on configuring a DSTM address server, dual
stack capable client nodes and a Tunnel End-Point (TEP) router. The client
nodes are IPv6 nodes in an IPv6 domain that want to communicate with
IPv4 based nodes elsewhere, while the server manages the IPv4 address pool
(Chakraborty, Dutta, & Biradar, 2009). The address server is responsible for
allocating client nodes with IPv4 addresses within the IPv6 network, and
also provides the TEP address. The server guarantees uniqueness of the
IPv4 address allocated to the node for that period of time. When a host from
the IPv6 domain wants to communicate with a node that has only an IPv4
address, it asks the DSTM server for a temporary IPv4 address (Xiaohong,
2013), which is issued to the client, together with information related to the
TEP. The client, on receiving this information configures an IPv4 stack and
from that point onwards, this client encapsulates all IPv4 packets and tun-
nels them, traversing the IPv6 domain to the TEP. On receiving the packet,
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the TEP decapsulates it and transmits the packet to the IPv4 destination host.
The TEP maintains a mapping of IPv4/IPv6 addresses and is also responsi-
ble for creating and suppressing the tunnel that temporarily exists between
the dual stack node and TEP router.
Dual stack as a transition solution on a network, has various merits and
weaknesses. First, the use of dual stack on a network infrastructure is trans-
parent to the network. Nodes that are in the IPv6 domain encapsulate all
IPv4 packets prior to transmission, thus, there is no need for the network to
maintain IPv4 routing information. Secondly, the applications that are used
on the clients need no configuration changes for them to continue work-
ing on dual-stack hosts. Also, allocation of IPv4 addresses in an IPv6 do-
main is effortless, since this can be easily done using DHCPv6, thus, reduc-
ing IPv4 related administrative overheads. However, this transition mech-
anism’s prime weakness is that it does not support asymmetric paths, that
is, return packets initiating from IPv4 hosts to dual-stacked clients in the
IPv6 domain must enter the network through the same TEP that initially for-
warded the traffic between the communicating nodes (T. Liu, Guan, Zheng,
& Qu, 2009). Finally, there are significant network performance issues re-
lated to dual stack, mainly to do with the delay experienced at the initial
stage of communication establishment between the sending and receiving
nodes (S. Lee, Shin, Kim, Nordmark, & Durand, 2002).
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Dual Stack Server IPv6 Address 2001:100:cafe:100::101 
Dual Stack Router 
IPv4 Address 
IPv6 Address 
IPv6 Address 
192.168.1.2 
2001:db8:100::c0a8:202 
2001:100:cafe:100::100 
IPv4 Router 
192.168.1.3 
192.168.1.254 
IPv6 Router 
2001:db8:100::c0a8:203 
2001:db8:100::c0a8:204 
IPv4 Host 192.168.1.20 
IPv6 Host 2001:db8:1:1::ffff:c0a8:120 
Figure 4.2: Architecture of dual stack implementation
4.3.2 Address Translation
There are a number of network address and protocol address translation
techniques that can be used during the IPv4/IPv6 transition phase. NAT,
in its classic form, is a technique that has been used to translate one IPv4
address into another address of the same version (Wing, 2010) (Srisuresh &
Egevang, 2001). This has mainly been used on access networks in organisa-
tions using private IP address, where IP addresses from inside the network
are mapped to public IP addresses (Srisuresh & Holdrege, 1999). By doing so,
the Internet based services become accessible from within the organisation
even when each host is not configured with a publically routable IP address
(Kohler, Morris, & Poletto, 2002). Based on classic NAT are address transla-
tion techniques that can be implemented as solutions to enable co-existence
of IPv4 and IPv6 based networks. These techniques allow establishment of
communication between IPv4-only and IPv6-only devices.
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Tunnelling 
Mechanism 
Description Address Mapping Weakness 
6to4 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 packets, tunnel 
is created 
automatically. 
Stateless, IPv4 
embedded in IPv6 
Routing scalability 
issue: no 
optimization of 
paths 
6over4 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 packets, tunnel 
is created 
automatically. 
None 
Needs IPv4 
multicast support 
Dual Stack 
Translation 
Mechanism 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 addresses, 
implementing 
gateway and server 
function. 
Binding, per flow 
Complicated 
implementation 
ISATAP 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 addresses. A 
tunnel with 
coexisting IPv4 and 
IPv6 addresses build 
up to the router. 
Stateless with link-
local or global prefix 
Low efficiency of 
possible paths  and 
complicated control 
plane 
Teredo 
Tunnel is built 
through NAT. 
Stateless, port 
embedded in IPv6 
Complicated 
implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation 
Mechanism 
Description Address Mapping Weakness 
NAT-PT 
Translates IPv4/IPv6 
addresses, keeps pool 
of IPv4 addresses in 
IPv6 domain. 
Stateful, one-to-
one mapping 
Low feasibility on 
IPv4 to IPv6 routing 
and high processing 
for large-scale 
connections 
NAPT-PT 
Translates IPv4/IPv6 
addresses, does not 
keep pool of IPv4 
addresses, and IPv6 
hosts can use a single 
IPv4 address. 
Stateful, one-to-
many mapping 
Redirecting issues 
and unable to 
translate packet 
fragments. 
NAT64 
Translates IPv4/IPv6 
addresses, translates IP 
header and IP address 
using various 
algorithms. 
Stateful, vice-versa 
mapping 
Pre-flow state 
maintenance and 
common translation 
issues. 
 
Table 4.1: Different translation techniques in IPv4-IPv6 transition
Network Address Translation Protocol Translation
Network Address Translation-Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) allows trans-
parent routing of packets between end nodes in the IPv6 domain with end
nodes in the IPv4 realm. A few variations of the NAT-PT exist. In Basic-
NAT-PT (Tsirtsis & Srisuresh, 2000), a pool of IPv4 addresses are maintained
in IPv6 domain and these addresses are allocated to IPv6-only nodes that in-
tend to communicate with IPv4 nodes in some other domain (Chuanhuang
& Haonan, 2012). Here, a one-to-one mapping of IPv4 to IPv6 addresses
is made, thus, there is a need to maintain as many IPv4 addresses in the
pool as IPv6 nodes in the network. A variation of this is Network Address
Port Translation + Protocol Translation (NAPT-PT), where only a single IPv4
address is used to enable v6 nodes to communicate transparently with v4
nodes. This is achieved by translating TCP/UDP ports of the communicat-
ing IPv6 node into that of the specified IPv4 address. The advantage NAPT-
PT has over NAT-PT is that there is no need to maintain a large pool of IP
addresses (Shi et al., 2007); however a large number of IPv6 hosts (as many as
the theoretical number of TCP/UDP ports) can effectively use a single IPv4
address to communicate with IPv4 nodes.
There are a number of limitations of NAT-PT and NAPT-PT address transla-
tion techniques. On establishment of a communication session between two
nodes, all requests and responses pertaining to that session have to be sent
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via the same NAT-PT router. To achieve this, the router can generally only
be placed at one location on the network (at the perimeter) creating a sin-
gle point of failure. Also, since the actual address translation is performed
by NAT-PT, applications that have IP address information in the higher OSI
layers will become dysfunctional. End-to-end security, as is possible in pure
IPv6 networks, is completely lacking (Y.-G. Hong, Shin, & Kim, 2003). An-
other major concern is that end-to-end IPSec security cannot be configured
since, IPSec requires end nodes to be configured with the same version of
the IP. NAT-PT is also tightly coupled with DNS (W. Peng, Zhou, Wang, &
Yang, 2009). Finally, implementing NAT-PT is complicated since it requires
a significant amount of configuration.
Numerous technical and operational difficulties are encountered when NAT-
PT is implemented on a network. For this reason IETF recommends that
NAT-PT should not be used as a general purpose transition mechanism and
has deprecated its use (Aoun & Davies, 2007).
IPv4
clients
IPv6
Network
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server
Step 3
Proxy 
server
IPv6 
clients
NAT-PT
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p 2
Ste
p 4
 
Step 1: 
DNS Query 
Source Address (IPv4 Host) 
Destination Address (NAT-PT Router – IPv4 Interface) 
Step 2: 
DNS Query 
Source Address (NAT-PT Router – IPv6 Interface) 
Destination Address (IPv6 DNS) 
Step 3: 
DNS Reply 
Source Address (IPv6 DNS) 
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of NAT-PT implementation
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Network Address Translation IPv6 to IPv4
NAT IPv6 to IPv4 (NAT64) is the transition technique that is the successor
to NAT-PT. Like its predecessor, NAT64 facilitates communication between
IPv6-only, to IPv4-only hosts (Jankiewicz, Chan, & Green, 2006). However,
total separation of DNS functionality and the NAT64 mechanism makes it a
far superior technology. On an infrastructure, NAT64 can be implemented
in two states, namely stateless or stateful. In stateless NAT64, the state of the
session, or binding information, is not preserved, which means that every
IPv6 node that is communicating with a v4 node needs a dedicated IPv4 ad-
dress. This is achieved by algorithmically mapping IPv4 addresses to each
communicating node. Stateless NAT64 does not solve the problem of de-
pleting IPv4 addresses, however, it will facilitate nodes with different ver-
sions of the IP to communicate. Stateful NAT64 is the more desired method
of implementing NAT64, and is capable of translating not only IPv6 ad-
dresses to IPv4, but also translating IPv4 to IPv6 (Bagnulo, Garcia-Martinez,
& Van Beijnum, 2012) (Ding, Savolainen, Korhonen, & Kojo, 2012) (Bagnulo,
Matthews, & van Beijnum, 2011). It also supports both IPv6 initiated and
IPv4 initiated communications. Being a stateful method, it creates or mod-
ifies bindings and session state information while performing translation.
Stateful NAT64 provides communication using TCP, UDP and ICMP be-
tween nodes by translating both the IP header and IP address using various
algorithmic functions.
Comparing stateless and stateful NAT64, it is observed that the former is ca-
pable of a one-to-one mapping between IPv6-only and IPv6-only node, while
the latter can be used in scenarios where there is a need to setup one-to-many
translation. So with stateful implementations, there is no limitation on the
number of end points, therefore, this is more suited as a transition solution
that can be implemented on a large scale by carrier network providers. State-
ful also conserves IPv4 addresses, however, lacks end-to-end address trans-
parency. One of the mandatory requirements for stateless NAT64 is that there
is a need to have an IPv4-translatable IPv6 address, but with the other, there
is no restriction on the characteristics of the IPv6 address assigned (Hodzic
& Mrdovic, 2012). Also, stateless NAT64 requires either manual or DHCPv6-
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Figure 4.4: Architecture of NAT64 implementation
based address assignment for IPv6 hosts, but with stateful NAT64, the mode
of IPv6 address assignment is inconsequential.
4.3.3 Tunnelling
Tunneling transition techniques provide mechanisms to utilise an already ex-
isting IPv4 infrastructure to carry IPv6 traffic. This is achieved by enabling
hosts and routers to tunnel IPv6 datagrams over IPv4 topology by encapsu-
lating the datagrams within IPv4 packets, primarily using IPv4 as the link
layer for IPv6 communication (Xiaohong, 2013) (Hou, Zhao, & Ma, 2010).
The key advantage of this technique is that the v6 protocol can work with-
out hindrance to the old version, whilst also allowing connectivity between
nodes using the newer version of the protocol. For ISPs that are in early
stages of IPv6 deployment, tunnelling is the desired option, since it does not
require a total upgrade of the network, yet can provide connectivity between
IPv6 islands. ISPs and similar network providers need to enable IPv6 only
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on the edge routers of the networks, facilitating rapid deployment of IPv6
services to customers. Therefore, tunnelling techniques enable incompatible
networks to be bridged.
Tunnelling transition mechanisms can generally be configured in three dif-
ferent ways: router-to-router; host-to-router (or router-to-host); and host-to-
host (Steffann, van Beijnum, & van Rein, 2013). Router-to-router tunnelling
is normally implemented using IPv4/IPv6 dual stacked routers (at the edge
of the network) to establish communication between two IPv4 or IPv6 net-
works over an existing IPv4 infrastructure (Raicu & Zeadally, 2003). A log-
ical link is established between the edge routers which connects the source
with the destination. All other routers within each IPv4 or IPv6 domain for-
ward traffic to the IPv4/IPv6 edge routers when data needs to be sent from
one IP domain to the other. With host-to-router tunnelling, an IPv4/IPv6
dual stacked host residing in an IPv4 domain creates an IPv6 over IPv4 tun-
nel to reach an edge IPv4/IPv6 router. The IPv4/IPv6 node configures an
IPv4/IPv6 tunnel interface, representing the tunnel, through which the IPv6
packet is transmitted. The tunnel between the host and the router acts as a
single hop. On receiving the packet at the IPv4/IPv6 router, another tun-
nel interface is created and using this, the router tunnels the IPv6 packet to
the IPv6 node over the existing IPv4 or IPv6 infrastructure. Finally, the host-
to-host tunnelling configuration is typically used between an IPv4/IPv6 dual
stacked node, with another similar node, where both are residing in one IPv4
domain. When a communication channel needs to be established between
the two nodes, an interface representing the tunnel is established on each,
which is then used to send data between the source and the destination.
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Tunnelling 
Mechanism 
Description Address Mapping Weakness 
6to4 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 packets, tunnel 
is created 
automatically. 
Stateless, IPv4 
embedded in IPv6 
Routing scalability 
issue: no 
optimization of 
paths 
6over4 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 packets, tunnel 
is created 
automatically. 
None 
Needs IPv4 
multicast support 
Dual Stack 
Translation 
Mechanism 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 addresses, 
implementing 
gateway and server 
function. 
Binding, per flow 
Complicated 
implementation 
ISATAP 
IPv4 encapsulates 
IPv6 addresses. A 
tunnel with 
coexisting IPv4 and 
IPv6 addresses build 
up to the router. 
Stateless with link-
local or global prefix 
Low efficiency of 
possible paths  and 
complicated control 
plane 
Teredo 
Tunnel is built 
through NAT. 
Stateless, port 
embedded in IPv6 
Complicated 
implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation 
Mechanism 
Description Address Mapping Weakness 
NAT-PT 
Translates IPv4/IPv6 
addresses, keeps pool 
of IPv4 addresses in 
IPv6 domain. 
Stateful, one-to-
one mapping 
Low feasibility on 
IPv4 to IPv6 routing 
and high processing 
for large-scale 
connections 
NAPT-PT 
Translates IPv4/IPv6 
addresses, does not 
keep pool of IPv4 
addresses, and IPv6 
hosts can use a single 
IPv4 address. 
Stateful, one-to-
many mapping 
Redirecting issues 
and unable to 
translate packet 
fragments. 
NAT64 
Translates IPv4/IPv6 
addresses, translates IP 
header and IP address 
using various 
algorithms. 
Stateful, vice-versa 
mapping 
Pre-flow state 
maintenance and 
common translation 
issues. 
 
Table 4.2: Different tunnelling techniques in IPv4-IPv6 transition
The manner in which a node determines the address of the tunnel endpoints
is of significance. If a tunnel requires manual configuration of the tunnel
endpoints, it is known as a configured tunnel. With this type of tunnel, the
actual IPv4 address of the endpoint is not derived from the source or destina-
tion encoded IPv6 addre s, but is manually configured along with the static
route information. This type of configuration is normally done when set-
ting up router-to-router tunnelling configuration. Alternatively, automatic
tunnels can be configured. No manual configurations are required, yet the
nodes are able to determine the end points by using information related to
logical tunnel interfac , routes and source/destination IPv6 addresses. All
tunnelling techniq es, discussed next, can be classified as either configured
or automatic tunnel.
6to4
The 6to4 mechanism is an address assignment, router to router, host to router,
and router to host automatic tunneling protocol that creates connectivity be-
tween IPv6 sites and hosts across IPv4 domains, by providing IPv6 unicast
addresses to communicating hosts. The IPv4 domain that it connects through
is treated as a single link (Bahaman, Hamid, & Prabuwono, 2012). Communi-
cation between 6to4 sites is tunnelled through directly, however, connectivity
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to other IPv6 domains is attained by using 6to4 relay agents and 6to4 routers
(Aazam, Syed, Shah, Khan, & Alam, 2011). So with minimal configuration,
6to4 can be implemented to allow IPv6 domains to communicate.
Tunneling techniques manipulate IP addresses to create appropriate node
and tunnel endpoint addresses, as does the 6to4 mechanism. As described
in RFC3056 (Carpenter & Moore, 2001), this mechanism uses the IANA-
assigned IPv6 global address prefix 2002::/16 to indicate that a site is us-
ing a 6to4 tunnel (J.-L. Chen, Chang, & Lin, 2004a) (Elich, Velan, Jirsik, &
Celeda, 2013). For for 6to4 to send data from one site to another 6to4 site, the
sending site assigns itself the IPv6 prefix 2002:a.b.c.d::/48, where a.b.c.d is a
globally unique v4 address of the interface on the 6to4 domains egress router
(Carpenter & Moore, 2001) (Hei & Yamazaki, 2004) (Guo, Zhu, Chen, & He,
2012). The prepended number has precisely the same format as a typical /48
prefix, thus enabling the sending domain to use it like a usual valid /48 pre-
fix. Thus, when a 6to4 domain needs to communicate with another similar
domain, there is no need to create a tunnel since the attached prefixes take
care of the addressing requirements. The destination address global routing
IPv6 prefix contained in the IPv6 packet being sent will be used to determine
the address of the tunnel endpoint. Also, to facilitate this communication, the
edge routers do not need to run any specific IPv6 routing protocols. This is
possible since IPv4 routing between the two 6to4 domains, which transmits
via the Internet IPv4 cloud, takes care of inter 6to4 domain routing (Hadiya,
Save, & Geetu, 2013). However, for a 6to4 domain to communicate with a
non-6to4 domain, the process is slightly different. In this case, an IPv6 re-
lay router is deployed, which essentially is an edge router configured with
a minimum of one logical 6to4 interface and at least one native IPv6 inter-
face (Carpenter, 2011). In this scenario, the relay router publicises the 6to4
2002::/16 prefix within the native IPv6 domain, and IPv6 route information
from that domain is advertised into its 6to4 connection. In order to establish
the location of the relay router, IPv4 anycast is employed. Also, between the
two dissimilar sites, the IPv6 exterior routing protocol must be implemented.
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Figure 4.5: Architecture of 6to4 implementation
Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol
Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP) is designed to
tunnel traffic between routers within a site, however, it can also facilitate
host to host, host to router, and router to host intra-site unicast IPv6 connec-
tivity (Templin, Gleeson, & Thaler, 2008). It allows IPv4 hosts and IPv4/IPv6
dual-stacked hosts within a site to communicate with similar hosts, thus, cre-
ating an IPv6 infrastructure inside an IPv4 domain (S.-D. Lee, Shin, & Kim,
2006) (S. Hong, Ko, Ryu, & Kim, 2006). Within an ISATAP domain, the exist-
ing IPv4 infrastructure is seen as a virtual link layer for IPv6 communication,
and other nodes in that site are viewed as potential IPv6 hosts and routers.
ISATAP uses the underlying IPv4 domain as a virtual Non-Broadcast Mul-
tiple Access (NBMA) network, therefore, it does not require existing IPv4
infrastructure to support multicasting (Armitage, Schulter, Jork, & Harter,
1999). Furthermore, ISATAP can be implemented to facilitate communica-
tion to some outside IPv6 networks or hosts.
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For an ISATAP host to communicate, first it has to create an interface iden-
tifier. To do this, private unicast IPv4 addresses are prepended with ::0:5efe
(Xiaodong, Mayan, & Yumei, 2009) (Aazam et al., 2011), while public uni-
cast IPv4 addresses are prepended with ::200:5efe. The interface identifier
can then be combined with a 64bit prefix that is valid for IPv6 unicast ad-
dresses (Guo et al., 2012), which includes link local (fe80::/64), unique lo-
cal, and global prefixes. For example, if two ISATAP nodes on one network
with IPv4 addresses 10.5.6.1 and 10.5.6.2 are to communicate, they will auto-
matically be configured with the ISATAP addresses of fe80::5efe:10.5.6.1 and
fe80::5efe:10.5.6.2 respectively. So, the interface identifier part of the ISA-
TAP address has an embedded IPV4 address, which is used to determine the
destination IPv4 address after the ISATAP-addressed IPv6 packet has been
tunnelled through the IPv4 domain. Needless to say, link local ISATAP ad-
dresses allow a host to communicate with another host only on the same
network, however, to communicate beyond the local domain, ISATAP based
global addresses have to be configured, and the host has to tunnel the packets
to an ISATAP router. An ISATAP host is configured with a Potential Routers
List (PRL), and the host randomly probes the routers in that list by send-
ing ICMPv6 Router Solicitation (RS) packets to find out which routers are
up and functioning. On receiving an RS, the router responds with a unicast
Router Advertisement (RA) message. An ISATAP router is a dual-stacked
device that is responsible for a few important things: (i) it advertises address
prefixes to ISATAP hosts identifying the logical ISATAP subnet that the host
is residing in, (ii) forwards packets between ISATAP hosts within a ISATAP
subnet and also between to IPv6 hosts on other networks and (iii) is an IPv6
default router for local ISATAP hosts.
ISATAP is a commonly used automatic tunneling mechanism; however, there
are a few design issues to be aware of. Firstly, there is heavy reliance on the
IPv4 DNS server. When ISATAP is deployed on a network, an ISATAP host
typically builds its PRL by consulting a DNS Server (Aazam, Khan, Alam, &
Qayyum, 2010). This is normally done by resolving a name, such as isa-
tap.domain.com, where domain.com is the local domain. This is seen as
problematic since ISATAP, being a lower layer protocol, has to rely heavily
4.3. THE TRANSITION MECHANISMS 79
IPv4
Network
IPv6
Network
Private LAN
Private LAN
Private LAN
Web 
Server
ISATAP 
Host B
ISATAP 
Router
ISATAP 
Host C
ISATAP Tunnel
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
 
Step 1: 
DNS Query 
ISATAP Host A sends a packet to Web 
server. 
Source Address (ISATAP IPv4 Host) 
Destination Address (ISATAP Router – IPv4 Interface) 
Step 2: 
DNS Query 
ISATAP Router encapsulates the packet 
with an IPv4 header. 
Source Address (ISATAP Router – IPv6 Interface) 
Destination Address (IPv6 Web Server) 
Step 3: 
DNS Query 
Web Server sends a response to ISATAP 
Host A. 
Source Address (IPV6 DNS Server) 
Destination Address (ISATAP Router – IPv6 Interface) 
Step 4: 
DNS Query ISATAP Router encapsulates the packet 
with an IPv4 header possesses a destination 
that is the lowest 32 bits of the IPv6 
destination address.  
Source Address (ISATAP Router – IPv4 Interface) 
Destination Address (ISATAP Host A) 
Figure 4.6: Architecture of ISATAP implementation
on higher layer IPv4 DNS services. Secondly, security breaches are possible
at the edge of the network if the IPv4 virtual link to the network edge is not
delimited carefully. If not configured securely, the external IPv4 host may
pretend to be part of the ISATAP link, thus causing a security breach.
Teredo
The Teredo transition mechanism, proposed by Microsoft, is a host to host
automatic tunneling technique that addresses a fundamental problem suf-
fered by both the tunneling techniques mentioned (6to4 and ISATAP). Both
of these mechanisms require public IPv4 addresses configured at the tunnel
end points, but with prevalent use of NAT to address the IPv4 shortage prob-
lem, this may not be possible (Elich et al., 2013). Teredo enables dual-stacked
nodes located behind an IPv4 NAT to establish IPv6 communication by tun-
neling packets through the IPv4 infrastructure after encapsulating IPv6 pack-
ets in IPv4 based UDP messages (Aazam et al., 2010). The Teredo protocol
was originally known as shipworm, based on a species of bivalve molluscs
that burrow holes in wooden ship hulls, analogous to the mechanism’s abil-
ity to penetrate through NAT. Teredo needs almost no manual configura-
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tion from a user within a network, and can also be used by ISPs to perform
large scale deployments (Huitema, 2006). Teredo clients, a server, and relays
have to be configured on a network when deploying this mechanism. Teredo
clients are IPv4/IPv6 dual stacked nodes behind a NAT IPv4 network, which
at the start of a communication process perform a qualification procedure by
exchanging appropriate messages with the Teredo server. The qualification
procedure entails determining whether the client is located behind NAT, the
actual type of NAT, and also its public IPv4 address. (S.-M. Huang, Wu, &
Lin, 2005) The Teredo server uses UDP port 3544 for listening to requests
from the clients, and responds by assigning an IPv6 address to the client. In
addition to address assignment, the server also forwards the IPv4 encapsu-
lated IPv6 packets it receives from the clients to the Teredo relay, and also on
the reverse path (from Teredo relay to a Teredo client). The relays also man-
age advertising reachability of Teredo based services into the IPv6 network.
Normally it is possible to co-locate a Teredo server and relay entities onto
one device.
There are a few negatives associated with using Teredo as an IPv4/IPv6 tun-
neling solution. Due to the injection of information related to routing pre-
fixes, the mechanism inefficiently uses IPv6 addresses. This is primarily due
to the requirement that reachability of Teredo services has to be advertised
to the IPv6 network, and in doing so a 32-bit prefix common to all Teredo
servers and the IPv4 address of the server have to be advertised in the IPv6
domain. Secondly, Teredo services cannot traverse symmetric NATs. When a
Teredo client attains an IPv6 address from a server, the mapped public IPv4
address and UDP port number are encoded in the IPv6 address. This en-
coded address is used by the Teredo relay when sending packets to the des-
tination, but when traversing symmetric NATs different mapped port num-
bers are allocated for each pass-through flow, thus, causing a conflict. Finally,
when compared with other automatic tunneling protocols, Teredo is a com-
plex technology to implement on networks. Therefore, the Teredo automatic
tunnelling protocol should only be considered as a last resort.
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Figure 4.7: Architecture of Teredo implementation
6over4
6over4 is a tunnelling technique that allows IPv4 networks to communicate
with IPv6 based domains. In addition to this, the mechanism can also be
used to communicate between an isolated IPv6 host with another similar
host over an inter-site IPv4 domain that is capable of supporting IPv4 mul-
ticasting. The mechanism uses the IPv4 network as a virtual data link layer
to traverse IPv6 initiated traffic. Formally, 6over4 was known as IPv6 over
IPv4, and is colloquially known as Virtual Ethernet. The mechanism allows a
network to function with hosts that have either version the of IP stack, with-
out requiring IPv6 hosts to be configured with IPv4 compatible addresses or
with information related to tunnels. However, it does require interfaces on
IPv6 capable routers and hosts to be enabled for 6over4 mode.
In relation to modifying IPv6 address, so that IPv6 traffic can traverse the
IPv4 network, 6over4 uses a trivial technique for generating link-local IPv6
addresses. For any node wanting to communicate using a 6over4 tunnel
over an IPv4 infrastructure, it has to set up a virtual IPv6 interface by creat-
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ing an interface identifier. The interface identifier is created by prepending
the IPv4 address of that interface with the suffix fe80::/64, creating a 128 bit
IPv6 address. For example, a host with the IP address 192.0.2.142 will use
fe80::c000:28e (where c000:28e is the hexadecimal representation of the IPv4
address) as its link local address. 6over4 treats the existing IPv4 network
as a single link that has multicast capabilities. Therefore, the Neighbor Dis-
covery process, such as router discovery and address resolution, works in a
6to4 regime. To facilitate multicasting, an IPv6 multicast address has to be
translated into an IPv4 multicast address. This is done by encapsulating IPv6
multicast packets with the destination address 239.192.y.z, where y and z are
the last two bytes of the IPv6 multicast address.
For 6over4 to be implemented as a tunneling solution, it is mandatory that
IPv4 multicasting is possible on the IPv4 infrastructure. However, there is
limited availability of this service on v4 networks (D. Lee, Lough, Midkiff,
Davis, & Benchoff, 1998). Also, not all operating systems support the use of
6over4; hence, 6over4 is rarely used on networks as a transition mechanism.
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4.4 Literature Analysis of Transition Mechanisms
This section presents a review of recurring issues related to transition mech-
anisms. There are multiple aspects of research within this topic, however,
discussions herewith mainly concentrate on the network performance flank
of common transition mechanisms. In relation to transition mechanism tech-
niques, there are many strands that have been studied to enhance the mech-
anisms or to evolve some novel technique to interoperate IPv4 and IPv6 net-
works. Based on Teredo, a tunnelling protocol known as Escort has been de-
veloped, which addresses some of Teredo’s fundamental problems (An, Luo,
Li, Zhang, & Yan, 2009). Inherent in Escort are the fundamental advantages
of Teredo, however, by incorporating Host Identity Protocol (HIP) archi-
tecture, Escort has introduced the concept of ID/Locator split (Henderson,
Ahrenholz, & Kim, 2003) (Moskowitz & Nikander, 2006) (Farinacci, Fuller,
Meyer, & Lewis, 2013). This allows Escort to decouple the name and loca-
tor roles currently filled by IP addresses, thereby, providing a more secure
communication channel than Teredo. Therefore, this makes Escort a strong
candidate as a mechanism for mobile and multihoming environments. This
technique is similar in concept to Evolvable Locator/ID Separation Inter-
net Architecture (ELISIA) (Zhang, Li, & Bao, 2013). Teredo Client Protection
Algorithm (TCPA) has been mooted as a solution to protect Teredo clients
from IPv6 routing header risks (Al-tamimi, Taib, & Budiarto, 2008). This
protects from exploitation of source routing in IPv6 from both internal and
external attacks. TCPA has been shown to be an efficient and logical alter-
native to plain Teredo. A technique known as SymTeredo (Punithavathani
& Radley, 2014), which is a minor extension of Teredo, addresses the issue
related to Teredos inability to traverse symmetric NAT . This was also at-
tempted in (S.-M. Huang, Wu, & Lin, 2006), however, the design violated
the load-balancing design of Teredo and imposed heavy loads on the Teredo
sever. With SymTeredo, only a slight modification to the Teredo mechanism
is required to the relay and the client’s components, allowing it to function
even in a symmetric NAT environment.
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Evident in literature are a few transition techniques that are novel in their ap-
proach in solving the IPv4-IPv6 coexistence problem. A framework known
as Prefixing, Encapsulating and Translation (PET) has integrated concepts of
tunnelling and translation techniques to support both traversing and inter-
connecting IPv4-IPv6 networks (P. Wu et al., 2010). In this technique, au-
tomatic translation spot election and translation context advertisements are
used to build dynamic tunnels to connect networks. In another technique,
which is based on hierarchical routing architecture (Sans & Gamess, 2013),
encapsulation overhead in tunnel based mechanisms is improved and con-
sumption of IPv4 addresses are reduced in translation based methods. Here,
the concept is based on principles of IPv4 routing and the ability of nodes
to establish whether a destination address is local, or on some remote net-
work. Using this as a premise, a three-layer hierarchical schema is proposed
where the host nodes are configured with an IPv4/IPv6 gateway, which is
the router that handles routing different versions of IP traffic.
Another technique that addresses some of the problems with tunnelling tech-
niques is the Dynamic Tunneling Transition Solution (DTTS) (Y. Wu & Zhou,
2011). This is based on a dynamic tunnelling technique and dual stack ap-
proach, enabling IPv4 applications to interact with similar applications in
both IPv4 and IPv6 domains (K. Wang, Yeo, & Ananda, 2001). DTTS re-
quires a pool of IPv4 addresses, thus, does not address the IPv4 shortage is-
sue, however, end-to-end IP address transparency, scalable deployment and
seamlessly running IPv4 applications in the IPv6 domain are some of DTTSs
advantages. Some other transition techniques derived from already exist-
ing methods are highlighted in (Elich et al., 2013) (J.-L. Chen, Chang, & Lin,
2004b) and (Nordmark & Gilligan, 2005). Some researchers have also evalu-
ated the intricacies of the current mechanisms with the view to improve their
design characteristics.
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Since the focus in this thesis is on performance evaluation of networks based
on test-bed analysis, in Table 4.3, some of the key research that have taken a
similar stance on transition mechanisms are presented.
Author(s) Title Research Focus 
N. Chuangchunsong, S. 
Kamolphiwong, T. 
Kamolphiwong, R. Elz, and P. 
Pongpaibool (2014) 
Performance Evaluation of IPv4/IPv6 
Transition Mechanisms: IPv4-in-IPv6 
Tunneling Techniques 
4over6  and Dual Stack 
Martin Elich, Petr Velan, Tomas 
Jirsik,and Pavel Celeda (2013) 
An Investigation Into Teredo and 6to4 
Transition Mechanisms: Traffic Analysis 
Teredo and 6to4 
Francisco Sans and Eric Gamess 
(2013) 
Analytical Performance Evaluation of Native 
IPv6 and Several Tunneling Technics using 
Benchmarking Tools 
ISATAP, 6to4 and Teredo 
Rajesh Duvvuru and Sunil 
Kumar Singh (2013) 
Minimizing Transmission Delay in IPv4 
Network to IPv6 Network through ADSTM 
Dual Stack 
Jingtao Su and Xianwei Zhou 
(2013) 
IVIT: A Core Stateless IPv4/IPv6 Translation 
Mechanism Combining Translation and 
Tunnel Technologies 
NAT-PT 
Fei Ren and Huachun Zhou 
(2012) 
Implementation and Test of PMIPv6 Dual 
Stack Protocol 
Dual Stack 
Nazrulazhar Bahaman, Erman 
Hamid and Anton Satria 
Prabuwono (2012) 
Network Performance Evaluation of 6to4 
Tunneling 
6to4 
Anthony K. Tsetse, Alexander 
L. Wijesinha, Ramesh K. Karne 
and Alae Loukili (2012) 
A 6to4 Gateway with Co-located NAT 6to4 
Mohammad Aazam, Adeel M. 
Syed, Syed Atif, Imran Khan 
and Muhammad Alam (2011) 
Evaluation of 6to4 and ISATAP on a Test LAN 6to4 and ISATAP 
Yingjiao Wu and Xiaoqing Zhou 
(2011) 
Research on the IPv6 Performance Analysis 
Based on Dual-Protocol Stack and Tunnel 
Transition 
Dual Stack, 6to4 and 
ISATAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Recent research on performance evaluation of transition mecha-
nisms
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4.5 Test-bed Transition Mechanism Implementations
The overarching purpose of this research is to evaluate the behaviour of TCP
and UDP traffic types on networks, and in this chapter the focus is on their
behaviour across transition mechanism implementations. It is envisaged that
by measuring common network performance metrics on test-bed implemen-
tations, the overall objective of the research will be achieved.
Next, the focus is on outlining the test-bed setups that were implemented
in a laboratory environment. In total, seven different transition mechanisms
have been tested.
Figure 4.8: DSTM network diagram
The first network implemented was to test TCP and UDP behaviour across
DSTM (Figure 4.8). As discussed earlier, this is the simplest of the transition
mechanisms, allowing connectivity between IPv4 and IPv6 environments.
Here, the routers were dual stacked with both versions of the protocols al-
lowing them to facilitate communication between IPv4 hosts and other sim-
ilar protocol hosts or IPv6 hosts. From an implementation point of view, this
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was the simplest of all the networks set up, since the computers were either
pure IPv4, or IPv6 (with appropriate gateways), and the two servers were
dual stacked with routing enabled. For the purposes of measuring the per-
formance metrics, two computers were chosen on the network as sender and
receiver of different traffic types.
In the next series of experiments, various tunneling transition techniques
were implemented. Configured Tunnel, 6to4, 6over4, ISATAP and Teredo
were implemented, as shown in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 respectively.
Figure 4.9: Configured tunnel network diagram
For configured tunnel, a dual stack gateway was configured as a tunnel end-
point on one end, while a dual stack router was implemented at the other
end of the tunnel. This tunnel was established across the IPv4 infrastructure,
and encapsulation and decapsulation of the traffic traversing the two IP envi-
ronments was performed by the dual stack gateway and the router. Config-
ured tunnel implementation was mainly done manually, accomplished using
Command Line Interface (CLI).
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In the 6to4 tunnel test-bed, the network setup was very similar to that of
configured tunnel. A 6to4 gateway was configured on one router at one end
of the tunnel, whilst the other tunnel end router was configured as a 6to4 re-
lay agent. These two endpoints established a tunnel across the IPv4 network
infrastructure to facilitate communication with IPv6 nodes. The IPv6 packets
are encapsulated in IPv4 packets by the 6to4 gateway and then forwarded to
the 6to4 relay router. At this point the packet is decapsulated and forwarded
to the global IPv6 network.
The 6over4 technique uses 6in4 as the procedure for encapsulating IPv6 pack-
ets in IPv4 multicast infrastructure. It uses a multicast enabled IPv4 network
as an intermediary between the different IP version infrastructures. After
adding IPv4 stack to the nodes, a 6over4 tunnel was created between the
routers, mainly via CLI using netsh and adds v6v4tunnel set of commands
to add local addresses and remote addresses to the routers. Here, the local
address is an IPv4 address that the tunnel uses to talk with the upstream ver-
sion 6 router. The remote IPv4 address is that of the upstream router, which
also has an IPv6 remote address.
Figure 4.10: 6to4 network diagram
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On completing the tests for 6over4, an ISATAP tunnel was implemented on
the same setup. Since this is also one of the tunnelling transition mecha-
nisms, the actual infrastructure did not require much change, however, there
were configuration changes. After configuring the IPv4 and IPv6 stacks ap-
propriately on all computers, the servers were configured as routers. Then
netsh command was used on both the routers to establish forwarding and ad-
vertisements to establish a connection between them. This enabled an ISA-
TAP tunnel to be created between the two IP environments.
Figure 4.11: ISATAP network diagram
The last of the tunnelling transition mechanisms implemented was Teredo.
Microsoft operating systems come pre-configured with Teredo, therefore, the
implementation was straightforward. However, since various mechanisms
were being compared for network performance, it was necessary to ensure
that the implemented test beds were very similar (if not the same) in config-
uration for all setups. To test the performance of Teredo, a Teredo server was
introduced on the IPv4 subnet. This server is responsible for the initial con-
figuration of the tunnel and for address configuration of the Teredo clients.
Also, a relay was configured that forwarded packets between IPv4 and the
IPv6-only hosts on the pure IPv6 network.
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Figure 4.12: Teredo network diagram
Finally, NAT64, an IPv4-IPv6 translation based transition technique was im-
plemented. This can be implemented either as stateless or stateful, but for
this research it was implemented as the latter. In this, IPv6 addresses are
translated in IPv4 (and vice versa) by creating bindings, or session states,
while performing translation. Stateful NAT64 supports both IPv4 initiated
and IPv6 initiated communications using static manually configured IP ad-
dress mappings.
To implement this translation technique, a NAT64 server was deployed, which
hosted DNS64 and commonly used domain services in the test-bed. In ad-
dition to this, Remote Access Management, DirectAccess and a Certification
Authority were also implemented on the same server.
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Figure 4.13: NAT64 network diagram
For each of the seven transition mechanisms implemented, a sender and a re-
ceiver computer were identified on the test-bed. These two nodes were con-
figured with appropriate D-ITG components allowing TCP and UDP traffic,
generated by D-ITG, to traverse between them. Four network performance
related metrics (throughput, delay, jitter and Central Processing Unit (CPU)
usage) were measured for various packet sizes.
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4.6 Performance Metrics Measurement for various Tran-
sition Mechanisms
To compare behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic types in the context of transi-
tion mechanisms, a total of seven different mechanisms were implemented
on the test-bed. For each mechanism, throughput, delay, jitter and CPU us-
age were measured.
At the beginning of the metrics measurement process, the first and second
sets of measurements taken were for pure IPv4 and pure IPv6 networks re-
spectively. Here, all nodes were stacked with either IPv4 or IPv6, and then
appropriate performance metrics were measured. By doing so, a benchmark
is established against which various transition mechanism metrics can be
compared.
TCP throughput results are presented in Figure 4.14. Due to hardware lim-
itations, the maximum bandwidth possible on the test-bed was 100Mbps
(as was the case in all the tests), and it can be seen that the pure IPv4 net-
work TCP throughput values are very close to the theoretical upper bound
for most packet sizes. It can also be observed that IPv6 values are slightly
lower than that of IPv4, for all packet sizes. For almost all packet sizes above
256Bytes, TCP throughput values range between 75-95 Bytes for the scenar-
ios tested. However, there are differences in TCP behaviour amongst the
transition mechanisms.
To gauge the difference in performance between the seven transition mech-
anisms and to compare that with pure IPv4 and IPv6 implementations, nor-
malised data is represented in a colour heat map as shown in Figure 4.15.
In this chart, green represents desirability, which in this case is higher TCP
throughput values.
Collectively in Figures 4.14 and 4.15, it can be seen that there is a clear and
significant distinction between TCP throughput values for different transi-
tion mechanisms. While pure IPv4/IPv6 have the highest values in this set,
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dual stack stands out with the best throughput of all the seven mechanisms
tested. Its throughput drop at the maximum is approximately 8%. Con-
versely, it can be seen that Teredo has the lowest throughput for almost all
packet sizes. At its lowest point, the throughput drop is almost 30% (this
is for packet size 256 and 384 bytes). In the tunnelling techniques tested, as
opposed to dual stack and translation, the configured tunnel and 6to4 give
slightly better TCP throughputs. ISATAP, apart from Teredo, has compara-
tively lower throughput values out of all the tunnelling techniques.
UDP throughput data is presented next. As seen in Figure 4.16 and the as-
sociated heat map in Figure 4.17, the highest values again are for pure IPv4
and IPv6 networks, these values being marginally higher than that for TCP.
The transition mechanism UDP throughput values show differences of upto
35% between the highest and lowest values. The lowest values are again re-
ported by Teredo while the highest of all transition mechanisms is by dual
stack. This pattern is similar to that of TCP throughput values, however all
values are marginally higher than TCP counterparts.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
T C
P  
T h
r o
u g
h p
u t
  ( M
b p
s )
Packet Size (Bytes)
Pure IPv4 Configured Tunnel 6to4
ISATAP 6over4 NAT64
Dual Stack Teredo Pure IPv6
Figure 4.14: Graph of TCP throughput implementing different transition
mechanisms
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.63 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.95
Configured Tunnel 0.51 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.83
6to4 0.52 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.88 0.84
ISATAP 0.33 0.51 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.86 0.91 0.84 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.80
6over4 0.42 0.74 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.87
NAT64 0.42 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.88
Dual Stack 0.52 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.89
Teredo 0.37 0.49 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.84 0.79 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.87
Pure IPv6 0.53 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.94
TCP Throughput: Transition Mechanisms
Figure 4.15: Heat map of TCP throughput implementing different transition
mechanisms
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Figure 4.16: Graph of UDP throughput implementing different transition
mechanisms
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.56 0.92 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.93
Configured Tunnel 0.53 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.78 0.79
6to4 0.52 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.82 0.78 0.83
ISATAP 0.51 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.78 0.81
6over4 0.44 0.51 0.70 0.72 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.83
NAT64 0.48 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.89
Dual Stack 0.52 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.90
Teredo 0.38 0.49 0.68 0.65 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.88 0.90 0.86
Pure IPv6 0.51 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.90
UDP Throughput: Transition Mechanisms
Figure 4.17: Heat map of UDP throughput implementing different transition
mechanisms
Comparing the transition mechanisms, 6over4 shows a slightly different be-
haviour to that with TCP traffic type. Here the values are lower, almost close
to that of Teredo. The translation techniques tested all seems to have com-
parable values, apart from that of Teredo. Of these techniques, ISATAP is
again recording comparatively marginally higher values for larger packet
sizes, but definitely lower for packets smaller than 512 bytes.
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In Figures 4.18 and 4.19, TCP delay values are presented. Here a clear pat-
tern emerges that shows there are significant differences between the mecha-
nisms. This is very important when configuring delay sensitive applications
on networks. As expected, networks without transition mechanisms have
the lowest values, with the pure IPv6 network having values marginally
lower than IPv4. All these values average around 100ms. NAT64 and dual
stack values band together, averaging around 400ms, but in all cases, NAT64
values are marginally higher. The values reported by all other transition
mechanisms are very similar, with an average around 1150ms. Teredo values
are in the same band, however, its values have a great degree of fluctuations
and are at the lower end of this band.
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Figure 4.18: Graph of TCP delay implementing different transition mecha-
nisms
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4
0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05
Configured Tunnel
0.97 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.97 0.88 0.94 0.93
6to4
0.98 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.93
ISATAP
0.98 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.86 0.95 0.89 0.98 0.94
6over4
0.95 0.99 0.97 0.91 0.90 0.99 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.95
NAT64
0.41 0.36 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.17 0.20
Dual Stack
0.38 0.33 0.45 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.19 0.16 0.17
Teredo
0.84 0.97 0.84 0.78 0.80 0.96 0.73 0.79 0.86 0.79 0.86 0.80 0.79
Pure IPv6
0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
TCP Delay: Transition Mechanisms
Figure 4.19: Heat map of TCP delay implementing different transition mech-
anisms
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Figure 4.20: Graph of UDP delay implementing different transition mecha-
nisms
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The three bands that appear in the TCP graphs have a significant separation
between them. Dual stack and NAT64, banded together, have values approx-
imately two and half times more than networks without transition mecha-
nisms, while all others have values 12-fold greater. Therefore, the choice of
transition mechanism on networks that run delay sensitive applications is
critical, otherwise there will be a significant impact on the quality of trans-
mission.
Delay values attained for UDP traffic type are presented in Figures 4.20 and
4.21. Here again, a clear distinction can be seen, where groups of mecha-
nisms are separated into three bands. The pattern is very similar to that of
TCP delay, however all values are lower slightly lower than for TCP. At the
bottom of the delay scale are the two networks without any transition mech-
anisms (average value less than 100ms), while in the middle are the dual
stack and NAT64 lines averaging around 380ms. The top band is where all
transition mechanisms are registering UDP delay values, and has an average
of approximately 1000ms.
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4
0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
Configured Tunnel
0.79 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.70 0.78 0.86 0.78 0.84
6to4
1.00 0.83 0.59 0.84 0.75 0.93 0.83 0.86 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.84 0.81
ISATAP
0.98 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.82 1.00 0.92 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.84
6over4
0.91 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.95 0.84 0.77 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.87
NAT64
0.42 0.38 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.24 0.17 0.21
Dual Stack
0.31 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.18 0.16 0.17
Teredo
0.86 0.95 0.86 0.79 0.76 0.92 0.70 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.76 0.72
Pure IPv6
0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03
UDP Delay: Transition Mechanisms
Figure 4.21: Heat map of UDP delay implementing different transition mech-
anisms
Jitter measurements for the different transition mechanisms are presented
next. For the TCP traffic type (Figures 4.22 and 4.23) it can be seen that for
lower packet sizes jitter values are good, however, larger packets generally
give higher jitter values. This is the case for all transition mechanisms. For
some packet sizes, pure IPv6 has the lowest jitter and for most scenarios the
highest jitter value is for the packet size of 1152 bytes. TCP jitter values,
in most cases, are below 1ms and distinct patterns cannot be identified to
differentiate between the transition mechanisms.
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Figure 4.22: Graph of TCP jitter implementing different transition mecha-
nisms
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4
0.62 0.31 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.50 0.46 0.62 0.58 0.69 0.58 0.69
Configured Tunnel
0.65 0.17 0.23 0.38 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.62 0.71 0.53 0.48 0.65
6to4
0.66 0.19 0.22 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.58 0.58 0.73 0.62 0.53 0.50
ISATAP
0.77 0.27 0.31 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.60 0.73 0.67 0.92 0.69 0.65 0.62
6over4
0.69 0.20 0.23 0.42 0.40 0.52 0.51 0.62 0.61 0.85 0.62 0.55 0.69
NAT64
0.65 0.20 0.19 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.54 0.49 0.73 0.65 0.50 0.62
Dual Stack
0.54 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.62 0.68 0.52 0.61
Teredo
0.73 0.23 0.27 0.45 0.46 0.55 0.59 0.63 0.65 1.00 0.58 0.54 0.65
Pure IPv6
0.54 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.63 0.62 0.63
TCP Jitter: Transition Mechanisms
Figure 4.23: Heat map of TCP jitter implementing different transition mech-
anisms
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For UDP traffic, values are presented in Figures 4.24 and 4.25. The pattern
here is very similar to that of TCP delay. Again, no clear distinction can be
made between the mechanisms however, for most packet sizes, dual stack
and NAT64 delay values band together with that of the pure IPv4/IPv6 net-
works. ISATAP and Teredo together are registering marginally higher values
than all the other mechanisms.
It can be seen that all TCP and UDP values approximately range between
0.2ms and 1ms. UDP jitter values are marginally lower for all transition
mechanisms. Also, NAT64 and dual stack have comparable values with that
of networks with pure IP stacks. In the context of the graphs presented, the
difference between the high values and that at the lower end of the band is
approximately double, that is, for a given packet size both TCP and UDP
jitter can be almost double between the different transition mechanisms.
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Figure 4.24: Graph of UDP jitter implementing different transition mecha-
nisms
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4
0.40 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.50 0.65 0.60 0.66 0.56 0.45
Configured Tunnel
0.50 0.18 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.70 0.85 0.55 0.60 0.60
6to4
0.43 0.15 0.20 0.45 0.47 0.60 0.55 0.70 0.72 0.85 0.54 0.67 0.52
ISATAP
0.70 0.28 0.39 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.76 0.85 0.80 1.00 0.65 0.79 0.65
6over4
0.43 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.50 0.65 0.60 0.79 0.70 0.92 0.42 0.69 0.40
NAT64
0.42 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.36 0.38 0.55 0.52 0.72 0.39 0.32 0.29
Dual Stack
0.60 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.36 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.65 0.50 0.35 0.39
Teredo
0.90 0.26 0.32 0.46 0.52 0.69 0.72 0.79 0.76 1.00 0.52 0.61 0.55
Pure IPv6
0.30 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.28 0.30
UDP Jitter: Transition Mechanisms
Figure 4.25: Heat map of UDP jitter implementing different transition mech-
anisms
The final metrics measured was CPU usage on the sender (CPU1) and re-
ceiver (CPU2) nodes , results of which are presented in Figures 4.26 to 4.33.
In all cases IPv4 and IPv6 pure networks used the lowest resources, while
CPU usage ranged between 10 to 40% with transition mechanism. Although
this metrics does not really distinguish between the different TCP and UDP
characteristics on transition mechanisms, it does show that on networks with
transition mechanisms, CPU usage increases drastically. This is evident in all
cases, with both TCP and UDP portraying similar characteristics.
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Figure 4.26: Graph of TCP CPU1 (sender) usage percentage implementing
different transition mechanisms
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4
0.13 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.13 0.21
Configured Tunnel
0.92 0.39 0.66 0.47 0.58 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.63
6to4
0.66 0.37 0.42 0.79 0.53 0.66 0.66 0.79 0.79 0.53 0.84 0.66 0.63
ISATAP
0.66 0.47 0.63 0.53 0.66 0.68 0.47 0.42 0.53 0.74 0.66 0.53 0.47
6over4
0.89 0.79 0.47 0.68 0.63 0.74 0.68 0.79 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.79 0.74
NAT64
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Figure 4.27: Heat map of TCP CPU1 (sender) usage percentage implement-
ing different transition mechanisms
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Figure 4.28: Graph of UDP CPU1 (sender) usage percentage implementing
different transition mechanisms
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Figure 4.29: Heat map UDP of CPU1 (sender) usage percentage implement-
ing different transition mechanisms
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Figure 4.30: Graph of TCP CPU2 (receiver) usage percentage implementing
different transition mechanisms
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Figure 4.31: Heat Map of TCP CPU2 (receiver) Usage Percentage Implement-
ing Different Transition Mechanisms
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Figure 4.32: Graph of UDP CPU2 (receiver) usage percentage implementing
different transition mechanisms
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Figure 4.33: Heat map of UDP CPU2 (receiver) usage percentage implement-
ing different transition mechanisms
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4.7 Results Evaluation
In the preceding section, results attained from the transition mechanism test-
beds have been presented and general trends have been explained. This
gives an interesting insight into the behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic as
they traverse networks with different transition mechanisms. In relation to
the four performance metrics measured in each scenario, there are a number
of specific observations of interest. These are discussed herewith.
There is a slight difference in throughput between IPv4 and IPv6. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, there are many advantages that the new version offers
over the predecessor, however, the throughput values attained in all tests
show that network performance slightly downgrades on networks imple-
mented with IPv6. This is the case for both TCP and UDP, with the difference
being just slight.
The throughput values attained in the test-bed tests show that there are sig-
nificant differences between the various transition mechanisms. All mecha-
nisms definitely have an impact on the throughput, but to varying degrees.
For TCP traffic, Teredo and ISATAP mechanisms register the highest through-
put drop (almost 30%) while the rest show approximately 8%. For UDP traf-
fic type, Teredo and 6over4 have the greatest impact on performance degra-
dation, where the maximum drop is approximately 35%. In all cases, tran-
sition mechanisms significantly impact network performance, irrespective
of the traffic type. Of the seven mechanisms installed, five were tunnelling
techniques, and in relation to their throughput values, differences have also
been identified for both the protocols.
TCP and UDP delay values are good differentiators of the various transition
mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, this is a significant metric since there are
many delay sensitive applications currently being used on networks. It is
seen that networks that do not have transition mechanisms have low delay,
however, for all transition mechanisms tested, there is a remarkable increase
in the values, irrespective of the actual traffic type. However, generally UDP
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delay values are slightly lower. Some mechanisms increase delay at least
three-fold, while others are registering a 10-12-fold increase. Dual stack and
6to4 increase the value the least while all the others have a significant in-
crease.
Jitter measurements do not show any clear distinction between the TCP and
UDP protocols, however, there is some indication that the actual transition
mechanism implemented does impact traffic jitter to a certain extent. In the
band of all values, there is a difference of approximately 0.2ms for most
packet sizes. This is the case for both TCP and UDP, however, in UDP jitter
values, NAT64 and dual stack stand out from the rest for a few packet sizes.
The values for these are comparable with IPv4 and IPv6 networks without
transition mechanisms.
Similar to jitter, CPU usage on the sending and the receiving nodes does not
distinctly show a difference between the mechanisms, however, it does show
that they add substantial overheads to the communicating nodes. Increases
of between 10 to 30% is evident, while that on networks with the transition
mechanisms is around 5%.
The test-bed results presented in this chapter gives an insight into the net-
work performance of seven transition mechanisms. Of interest in this chap-
ter has been the difference between the transition mechanisms with TCP and
UDP traffic traversing the test-bed - this has been highlighted in the discus-
sions. Since all performance metrics highlight the difference between the
mechanisms and the protocols, they can be used as a criterion for creating an
ordinal ranking of the mechanisms. This will be discussed later in the thesis,
in Chapter 7.
Chapter 5
TCP and UDP Behaviour in Wireless
Environments
5.1 Introduction and Motivation
In the last decade, the world has become increasingly mobile and conse-
quently traditional ways of creating networks have proven to be inadequate.
Traditional cabled networks reduce mobility, whereas there is no such limita-
tion with wireless connectivity. There is also an increased drive towards the
concept of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) and connecting seamlessly to dif-
ferent network infrastructures. Wireless networking technologies are slowly
encroaching on the realms of traditional, fixed, wired networks. Although
this technology is versatile, it currently dominates only in the last mile data
delivery on network infrastructures. Consequently, a wired-to-wireless net-
work is a common occurrence.
In this chapter, TCP and UDP end-to-end network performance issues are
examined as data traverses a heterogeneous network comprising of wired
and wireless links. On a test-bed, the last mile connection wireless is set up
and common performance related metrics are measured and analysed. This
is all done specifically within the IEEE 802.11 WLAN’s three latest standards.
A description of wireless techniques are presented, which is followed by a
discussion relating to wireless standards. Wireless security protocols are pre-
sented followed by an outline of the experimental test bed configuration and
a presentation of the test bed results.
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5.2 Wireless Preamble
The Internet has been growing at a phenomenal rate and become a huge
mesh of interconnected sub-networks, one that is increasingly becoming a
heterogeneous environment. The unprecedented growth of computer net-
works and the heterogeneity in its components has fundamentally become
a concern for a legacy protocol like TCP (Niehenke, 2014). What began as
a network created using just copper wires, has now evolved into a global
network, that in addition to using typical wires, is employing state-of the-
art fibre optics and numerous wireless technologies such as infrared, satel-
lites and radio waves. Subsequently, today there is a new class of connected
end-users who remains linked to networks without the need for a physical
medium (wire) between them and a network’s gateway. This is the mobile
and wireless network revolution.
Wireless technologies continue to play an ever increasing role in all aspects
of network communication. This field has also attracted a great deal of inter-
est from researchers and developers, thus has expanded rapidly in the last
two decades (Petersen & Carlsen, 2008); (Hengstler & Aghajan, 2006). This
is evident with the continuous development of new IEEE802.11 standards
and the dominant penetration of wireless broadband Internet access in all
aspects of our lives at home and in business establishments. In relation to
indoor wireless local area networks (WLANs), the predominant use of this
is currently for the last mile connection, that is, it enables users at the edge
of the Internet to remain connected to the infrastructure via some network
but without the use of traditional cables (Dimitrakopoulos, Demestichas, &
Koenig, 2010) (Aslam, Guinard, McGibney, Rea, & Pesch, 2011). Mostly ra-
dio frequencies are used on WLANs as the foundation technology.
Nowadays, a typical network is one that has both wired and wireless parts.
Generally, the network backbone and core are wired, and the last hop por-
tion is normally wireless. Hence data travelling on networks often traverses
a wireless link prior to arriving at a destination node. This is convenient for
the end users, however, it is a well-known fact that wireless communication
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channels, when compared with their counterparts, are notoriously unreliable
(Chan & Baciu, 2012). This is mainly due to the general characteristics of
the associated wireless technologies, including the use of radio waves as the
communication link (Wells, 2009). In addition to this, it has been shown in
numerous studies that due to variability in technologies and unpredictabil-
ity in conditions, wireless transmissions are the bottleneck when it comes to
performance issues on a network (Chan & Baciu, 2012) (Xylomenos, Polyzos,
Mahonen, & Saaranen, 2001). For this particular reason, researching the in-
teraction between TCP/UDP and IEEE802.11 WLAN technologies has been
a focus of much research in recent times (Huston, 2001) (Xylomenos & Poly-
zos, 1999) (Balakrishnan, Padmanabhan, Seshan, & Katz, 1997). However,
the bulk of these studies does not necessarily look at the last-mile connec-
tion issues related to network performance, but are mainly focusing on the
sending-side (that is, primarily the servers) in communication channels.
In a heterogeneous environment, as data moves between wired and wire-
less sectors, it is important to realise that network performance will be of
concern. Communication protocols, like TCP and UDP, establish end to end
connectivity between the sender and the receiver, irrespective of the type of
communication media in the path. This non-discrimination leads to the pro-
tocol not being able to distinguish between wired and wireless paths. This is
good news because this transparency implies communication protocols can
function without the knowledge of the intricacies of the actual transmission
path. However, data losses in wireless paths is much greater than that on
wired links, and communication protocols are not able to differentiate be-
tween the implications of such an unreliable medium. Thus in the event that
the wired and wireless links have differing reliability, the communication
protocols react to both networks the same. This matters since a protocol, like
TCP, is designed to deal with wired losses by reducing its sending rates, but
for a wireless network this throttling back is not necessary since it may be
the unreliability of the link (and not congestion). So instead of wireless data
losses that can generally be recovered locally using numerous error checking
and recovery techniques, a solution that reduces data transfer rates unneces-
sarily is applied by default.
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5.3 Wireless Standards
Networking standards by IEEE are generally designated with standard num-
bers starting with 802, and the 11 family of the standards relates to wireless
local area networks. IEEE802.11 standard is a set of both Media Access Con-
trol (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications that are used to imple-
ment WLANs using radio frequency bands (Saliga, 2000). Back in 1997, the
first standard of wireless IEEE802.11 was released. This supported a maxi-
mum speed of only 2Mbps, which is insufficient for most applications cur-
rently being used, and for this reason, 802.11 wireless products cease to ex-
ist. Initially, it was deployed only in vertical applications, such as inventory
management, point of sale and transportation management, but later was
used to experiment with enterprise type networks.
Sensors 
RFID 
ZigBee Alliance 
802.15.4 
Wide Area Network (WAN) 
802.16e 
Nomadic 
802.20 
Mobile 
802.21 
Handoff 
802.22 
WRAN 
2, 2.5, 3, 4G 
Cellular 
Wide Area Network (WAN) 
802.16 
WiMax 
Local Area Network (LAN) 
802.11 
Wi-Fi (a,b,g,n,ac) 
Personal Area Network (PAN) 
802.15 
Bluetooth 
8020.15.3 
802.15.4 
ZigBee 
 
Table 5.1: Wireless networks and their corresponding IEEE 802.11 protocols
The original standard used either infrared signals or the Industrial Scientific
Medical (ISM) frequency band at 2.4GHz and also defined the Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) as its media access
mechanism (T.-S. Ho & Chen, 1996). CSMA/CA technique, allows maxi-
mum capacity on a channel to about 65% of the bandwidth, mainly due to
the overheads of error correction and error checking. All WLAN technolo-
gies today operate using the ISM band, which has been defined as three unli-
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censed bands in the range 902-928MHz (Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band),
2.400-4.835GHz (S-Band) and 5.725-5.850GHz (C-Band). A major weakness
of 802.11 was that it offered a lot of choice for manufacturers and designers of
products, thus interoperability between different vendor items was always a
challenge.
In 1999, two new standards for WLANs were released, one of which was
IEEE802.11a. This higher bandwidth standard permitted data rates up to
54Mbps and used the 5GHz radio frequency range (Kapp, 2002). The ac-
tual release of products based on IEEE802.11a happened in 2001, mainly
due to lack of development in radio frequency bands. It used Orthogo-
nal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) for signal generation. In the
main, OFDM divides the 5GHz sending band into 53 sub bands, with 48
sub bands for sending and 4 for control information (Kapp, 2002) (Doufexi
et al., 2002) (“Supplement to IEEE Standard for Information Technology -
Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems - Local
and Metropolitan Area Networks - Specific Requirements. Part 11: Wireless
LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifica-
tions: High-Speed Physical Layer in the 5 GHz Band”, 1999). The use of sub
bands reduces the effects of signal interference and enhances transmission
security.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Preamble PLCP Header MAC PDU 
Header Payload CRC32 
Frame Control Duration Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 
Sequence 
Control 
Address 4 
Protocol 
Version 
Frame 
Type 
Frame 
Subtype 
To DS From DS 
More 
Fragments 
Retry 
Power 
Management 
More 
Data 
Security Reserved 
30 Bytes 0-2312 Bytes 4 Bytes 
2 Bytes 
6 bits 2 bits 4 bits 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 1 bit 
2 Bytes 6 Bytes 
6 Bytes 6 Bytes 2 Bytes 6 Bytes 
Figure 5.1: The 802.11 frame format structure
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5.3.1 IEEE802.11b
IEEE802.11b rectified all the amendments to the original standard and was
released in 1999, together with the IEEE802.11a standard. However, since
this standard used the unprotected 2.4GHz frequency range and a lot of de-
velopment had already been undertaken in this frequency range, products
based on this standard were released into the market much sooner than the
actual release date of the standard (Bousquet, Messier, & Magierowski, 2007)
(“Supplement to IEEE Standard for Information Technology- Telecommuni-
cations and Information Exchange Between Systems- Local and Metropolitan
Area Networks- Specific Requirements- Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Ac-
cess Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications: Higher-Speed
Physical Layer Extension in the 2.4 GHz Band”, 2000). Unlike (IEEE802.11a,
IEEE802.11b) uses the same frequency range as that of the original IEEE802.11,
but has an increased maximum data rate of 11Mbps (Hoefel, 2008). This
much needed increased bandwidth and substantial price reduction (Celebi,
Dericiogullari, & Bitirim, 2007) in IEEE802.11b devices allowed developers
to utilise typical office applications over wireless. This led to a wide accep-
tance of WLAN technology and at that stage 802.11b became the definitive
standard for WLAN.
802.11 
Protocol 
Year 
Introduced 
Frequency 
(GHz) 
Bandwidth 
(MHz) 
Modulation 
Technique 
Theoretical 
Maximum  
Data Rate 
(Mbps) 
802.11a 1999 5 20 OFDM 54 
802.11b 1999 2.4 22 DSSS 11 
802.11g 2003 2.4 
20 OFDM, 
DSSS 
54 
802.11n 2009 2.4, 5 20, 40 OFDM 300 
802.11ac 2013 5 20, 40, 80, 160 OFDM 600 
 
Table 5.2: Different wireless standards and their specifications
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IEEE802.11b uses High-Rate Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (HR-DSSS)
for radio wave signal generation. This method (Jemai, Piesiewicz, & Kurner,
2005) is very similar to traditional DSSS, however, the actual encoding mech-
anism uses Complementary Coding Key (CCK) (Pursley & Royster, 2007)
(Pursley & Royster, 2009). CCK takes 4 or 8 bits of data and encodes it into
one CCK unit. Thus the HR-DSSS CCK modulation mechanism can revert
to low data rates, if necessary, to allow backward compatibility. In the main,
IEEE802.11b allows a data transfer rate of 11Mbps, but can scale back to ei-
ther 1, 2, or 5.5Mbps (Saliga, 2000). At lower transmission speeds less com-
plex and more redundant methods of data encoding are used, so data is less
susceptible to corruption due to the vulnerabilities of wireless transmission
technology (de Carvalho, Veiga, Marques, Pacheco, & Reis, 2010). Irrespec-
tive of all these, from todays stand point, 802.11b has a low maximum speed
(Garg & Kappes, 2003) and its use of an unregulated frequency band implies
interference from home and office appliances.
5.3.2 IEEE802.11g
In 2003, IEEE ratified 802.11g as the third wireless modulation standard. This
attempted to combine the best of 802.11a and 802.11b, by offering support for
a maximum throughput of 54Mbps using 2.4GHz frequency for increased
coverage range. Being backward compatible with its predecessor, allowed
the use of 802.11g equipment on the 802.11b infrastructure during the mi-
gration phase (T. Wang & Refai, 2005). Dual-band devices (that support both
802.11a and 802.11b) started appearing in the market as dual-band/tri-mode,
supporting all 802.11a, b and g in one single device (Celebi et al., 2007) (Drilo
& Flatz, 2003). As was the case with the previous version, actual products
with this standard came onto the market well before the ratification date.
IEEE802.11g wireless signal has a great maximum speed and is not easily
susceptible to typical wireless obstructions. It uses OFDM and CCK technol-
ogy for mandatory modulation schemes, giving it an upper mandatory data
rate of 24Mbps, although it also uses other schemes to maintain compati-
bility (Drilo & Flatz, 2003) (M.-J. Ho, Wang, Shelby, & Haisch, 2003) (Issac,
Hamid, & Tan, 2006). However, since it also has optional components, it can
provide optional higher data rates of 36, 48, and 54Mbps. Although 802.11g
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is backward compatible, the presence of any 802.11b device on the network
significantly, negatively impacts on the network speed.
For this standard to maintain backward compatibility, 802.11g uses a DSSS
modulation technique. The mechanism is complex, but in the main it uses
four different physical layers, three of which are described as Extended Rate
Physical (ERP) and one which is DSSS-OFDM (S.-C. Wang, Chen, Lee, &
Helmy, 2005). All of these four coexist at the sender end during initial frame
exchange, and depending on what is supported at the other end of the com-
munication link, the sender is able to use any one of the four to initiate back-
ward compatibility mode communication.
For its time, 802.11g was compelling because it gave a five-fold increase in
WLAN speed over its predecessor and offered great range and coverage (S.-
C. Wang et al., 2005). Its backward compatibility was also a bonus.
5.3.3 IEEE802.11n
The previous 802.11 standards were again improved, and in 2009 the IEEE802.11n
WLAN standard was introduced, a standard that took seven years of devel-
opment by the IEEE TGn task group. This amendment improved WLANs
(Letor, Torfs, & Blondia, 2012) (Lim, Kim, & Suh, 2012) (Paul & Ogunfunmi,
2008) significantly since it added Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO)
to its mechanism, together with Spatial-Division Multiplexing (SDM), Space-
Time Block Coding (STBC) and transmitter beam forming (Lim et al., 2012)
(Paul & Ogunfunmi, 2008) (Perahia, 2008). These effectively enhanced the
maximum achievable speed from 54Mbps to 600Mbps, using four spatial
transmission streams at a channel width of 40MHz. In addition to MIMO,
frame aggregation and security improvements were also introduced, whilst
still enabling transmission using 2.4GHz and 5GHz frequency bands (Lim et
al., 2012) (Perahia, 2008). These techniques theoretically increase speed more
than ten-fold over the maximum data rate possible with the 802.11a/g stan-
dards.
The increase in speed and range is evident in the 802.11n standard. This has
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been achieved by enhancements in both the PHY and MAC layers. Frame
aggregation, enables the media to send multiple MAC frames in one PHY
packet, reducing the associated overheads. Another key enhancement is
related to the introduction of a Reverse Direction (RD) protocol. This ef-
fectively allows the transmitting device currently holding the transmission
channel to seamlessly transfer control to another device, without requir-
ing the second device to initiate a data transfer. For delay sensitive appli-
cations, such as multimedia streaming and Voice-over WLAN (VoWLAN)
(Lim et al., 2012), 802.11n has inbuilt QoS features, allowing it to prioritise
network traffic (Kolahi, Cao, & Chen, 2013). If handheld devices are using
the 802.11n standard, its Power Save Multi-Poll (PSMP) feature conserves
battery markedly. In addition, 802.11n has an extended channel switch an-
nouncement, allowing an access point to switch between different supported
channels (Perahia, 2008). There has also been an improvement in radio re-
source management which enables 802.11n based access points to function
more efficiently in an environment where there are multiple access points
functioning together on one network. There is also improved handoff be-
tween base stations, which enables better use of VoIP technology on mobile
phones on wireless networks.
IEEE802.11n has had resounding market success. Initially, devices appeared
with draft standards, however, when the 802.11n proper was released, over
100 devices were released in the first few months, three times as many as
with the 802.11a, b, or g standards (Perahia, 2008). This was the first time
wireless networks became capable of hundreds of megabits of data transfer,
as opposed to just a few megabits per second.
5.3.4 IEEE802.11ac
The latest wireless standard released in early 2014, is IEEE802.11ac, which
took approximately two years to develop, frame format shown in Figure
5.2. This standard provides Very High Throughput (VHT), with data rates
in access of 1Gbps and uses the 5.8 ISM radio band. It also claims that a
data rate of up to 7Gbps is possible (L. Verma, Fakharzadeh, & Choi, 2013).
For the first time, Multi-User MIMO (MU-MIMO) technology has been em-
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ployed (L. Verma et al., 2013). This enables increased total capacity in situa-
tions where a single access point is sharing wireless channels with a number
of other wireless stations. MU-MIMO allows simultaneous transmission of
data from an access point to the connecting devices this is in contrast to the
time sharing schemas used in CSMA technology that were employed in the
earlier standard (L. Verma et al., 2013) (Ong et al., 2011). It is expected that
the use of 802.11ac will become dominant in the market space and that by
2015, there will be close to one billion devices in the world using this VHT
standard.
There are a number of key improvements that really differentiates 802.11ac
from its predecessors. IEEE802.11n supported the use of only two channels
(20 and 40 MHz) while the new standard supports 20, 40 and 80, and has
the option to support 160MHz as well (Hoefel, 2013) (L. Verma et al., 2013).
The 160MHz channel is available with both contiguous and non-contiguous
types allowing flexible channel assignment (Hoefel, 2013). Larger channel
sizes are desired since they increase data transfer rates. In relation to spatial
streams, 802.11n was capable of handling a maximum of four streams, while
802.11ac has increased this to eight streams. With this, beamforming has also
been enhanced, enabling the wireless antennas to focus the transmission of
radio frequencies to where they are required, unlike earlier uni/omnidire-
ctional type antennas. Since beamforming is based on explicit channel mea-
surements, both the transmitter and the receiver must support the technol-
ogy. In addition to supporting the traditional 64 Quadrature Amplitude
Modulation (QAM), the new standard also supports 256QAM as an optional
mode (C.-W. Huang et al., 2012). There are also three optional features that
have been inherited from 802.11n:Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) code,
STBC and Short Guard Interval (SGI) of 400ns. These technical enhance-
ments together have increased data transfer rates approximately ten fold
from what was offered by earlier wireless standards.
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Wireless standards continue to evolve, and there is a juggling act between
the maximum amount of data it can transmit and the size of the cover-
age area. Higher frequency (5GHz versus 2.4GHz) implies greater band-
width, and greater attenuation. Radio waves attenuate exponentially over
distance, therefore, since 802.11ac is using 5GHz frequency, it will undoubt-
edly deliver increased data rates, however, the coverage area may be sig-
nificantly smaller than that expected when using 2.4GHz devices. Wireless
Gigabit (WiGig) is the next big evolutionary step in developing wireless stan-
dards (Vaughan-Nichols, 2010) (Hansen, 2011). The next proposed standard
IEEE802.11ad, will be based on this and will be using a 60GHz frequency
band. This is just the beginning of an exciting technical roadmap progres-
sion that will take WiGig to new heights using proven techniques, as well as
new ones, yet to be discovered.
Enhancing data transfer rates and coverage area is important, however equally
important is securing data that is being transmitted on connection media. On
a wireless network this is more of an issue than with wired transmissions,
giving rise to the development of security protocols.
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Figure 5.2: The 802.11ac frame format structure
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5.4 Wireless Security Protocols
Wireless communication security is more of a concern than wired since there
is no inherent physical protection between devices. The physical connec-
tion has been replaced by logical associations using radio, which by nature
uses broadcast for transmission. In such an environment common security
threats, such as eavesdropping, injecting bogus messages, jamming, replay-
ing attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) can be easily mounted (Nisbet, 2012).
To protect from these and to give confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
to data travelling via wireless, wireless security protocols have been devel-
oped. Wireless security protocols are presented in Table 5.3.
 WEP WPA WPA2 
IV Length 24 bits 48 bits 48 bits 
Authentication N/A 
IEEE 
802.1X/EAP/PSK 
IEEE 802.1X/EAP/PSK 
Cryptographic 
Algorithm 
RC4 RC4 AES 
Data Integrity CRC32 MIC CCM 
Encryption Method WEP TKIP CCMP 
Key Size 40 – 104 bits 128 bits 128 bits 
Keys for Packets No Yes Yes 
Key Management 
Manual key 
rotation 
Per packet key 
rotation 
Per packet key rotation (TKIP) 
Per session key rotation (AES-CCMP) 
 
Table 5.3: Different wireless security mechanisms and specifications
5.4.1 Wired Equivalent Privacy
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was the first IEEE802.11 specification that
attempted to secure wireless communication. Developed in 1999 by the Wi-
Fi alliance, its aim was to make wireless networks at least as secure as a wired
local area network, that is, it was never intended to achieve strong security
(Lashkari, Mansoor, & Danesh, 2009) (Lashkari, Towhidi, & Hosseini, 2009)
(Maple, Jacobs, & Reeve, 2006). In essence, WEP aimed to provide access
control to the network, message confidentiality, and integrity. For controlling
access, the connecting station first needs to authenticate itself with the access
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point that it wants to establish communication with. This is achieved using
a simple challenge-response protocol between the two, at the end of which
communication is established based on the success or failure of the authenti-
cation. Actual authentication is one way only, that is, the access point is not
authenticated to the connecting station, but the station is to the access point.
In relation to confidentiality, WEP uses the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stream
cipher. Here, for each message sent via wireless, RCA is initialised and a
pseudo-random byte sequence (key stream) is generated (Lashkari, Mansoor,
& Danesh, 2009) (Lashkari, Towhidi, & Hosseini, 2009). This sequence is
XORed with the message to generate the encrypted message. In this schema
(Figure 5.3), it is essential that each message is encrypted with a different key
stream. To ensure that data integrity is maintained, WEP does this using pro-
tection based on an encrypted Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)(Schweber,
1992) value operation (Lashkari, Towhidi, & Hosseini, 2009) (Borsc & Shinde,
2005). Here, an Integrity Check Value (ICV) is generated and appended to
the message prior to the encryption before transmission.
The introduction of WEP was the first attempt to secure WLAN commu-
nications. However, soon there were a number of vulnerabilities found in its
mechanism. WEP goals were ill-defined from the offset, thus, there were
flaws just waiting to be exploited. Having only one way authentication
meant that a connecting station could associate with a rogue access point;
using the same shared key for both authentication and encryption was an-
other major weakness. During authentication between the connecting nodes,
no sessions are established so once the process completes, it is possible for
a potential attacker to spoof the MAC address of the connecting station and
continue communication, that is, the connection station can be impersonated
(Reddy, Sai Ramani, Rijutha, Ali, & Reddy, 2010) (Maple et al., 2006). WEPs
confidentiality mechanism is also flawed since it uses weak RC4 keys for the
seed values; therefore the beginning RC4 output is not really random and
reveals a lot of secret information about the key that is used. WEP is sus-
ceptible to passive attacks (based on traffic statistical analysis), active attacks
(based on traffic injections and impersonation) and also dictionary-building
brute force attacks.
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Figure 5.3: WEP encryption block diagram
5.4.2 Wi-Fi Protected Access
Due to a number of apparent vulnerabilities in WEP, Wi-Fi Protected Access
(WPA) was formally adopted in 2003 as the replacement for its predecessor.
WPA, also referred to as the draft IEEE802.11i, has the facility to be installed
on WLANs with just a firmware upgrade on WEP capable Network Interface
Cards (NICs), however, it does require totally new access points, since there
are major changes required in them (Maple et al., 2006) (Bohn, Grob, Nubgen,
& Schwann, 2006). Commonly WPA was implemented as WPA-Pre-Shared
Key (PSK), which uses keys of length 256bits, a significant change from the
64 and 128bit keys that were used in WEP implementations.
There were a number of major changes implemented in WPA. Encrypted
Message Integrity Checks (MIC) were incorporated in WPA to ascertain if an
attacker had captured or altered data packets between the communicating
node and the access point (MIC has replaced CRC). This reduces the chance
of a DoS and spoofing type attacks. The encryption algorithm has been im-
proved to the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) (Figure 5.4), which
supplies each connecting host with a much longer unique key that gets ro-
tated at a configurable interval (Lashkari, Mansoor, & Danesh, 2009) (Selim,
El Badawy, & Salam, 2006). TKIP uses a per-packet key, which dynamically
generates a 128bit key for each packet, resulting in negating attacks that nor-
mally compromised WEP (Lashkari, Mansoor, & Danesh, 2009).
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Figure 5.4: TKIP encryption block diagram
For authentication enhancement, WPA can be used together with a RADIUS
server to implement WPA-Enterprise. In this scenario, WPA uses 802.1X+EAP
for authentication while the RADIUS server eliminates the need for using
pre-shared keys (Y. Wu, Zhu, Kong, & Yi, 2009). Such a setup is desirable
since it can be easily integrated with the Windows login process.
Despite significant improvements in WPA over WEP, the new WLAN secu-
rity protocol has already been exploited. Different approaches have been
employed to circumvent WPA security, showing that there are numerous
vulnerabilities in its design (ref 1, ref 2, ref 3). Eventually in 2010 it was
proved that nearly all traffic going towards a WPA enabled WLAN client can
be decrypted by using fragmentation and injection of an arbitrary amount of
packets in the data stream.
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5.4.3 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2
WPA2 is the most recent of the wireless encryption algorithms and has been
in existence since 2004. WPA, the predecessor, was always thought of as
an intermediate measure until a new protocol was made available, hence
WPA2. Also known as IEE802.11i-2004, it provides much stronger data pro-
tection and network layer access control than WEP and WPA (Li, Kolahi,
Safdari, & Argawe, 2011). One of its major significant changes has been
the mandatory use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm
and counter cipher mode with block Chaining Message Authentication Code
Protocol (CCMP), which together has replaced TKIP (Kolahi, Singla, Ehsan,
& Dong, 2011). WPA2 provides wireless security ranging from small home
installations to government grade security on large implementations.
WPA2 by default provides support for WPA mechanism. However, in ad-
dition to this, WPA2 has a number of other additional benefits and features.
It provides strong authentication and encryption support for both infrastruc-
ture and ad-hoc implementations. In comparison to this, WPA services for
strong encryption, is limited to infrastructure networks only. There is also
support for key caching - this mechanism reduces overheads on network
nodes that are roaming between different access points. Also, WPA2 sup-
ports pre-authentication, that is, it capable of completing an authentication
exchange between a wireless node and an access point prior to initiation of
roaming.
The security provided by implementing WPA2 is robust. This has been achieved
by using an authentication services that uses a four-way handshake mecha-
nism to authenticate wireless stations and nodes during the first stage of the
communication process.
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5.5 Some Key Research
There are numerous researches that have been undertaken in the area of
wireless networks. This is mainly due to the diversity in the topic. In re-
lation to IEEE802.11, some recent research are mentioned in Table 5.4. In
all these research undertakings, some aspect of wireless networks have been
performance analysed on test-bed implementation. This approach is similar
to what has been used in this thesis undertaking.
 
 
 
. 
Author(s) Title Research Focus 
José A. R. Pacheco de Carvalho, H. 
Veiga, Cláudia F. F. P. Ribeiro Pacheco, 
and A. D. Reis (2014) 
Experimental Performance Studies of 
Laboratory WPA IEEE 802.11b,g PTMP 
Links 
IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 
802.11g, WPA 
Upendra Singh and Poonam Jindal 
(2014) 
Performance Analysis of Secure 
Wireless Local Area Network using 
Test-bed 
IEEE 802.11n, 
WPA, and WEP 
Roger Pierre Fabris Hoefel (2014) 
IEEE 802.11ac: A Performance 
Evaluation with Lattice-Based MMSE 
and Zero Forcing MIMO OFDM 
Receivers 
IEEE 802.11ac 
Vincent Picard and Eric Lafond (2014) 
Performance Evaluation of Next 
Generation Wi-Fi (802.11ac) for Mobile 
Offloading 
IEEE 802.11ac 
Saad Saleh, Zawar Shah, and Adeel Baig 
(2013) 
Capacity Analysis of Combined IPTV 
and VoIP Over IEEE 802.11n 
IEEE 802.11n 
M. Hasbullah Mazlan, Sharifah H.S. 
Ariffin, Mohammed Balfaqih, S. 
Norhaizum M. Hasnan, and Shariq 
Haseeb (2012) 
 
Latancy Evaluation of Authentication 
Protocols in Centralized 802.11 
Architecture 
WPA2 
Naeem Khademi, Michael Welzl, and 
Stein Gjessing (2012) 
Experimental Evaluation of TCP 
Performance in Multi-rate 802.11 
WLANs 
IEEE 802.11g 
J. A. R. Pacheco de Carvalho, Cláudia F. 
F. P., Nuno Marques, and H. Veiga 
(2011) 
Comparative Performance Studies of 
Laboratory Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11 b, g WEP 
Point-to-Point Links 
IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 
802.11g, and WEP 
J. A. R. Pacheco de Carvalho, H. Veiga, 
N. Marques, C. F. F. Ribeiro Pacheco, 
and A. D. Reis (2011) 
Performance Measurements of IEEE 
802.11 b, g Laboratory WEP and WPA 
Point-to-Point Links using TCP, UDP 
and FTP 
IEEE 802.11b, IEEE  
802.11g, WEP, 
WPA 
Emilija Miletic, Klaus Tittelbach-
Helmrich, and Goran Panic (2011) 
Performance Investigation on an MIMO 
capable 802.11aCcompliant MAC 
Protocol Implementation 
IEEE 802.11a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5.4: Recent research on performance evaluation of wireless standards
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5.6 Wireless Test-bed Setup
D-ITG Sender
IPv4 Address: 10.0.0.3/8
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::a00:3/64
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
IEEE 802.11 g/n/ac
Access Point
IPv4 Address: 10.0.0.2/8
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::a00:2/64
IPv4 Address: 10.0.0.1/8
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::a00:1/64
IPv4 Address: 172.16.1.1/16
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::ac10:101/64
Server
D-ITG Receiver
IPv4 Address: 172.16.1.2/16
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::ac10:102/64
Wired BackboneLast Mile Data Delivery
Security Protocols:
WEP, WPA, WPA2
Figure 5.5: Wireless network diagram
Figure 5.5 shows the network that was implemented in a laboratory envi-
ronment in which wireless networks were tested. In this, there is a wired
connection between the wireless access point and a server, and a wireless
connection between a client node and the access point. Since D-ITG was
used to generate data and to measure various network performance metrics,
another node was connected to the sever to act as D-ITG receiver.
The access point and the wireless nodes were configured with various wire-
less standards and encryption techniques. On completing each configura-
tion and testing it for functionality, D-ITG session was initiated and various
performance related metrics were collected. With wireless networks, unlike
with transition mechanism, TCP and UDP drop rates were also measured.
However, all TCP drop rates registered were zero. Data attained from the
wireless test-bed is presented and discussed in the next section.
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5.7 Performance Metrics Measurements from Wireless
Test-beds
To compare behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic types on wireless implemen-
tations, a test-bed of wireless devices was implemented. Various wireless
standards, encryptions and IP versions were implemented and for each com-
bination, throughput, and delay were measured. The first and the second set
of measurements that were taken were for pure IPv4 and pure IPv6 wired
networks respectively. Here, all nodes were stacked with either IPv4 or IPv6,
and then appropriate performance metrics were measured. Later the wired
network was removed, and on the same test-bed various wireless combina-
tions were implemented. This was done with a wireless infrastructure type
network using an access point. The test-bed used in these evaluations was
capable of transferring data at gigabit speeds.
In Figure 5.6, TCP throughput values are presented. To clearly see the differ-
ence between the wireless options, wired results have been omitted in this
graph. However, it is worth noting wired values attained plateaued at ap-
proximately 450Mbps. Evaluating just the networks with different variations
of wireless, it is evident that the IEEE802.11ac network, without encryption,
gives the highest throughput values. Whilst the theoretical upper bound for
this is significantly higher (discussed earlier in section 5.3.4), the values at-
tained on the test-bed are heavily compromised - the maximum attained here
just average 120Mbps. It is also noted that in most of the other scenarios, the
wireless throughput values registered are all under 50Mbps. Again, this is
significantly lower than the theoretical values for the different standards. To
see the difference between all values recorded under 50Mbps, an extrapo-
lated TCP throughput graph is presented in Figure 5.7.
In the TCP extracted graph, together with the TCP heat map in Figure 5.8,
there are a few interesting observations. In all throughputs under 50Mbps,
IEEE802.11n with WPA2 as the encryption protocol is the best performer.
This is true for both versions of the Internet protocol. Following that, IEEE802.11ac
with WPA2 peaks at around 40Mbps. It is again noticed that in both pairs
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mentioned above, IPv6 values are slightly lower that IPv4. All other val-
ues average below 10Mbps mostly with IEEE802.11g WPA2 registering the
lowest values. It is also observed that IEEE802.11ac with WPA2 v6 values
significantly fluctuate for different packet sizes.
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Figure 5.6: Graph of TCP throughput for various network scenarios
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Figure 5.7: Extracted graph of TCP throughput (up to 60 Mbps)
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.38 0.49 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.89 0.99 0.98
Pure IPv6 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.28 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.55 0.68 0.81 0.90 1.00 0.99
ac Open v4 0.10 0.30 0.49 0.73 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.90
ac WPA v4 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.07
ac WPA v6 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08
ac WPA2 v4 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.37
ac WPA2 v6 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.27
n Open v4 0.09 0.39 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.79 0.87 0.76 0.71 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.47
n WEP v4 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.01
n WEP v6 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.08
n WPA v4 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.04
n WPA v6 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.01
n WPA2 v4 0.21 0.59 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92
n WPA2 v6 0.29 0.59 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.72
g Open v4 0.42 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.17
g WEP v4 0.39 0.54 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.67 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.40
g WEP v6 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.56
g WPA v4
0.66 0.83 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.98 0.62
g WPA v6
0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.27
g WPA2 v4
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
g WPA2 v6
0.69 0.81 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.45
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Figure 5.8: Heat map of TCP throughput for various network scenarios
130
CHAPTER 5. TCP AND UDP BEHAVIOUR IN WIRELESS
ENVIRONMENTS
Next, UDP throughput values attained in all test-bed experiments are pre-
sented. In Figure 5.9, it is observed that the lines mostly follow a pattern
similar to that of TCP, however, all values are slightly higher. IEEE802.11ac,
without encryption, is registering the highest values, and these values are al-
most 35% higher than TCP. All the other wireless scenarios register values at
almost one-third that of the IEEE802.11ac, ranging to a maximum of 60Mbps.
Within this range, there are distinct patterns that can be identified, as can be
clearly seen in the extracted graph, presented in Figure 5.10.
There is a significant difference between the UDP throughout values reg-
istered in different scenarios, as shown in Figure 5.10 and emphasised in the
heat map, Figure 5.11. As was the case for TCP, IEEE802.11n with WPA2
on IPv4 has the highest throughput values, maximizing to approximately
55Mbps. This is almost one-third that of a network with IEEE802.11ac with-
out any encryption. Following closely is WPA2 on the IPv4 network imple-
mented with IEEE802.11ac. This is registering a drop of almost 10% from that
of IEEE802.11n. Following that, in the band 30-40Mbps, are again the WPA2
lines for both IEEE802.11n and ac standards, but for the IPv6 networks. The
graph shows that in relation to WPA2, there is a performance drop of at least
40% between IPv4 and IPv6, with the latter version having lower values.
IEEE802.11n IPv4 without any encryption values are comparable with those
discussed above, since they all fall in the same band in the graph. However,
these are all at the lower end of that band.
For both TCP and UDP traffic types there are patterns evident in the graphs.
TCP shows values slightly lower than UDP, while IPv6 values in all cases are
also lower than its counterpart version. The latest standard in wireless defi-
nitely gives the best throughout on a network without encryption, however,
with encryption throughput, values drop to that comparable with earlier edi-
tions of the wireless standard. In all cases there is a remarkable throughout
drop between wired and wireless networks, therefore, since throughput val-
ues are different in most scenarios, wireless techniques can be ranked, which
will be done later in the thesis.
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Figure 5.9: Graph of UDP throughput for various network scenarios
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Figure 5.10: Extracted graph of UDP throughput (up to 60 Mbps)
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.46 0.55 0.69 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85
Pure IPv6 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.50 0.67 0.75 0.84 0.92 1.00 0.99
ac Open v4 0.07 0.21 0.35 0.50 0.66 0.80 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.97
ac WPA v4 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07
ac WPA v6 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07
ac WPA2 v4 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.31
ac WPA2 v6 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.23
n Open v4 0.13 0.26 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.72 0.64
n WEP v4 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
n WEP v6 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
n WPA v4 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
n WPA v6 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09
n WPA2 v4 0.22 0.47 0.72 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99
n WPA2 v6 0.23 0.39 0.55 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53
g Open v4 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.53
g WEP v4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g WEP v6 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.91
g WPA v4
0.09 0.21 0.33 0.45 0.56 0.64 0.72 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.92
g WPA v6
0.07 0.20 0.32 0.41 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.69 0.74 0.79 0.90 1.00 1.00
g WPA2 v4
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA2 v6
0.09 0.21 0.33 0.45 0.57 0.64 0.70 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.96
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Figure 5.11: Heat map of UDP throughput for various network scenarios
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The next metric measured on various wireless networks was jitter, values
for which are presented herewith. In Figure 5.12, all values for TCP jitter
are shown and it highlights that IEEE802.11g, with a WPA2 encryption pro-
tocol on a network with IPv4, has significantly higher jitter values than all
the other wireless combinations implemented. While all values are below
0.01ms in all scenarios, IEEE802.11g with WPA2 on the IPv4 network has, at
a maximum, 8-fold higher values. This is mostly the case for larger packet
sizes. In Figure 5.13, the extracted values up, to the maximum of 0.006ms,
are presented and here a differentiation can be made between most of the
other wireless scenarios. For smaller packet sizes all values are close to zero,
but for large packet sizes, values range from 0 to 0.004ms. The IEEE802.11ac
TCP jitter values attained are comparable with all the others. IEEE802.11g
with WPA on an IPv6 infrastructure stands out in this band, with all values
significantly higher than the rest. These differences are emphasised in the
associated heat map shown in Figure 5.14
In relation to UDP jitter measured on wireless networks, the patterns here
are very similar to that of TCP. As shown in Figure 5.15, for all cases but
one, the values attained are close to zero, similar to that of TCP. As is the
case with TCP, IEEE802.11g with WPA2 encryption protocol on a network
with IPv4 has the highest values, significantly higher than the rest. At its
peak, the UDP jitter is almost 6 times higher than all the other scenarios.
When values close to zero are extrapolated (Figure 5.16) it can be seen that
although all UDP jitter recorded are under 0.005ms, there still exists a pattern
of separation between the wireless combinations. This is also highlighted in
the associated heat map in Figure 5.17. It can be seen that in this minor range
of values there are three distinct bands. Tightly grouped together at the top
are IEEE802.11g WEP with IPv6 and two IEEE802.11n WPA lines, followed
by a combination of WPA and WEP implemented in different combinations.
At the bottom of the band are mostly the lines associated with IEEE802.11ac,
showing that the new version of the wireless standard has significant im-
provement in reducing wireless UDP jitter on networks.
Wireless jitter, like throughput, is an important performance metrics. Jitter
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is an issue on wireless networks and this has been emphasised in the results
attained. Since different combinations of wireless standards and encryptions
on the two versions of IP networks produce different jitter values, it will be
used to rank the wireless combinations later in this thesis.
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Figure 5.12: Graph of TCP jitter for various network scenarios
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Figure 5.13: Extracted graph of TCP jitter (up to 0.006 ms)
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.54
Pure IPv6 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.76 1.00 0.77 0.66 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.52
ac Open v4 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08
ac WPA v4 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.59
ac WPA v6 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.57 0.57
ac WPA2 v4 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18
ac WPA2 v6 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.23
n Open v4 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.17
n WEP v4 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.43 0.54 0.67 0.74 0.81 0.91 1.00 1.00
n WEP v6 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.57
n WPA v4 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.74
n WPA v6 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.78 0.96 0.96
n WPA2 v4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
n WPA2 v6 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
g Open v4 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
g WEP v4 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
g WEP v6 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA v4
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA v6
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
g WPA2 v4
0.05 0.11 0.17 0.39 0.61 0.70 0.78 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.00
g WPA2 v6
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
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Figure 5.14: Heat map of TCP jitter for various network scenarios
136
CHAPTER 5. TCP AND UDP BEHAVIOUR IN WIRELESS
ENVIRONMENTS
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
U D
P  
J i t
t e
r   (
m
s )
Packet Size (Bytes)
Pure IPv4 Pure IPv6 ac Open v4 ac WPA v4 ac WPA v6 ac WPA2 v4 ac WPA2 v6
n Open v4 n WEP v4 n WEP v6 n WPA v4 n WPA v6 n WPA2 v4 n WPA2 v6
g Open v4 g WEP v4 g WEP v6 g WPA v4 g WPA v6 g WPA2 v4 g WPA2 v6
Figure 5.15: Graph of UDP jitter for various network scenarios
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Figure 5.16: Extracted graph of UDP jitter (up to 0.006 ms)
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.88 1.00 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.76
Pure IPv6 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79
ac Open v4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ac WPA v4 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
ac WPA v6 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
ac WPA2 v4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
ac WPA2 v6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
n Open v4 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11
n WEP v4 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.57 0.67 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.00
n WEP v6 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.44
n WPA v4 0.34 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.57 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.83 0.83
n WPA v6 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.85 0.85
n WPA2 v4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
n WPA2 v6 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15
g Open v4 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
g WEP v4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WEP v6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA v4
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA v6
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA2 v4
0.18 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.59 0.70 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.94 1.00 1.00
g WPA2 v6
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
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Figure 5.17: Heat map of UDP jitter for various network scenarios
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TCP and UDP delay values measured on wireless networks are presented
here. In Figure 5.18, it can be seen that all TCP delay values are below
approximately 10ms and they are distinctly separated into three different
bands. The group that has registered the highest delay is comprised of the
IEEE802.11n standard only. In this, the IEEE802.11n with WPA on both ver-
sions of IP and IEEE802.11n with WPA2 on IPv4 networks are present, regis-
tering a reading averaging 10ms. At half this delay value is the next band av-
eraging around 5ms. In this there are no specific patterns that can be identi-
fied, but two lines are for WPA2 and two are with IEEE802.11n. IEEE802.11ac
with WPA2 on an IPv6 network is also present. In this band two scenarios
that register very close to the same values are for networks with WPA2 on
IPv6 for the two newer standards IEEE802.11n and ac. The rest of the sce-
narios are all registering values close to zero. To differentiate between the
TCP values, and to highlight the existence of the three bands, a heat map is
presented Figure 5.19. This emphasises that there are clear bands of delays
in the scenarios tested.
TCP delay is a significant factor on wireless networks. Wired networks tested
showed almost insignificant delays (results not shown in graphs), whist some
wireless scenarios report almost 10 times higher TCP delay values.
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Figure 5.18: Graph of TCP delay for various network scenarios
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 0.48 0.28 0.07 0.35 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.82 1.00 1.00
Pure IPv6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ac Open v4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ac WPA v4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ac WPA v6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ac WPA2 v4 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
ac WPA2 v6 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
n Open v4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WEP v4 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
n WEP v6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
n WPA v4 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
n WPA v6 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00
n WPA2 v4 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
n WPA2 v6 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
g Open v4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WEP v4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WEP v6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g WPA v4
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
g WPA v6
0.01 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
g WPA2 v4
0.59 0.56 0.52 0.73 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.89
g WPA2 v6
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Figure 5.19: Heat map of TCP delay for various network scenarios
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Figure 5.20: Graph of UDP delay for various network scenarios
UDP delay results are presented in Figure 5.20, with subsequent heat map
in Figure 5.21. As with TCP, there are significant differences between the
scenarios tested and again the results can be divided into three bands. At
the maximum, the values attained are approximately 10ms, so the values for
UDP delay are comparable with those of TCP. In this upper most band there
are five lines comprising of IEEE802.11n and ac, with WPA and WPA2 en-
cryption mechanisms. In this, both IPv4 and IPv6 exist, however none of the
lines represent data in which WEP has been used as the encryption mecha-
nism. In between 4 and 6ms, there is a mix of lines, mostly with IEEE802.11n
and ac wireless standards. Following this are the lines registering UDP de-
lays at almost 0ms, and in this all the lines are associated with IEEE802.11g
wireless standard.
The delay values attained on individual test-beds show that there are sig-
nificant differences between some of the combinations of wireless standards,
encryptions methodology and IP version. The actual difference between TCP
and UDP values is negligible, nonetheless, together both TCP and UDP delay
values can be used as a performance metric to rank various wireless scenar-
ios.
5.7. PERFORMANCE METRICS MEASUREMENTS FROM WIRELESS
TEST-BEDS 141
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
Pure IPv4 1.00 0.78 0.56 0.63 0.71 0.82 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96
Pure IPv6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ac Open v4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ac WPA v4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ac WPA v6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
ac WPA2 v4 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
ac WPA2 v6 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
n Open v4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WEP v4 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39
n WEP v6 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
n WPA v4 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
n WPA v6 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97
n WPA2 v4 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
n WPA2 v6 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
g Open v4 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
g WEP v4 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
g WEP v6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g WPA v4
0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
g WPA v6
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g WPA2 v4
1.00 0.88 0.76 0.66 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.65
g WPA2 v6
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Figure 5.21: Heat map of UDP delay for various network scenarios
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The final metric measured in the wireless environment is drop rate. This
performance metric is not an issue of concern on wired networks, however,
in case of wireless links, it can be a major factor impacting on network per-
formance. This is presented below in Figure 5.22 and the subsequent colour
chart in Figure 5.23. Here, only UDP drop rate is presented since for TCP
data type, all values are approximately zero.
The drop rate graph and the heat map show that the packet drop rate is only
of concern when the transmission packet size is small, say under 512 Bytes.
For larger packets, in most cases, the values cannot be differentiated. How-
ever, for all packet sizes there are two scenarios that stand out. IEEE802.11ac
with WPA for both versions of the IP is registering values much higher than
all other values where for smaller packets, drop rate reaches almost 70%. The
difference in drop rates between the two versions of IP in IEEE802.11ac with
WPA is negligible, however, as the packet size increase, drop rate decreases
to almost 10%.
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Figure 5.22: Graph of UDP drop rate for various network scenarios
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64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1408 1536
ac Open v4 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ac WPA v4 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.14 0.14
ac WPA v6 0.74 0.69 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.14
ac WPA2 v4 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ac WPA2 v6 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n Open v4 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
n WEP v4 0.86 0.58 0.31 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WEP v6 0.57 0.33 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WPA v4 0.49 0.37 0.26 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WPA v6 1.00 0.65 0.30 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WPA2 v4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n WPA2 v6 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g Open v4 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g WEP v4 0.87 0.73 0.59 0.40 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.19
g WEP v6 1.00 0.84 0.67 0.47 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
g WPA v4
0.70 0.58 0.47 0.38 0.30 0.20 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
g WPA v6
0.20 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00
g WPA2 v4
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g WPA2 v6
0.65 0.49 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
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Figure 5.23: Heat map of UDP drop rate for various network scenarios
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5.8 Results Evaluation
In this chapter, the focus has been on evaluating TCP and UDP behaviour
on networks that have some implementation of different wireless standards
and encryption techniques. Results and data have been presented using line
graphs and heat maps presented in the previous section. For wireless, the
metrics measured are throughput, jitter, delay, and UDP packet drop rate.
Whilst the intricacies of each scenario have been discussed already, here, the
key observations will be highlighted.
On wireless networks, one of the primary differentiating performance met-
rics is throughput. Throughput values attained are all a fraction of what can
be achieved on wired networks. It is also observed that there is a major differ-
ence between theoretical bandwidth and the maximum throughput achieved
on test beds. In the case of wired networks, this difference is not that big (a
10 to 15% drop), but for wireless there is almost a 10-fold difference. As ex-
pected, IEEE802.11ac gives the highest throughout for both TCP and UDP
traffic types. When comparing TCP and UDP throughput values, UDP, in
the most extreme case, is giving an almost 35% higher reading than TCP.
Implementing wireless encryption standards, reduce network performance
and in this thesis the maximum reported drop in this scenario is almost 10%.
This has been the case for WPA2 where implemented on IEEE802.11ac. Also
it can be seen that WPA2 on networks gives the best TCP and UDP through-
put values when compared to the other security mechanisms. The difference
between IPv4 and IPv6 is heavily emphasised on wireless networks, where it
can be seen that there is a performance drop of approximately 40%, in favour
of IPv4.
Jitter plays a critical role on networks, and its impact on compromising net-
work performance can be immense. In this thesis, it can be seen that most
jitter values are acceptable and fall below 0.01ms on wireless infrastructures,
however, one case (a combination of IEEE802.11g with WPA2) is registering
values almost 8-fold higher than the rest. This clearly shows that from a
network performance perspective, the choice of the actual wireless standard
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and the security encryption mechanism is vital.
Undoubtedly, delay on wireless networks is generally a concern, and this
has been emphasised on the test bed networks. Here, it can be seen that
delay happens to be the key differentiator between the wireless scenarios,
highlighting that some combinations of wireless and security standards can
give 10 times higher values than others. The actual difference between TCP
and UDP is insignificant, however in both, a clear distinction can be made
between the wireless scenarios. Also noteworthy is that a majority of the sce-
narios are registering jitter readings close to zero.
On wireless networks, unlike on wired, packet drop rate can heavily impact
on network performance. In the tests conducted, TCP traffic type did not reg-
ister a significant drop rates, however UDP did. At the most there is a UDP
drop rate of 70% and this is very interesting since it is for the newest version
of wireless standard (but with an older version of security mechanism). This
again highlights that the choice of combination of wireless standard and the
security enhancement is critical for getting the best network performance.
The wireless networks implemented on test-beds have highlighted some sig-
nificant characteristics of such networks. As mentioned earlier in the thesis,
wireless usage on LANs is currently mainly for last mile data delivery, there-
fore, enhancing network performance on this critical part of the communica-
tion link is of the uttermost importance. The network performance metrics
measured in these scenarios does distinguish between the combinations of
wireless standards and security mechanisms - this will be used later in the
thesis to rank various wireless networks based on the common metrics that
have been measured.

Chapter 6
TCP/UDP Behaviour in Virtual Private
Networks
6.1 Introduction and Motivation
The existence of a network-centric world has revolutionised the way people
conduct their businesses. It is now common practice for employees to con-
nect to a company’s internal network from diverse locations, and for indi-
viduals to use networks to retrieve critical and confidential data from distant
locations, for example, Internet banking from a home computer or mobile
phone (Ortiz, 1997). Alliances and partnerships among organisations have
become a crucial business strategy, thus requiring a secure communication
channel between various sites. The openness and availability of the Internet
has facilitated this explosive growth, however, data confidentiality, integrity,
and availability are always a paramount concern.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology is the solution that can secure
communication between various sites or within one site. This chapter pro-
vides details about VPN, first by presenting some commonly used VPN pro-
tocols and then outlining the literature related to its network performance
issues. This is followed by details of the test-bed that was implemented to
measure performance metrics related to TCP/UDP traffic types on selected
VPN protocols, and the results attained from it.
6.2 VPN Preamble
VPN is defined as a communication environment constructed by controlled
segmentation of a shared communication infrastructure to emulate the char-
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acteristics of a private network. Proposed as a standard in 1994 in Hanks,
Li, Farinacci, and Traina (1994a) and Hanks, Li, Farinacci, and Traina (1994b)
(and later in Farinacci, Li, Hanks, Meyer, and Traina (2000) and Dommety
(2000)), it is a TCP/IP based technology that can extend a private network
beyond one location across any public network, such as the Internet. VPN
enables communicating nodes to share information securely as if they were
directly connected on one cohesive private network (Pena & Evans, 2000)
(Metz, 2003). The extended VPN secured network can be used to access net-
work based resources in the same way as the resources are available within
a network, that is, the entire setup will be transparent from a network users
perspective (Wood, Stoss, Chan-Lizardo, Papacostas, & Stinson, 1988). It is
also worth noting that a VPN does not establish a link between different sites
to create an integrated network, but is solely implemented for the purposes
of inexpensively securing data transfer on an already existing network in-
frastructure.
There are various types of VPNs that can be implemented. On an one site
network in an organisation, VPN can be deployed to secure access to local
network resources (J. Zeng & Ansari, 2003) (Berger, 2006). Here, data sent
via VPN will reside on that particular network and will traverse only the
nodes nominated to communicate using the security mechanism. The nodes
that are not part of the secured channel will continue communicating as per
normal. In addition to this, a VPN can also be employed to allow secure re-
mote access to a corporate network (this is known as client VPN) (Chandra &
Nair, 2007). VPN used in this way will enable users to connect to a network
when they are offsite but need to connect to their corporate private network
to access data securely. This is similar to an archaic dial-up connection to
network; however, with VPN the connection is secure and easier to imple-
ment since all that is required is a TCP/IP connection between the users node
and the network. Another major use of VPN is to create what is commonly
termed site-to-site VPN (FitzGerald, 2011). This facilitates secure communi-
cation in geographically disparate offices by encrypting/decrypting data as
it leave/arrives at various sites. The intermediary network between the sites
is generally the Internet or some form of third party line, details of which
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may not necessarily be known. For a site-to-site VPN, dedicated equipment
at the edge of the networks may be necessary and generally site-to-site VPNs
can either be policy based (where some traffic destined for the other network
triggers a session to be established) or may be router based (where traffic is
routed via a tunnel to some destination router). Finally, another type of VPN
which commonly used is similar to the client VPN, however, it does not re-
quire preconfigured software at the client end of communication. Instead a
standard browser that supports active contents, acts as a VPN client a setup
beneficial to remote clients since there is no configuration required and they
can simply logon via a webpage to initiate the session . This technique is
an OSI layer-4 VPN solution typically used to carry out bank transactions,
while the other techniques mentioned are layer-3 solutions.
6.3 VPN Protocols
With the availability of numerous off-the-shelf utilities, data in motion on a
network can easily be breached, even by novice users. To protect such data, a
proven solution is implementing VPN between the transmission end points
(Chandra & Nair, 2007). This will secure moving data by encrypting it so that
any unauthorised party eavesdropping will be not be able to make sense of
what is being transmitted. In addition to encrypting with VPN, authentica-
tion between communicating entities can also be achieved.
VPN protocols are generally categorised as per their functionality at different
layers of the OSI model, in particular the layer at which data is exchanged
between the sites (Knight & Lewis, 2004) (Joha, Shatwan, & Ashibani, 2007).
While the focus of this research is to evaluate TCP/UDP traffic behaviour
across VPN, the emphasis will just be on layer three protocols. Nonetheless,
layer-2 protocols are briefly discussed next, prior to delving into the intrica-
cies of layer-3 VPN. Brief advantages and disadvantages of VPN protocols
are presented in Table 6.1.
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Layer 3 VPN 
Protocol 
Encryption 
Strength 
Algorithms 
Compatible 
Platforms 
Ports 
PPTP 
128 bits MPPE 
protocol 
RSA and RC4  
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
TCP port 1723 
IPSec 256 bits key 3DES and AES 
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
UDP ports 500, 
1701, and 4500 
SSTP 
256 bits 
encryption with 
2048 bits key 
AES and RC4 
Windows and 
Linux 
TCP port 443 
OpenVPN 
128 bits 
encryption with 
1024 bits keys, 
256 bit 
encryption for 
control channel 
3DES, AES, 
Blowfish. and 
RC5 
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
TCP port 443 
UDP port 53 
(can be 
changed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Description Advantages Disadvantage 
Layer 2 VPNs 
Forwards Layer 2 information 
(MAC, DLCI, VLAN ID) 
 
ISP dependent 
Low latency 
No packet size overhead 
Multiprotocol support 
Easy to implement 
ISP dependent 
Hardware overhead cost 
Security issues 
Layer 3 VPNs 
Forwards Layer 3 information 
(IP addresses) 
Secured 
Scalable 
Lower cost 
Complicated to 
implement 
Increased latency 
Overhead cost for further 
tunnelling 
 
 
 
 
Layer 2 VPN 
Protocol 
Description 
ATM 
Provides cell, packet, and circuit switching. Supports 
permanent virtual circuit and connection oriented. 
Frame Relay 
Provides congestion control buffering and relies on 
TCP for error recovery. Packet switching and uses 
virtual circuit. 
HDLC 
Provides error detection and flow control; 16/32 bit 
Checksums. Link layer technology used over WAN 
liks 
PPP 
Provides authentication (PAP and CHAP), error 
detection, and link quality mechanism. Encapsulates 
data (HDLC frame), and maintains and terminates 
link setup. 
 
Table 6.1: Comparison of layer 2 and layer 3 VPNs
6.3.1 Layer 2 VPN Protocols
There are numbers of Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN) that has been in use for a num-
ber of years (Andersson & Rosen, 2006). E capsulati g packets at layer 2
enables the VPN tunnel to transport non-IP protocols, however, nowadays
most networks are IP based (Metz, 2004) (S. Kim, Ryu, Park, & Kim, 2006). So
VPN tunnels based on layer can theoretically transport any kind of packet,
mainly using Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)(Simpson, 1994) to connect the
tunnel endpoints. Table 6.2 summarises the two common Layer 2 VPN pro-
tocols (Y. Wang, Yao, Zhao, & Zhou, 2001) (Townsley et al., 1999).
Layer 3 VPN 
Protocol 
Encryption 
Strength 
Algorithms 
Compatible 
Platforms
Ports 
PPTP 
128 bits MPPE 
protocol 
RSA and 4  
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Andr id, 
and iOS. 
TCP port 1723 
IPSec 256 bits key 3DES and AES 
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
UDP ports 500, 
1701, and 4500 
SSTP 
256 bits 
encryption with 
2048 bits key 
AES and RC4 
Windows and 
Linux 
TCP port 443 
OpenVPN 
128 bits 
encryption with 
1024 bits keys, 
256 bit 
encryption for 
control channel 
3DES, AES, 
Blowfish. and 
RC5 
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
TCP port 443 
UDP port 53 
(can be 
changed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Description Advantages Disadvantage 
Layer 2 VPNs 
Forwards Layer 2 information 
(MAC, DLCI, VLAN ID) 
 
ISP dependent 
Low latency 
No packet size overhead 
Multiprotocol support 
Easy to implement 
ISP dependent 
Hardware overhead cost 
Security issues 
Layer 3 VPNs 
Forwards Layer 3 information 
(IP addresses) 
Secured 
Scalable 
Lower cos  
Complicated to 
implement 
Increased latency 
Overhead cost for further 
tunnelling 
 
 
 
Layer 2 VPN 
Protocol 
Description 
L2TP 
Combination of PPTP and L2F which sends 
encapsulated packets over ATM, HDLC, and Frame 
Relay. Paired with IPSec to provide encryption such as, 
3DES and AES. 
PPP 
Provides authentication (PAP and CHAP), error 
detection, and link quality mechanism. Encapsulates 
data (HDLC frame), and maintains and terminates link 
setup. 
 
Table 6.2: Different types of layer 2 VPN protocols
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6.3.2 Layer 3 VPN Protocols
There are a number of commonly used Layer 3 VPNs as shown in Tables
6.3. These are generally used to by consumers on edge devices (Knight &
Lewis, 2004) that generally connects a customer’s end node to that of a ser-
vice provider’s network infrastructure. With VPNs, data can be encrypted
and/or authenticated ( (Mohapatra, Metz, & Cui, 2007) and (Metz, 2003)),
some common algorithms for these are presented in Table 6.4.
Layer 3 VPN 
Protocol 
Encryption 
Strength 
Algorithms 
Compatible 
Platforms 
Ports 
PPTP 
128 bits MPPE 
protocol 
RSA and RC4  
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
TCP port 1723 
IPSec 256 bits key 3DES and AES 
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
UDP ports 500, 
1701, and 4500 
SSTP 
256 bits 
encryption with 
2048 bits key 
AES and RC4 
Windows and 
Linux 
TCP port 443 
OpenVPN 
128 bits 
encryption with 
1024 bits keys, 
256 bit 
encryption for 
control channel 
3DES, AES, 
Blowfish. and 
RC5 
Windows, Linux, 
Mac OSX, Android, 
and iOS. 
TCP port 443 
UDP port 53 
(can be 
changed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Description Advantages Disadvantage 
Layer 2 
VPNs 
Forwards Layer 2 
information 
(MAC, DLCI, 
VLAN ID) 
 
ISP dependent 
Low latency 
No packet size 
overhead 
Multiprotocol 
support 
 
 
ISP dependent 
Hardware overhead 
cost 
 
Layer 3 
VPNs 
 
Forwards Layer 3 
information (IP 
addresses) 
 
 
Complicated to 
implement 
Increased latency 
 
 
 
 
 
Layer 2 VPN 
Protocol 
Description 
ATM 
Provides cell, packet, and circuit switching. Supports 
permanent virtual circuit and connection oriented. 
Frame Relay 
Provides congestion control buffering and relies on 
TCP for error recovery. Packet switching and uses 
virtual circuit. 
HDLC 
Provides error detection and flow control; 16/32 bit 
Checksums. Link layer technology used over WAN 
liks 
PPP 
Provides authentication (PAP and CHAP), error 
detection, and link quality mechanism. Encapsulates 
data (HDLC frame), and maintains and terminates 
link setup. 
 
Table 6.3: Different types of layer 3 VPN protocols
Encryption 
Algorithm 
Year 
Published 
Key Length Block Size Rounds 
AES (Rijndael) 1998 128, 192 or 256 selectable 128 bits 10, 12 or 14 depending on key size 
Blowfish 1993 32-448 bits 64 bits 16 
DES 1977 56 bits (+8 parity bits) 64 bits 16 
3DES 1998 168, 112 or 56 bits 64 bits 48 DES-equivalent 
RC4 1987 40-2048  1 
RC5 1994 0-2040 bits 32, 64 or 128 bits 1-255 
 
Table 6.4: Comparison of data encryption algorithms of block cipher
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Point to Point Tunnelling Protocol
The Point to Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP) specification was initially pub-
lished in 1999, RFC 2637 (Hamzeh et al., 1999) and was originally developed
by the PPTP forum, a vendor consortium of Microsoft, U.S. Robotics and
several remote access vendor companies. This tunnelling protocol is inbuilt
in Microsoft operating systems, thus, allowing any client running such an
operating system to seamlessly connect securely to a corporate VPN (Joha
et al., 2007). The actual PPTP specification does not detail any encryption
or authentication mechanisms, however, for both of these, PPTP relies on
PPP (Simpson, 1994) (Jaha, Ben-Shatwan, & Ashibani, 2008). Thus, PPTP
implementations with commonly used Microsoft operating systems have
various levels of authentication and encryption natively embedded into the
Windows PPTP stack. Initially Microsoft used the Data Encryption Stan-
dard (DES) in the Microsoft-Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(MS-CHAP) for authenticating remote access clients, later, the protocol was
changed to Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP)/EAP with
MSCHAPv2. In the Linux domain, PoPToP daemons (and modules of PPP
and Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE)) are generally used in the
server to provide support for PPTP. At the client end, there used to be lim-
ited support initially, however, new Linux distributions (since SuSE Linux
10) provide full support for this VPN protocol.
PPTP is designed to use two different types of packets to establish secure
communication between different nodes. Generic routing encapsulation (GRE)
is used to carry VPN payload, achieved by adding the GRE header to the
original data packets. In the GRE header, control bit information, sequence
and tunnel number information are present. This is very similar to the Layer
2 Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP) header (Berger, 2006). In addition to using the
GRE packet, PPTP uses a second type of packet that contains the PPTP con-
trol message, which is just a generic TCP packet using port 1723. The second
packet contains information related to session control, like connection re-
quest and response, related parameters and information related to transmis-
sion errors. Both GRE and the PPTP message lack facilities to provide au-
thentication and encryption, therefore PPTP has to be combined with other
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methods so that security enhancements can be achieved.
Corporate
Network
Internet
Step 1
Step 2
PPP
PPTP Tunnel
Step 3
ISP
Provider
Remote Host
PPTP Server
Corporate Host
 
Step 1: 
DNS Query 
Source Address (Remote User) 
Destination Address (ISP Provider DNS) 
Remote User makes a remote 
connection to the Corporate Host. 
PPP is established between ISP and 
Remote User. 
Step 2: 
DNS Query 
Source Address (ISP Provider DNS) 
Destination Address (PPTP Server) 
One PPTP tunnel is automatically 
created between the Remote User 
and the corporate network. 
Step 3: 
DNS Reply 
Source Address (Remote User) 
Destination Address (Corporate User) 
Connection between hosts is 
established. 
Figure 6.1: PPTP implementation via remote access to the corporate network
There have been many significant security vulnerabilities seen in relation to
PPTP. These vulnerabilities are mainly related not to the underlying archi-
tecture of the protocol itself, but to its dependability on other protocols like
PPP and MPPE. Also, there are known problems when PPP and MPPE are
integrated, which also contributes to PPTP problems. MS-CHAP version 1
and 2 have been used with PPTP for authentication, but in recent times it
has been shown that both versions can be breached. Version 1 is fundamen-
tally insecure and there exist numerous tools that can be employed to extract
the passwords, since the hashing algorithm it employs is weak. MS-CHAP
version 2 can be exploited as well since it uses 3DES, which is vulnerable
to dictionary brute force attacks. Such attacks can be mounted on captured
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challenge-response datastream by trying out all possible combinations of 256
bit key. MPPE, generally used in conjunction with MS-CHAP, uses RC4 and
can also be easily cryptanalysed since it uses the same key for encrypting
data in both directions in the communication flow. This can be achieved by
XORing the sniffed datastream from both directions together. PPTP lacks
two factor authentications, but relies on a simple username/password com-
bination. This, when compared to newer VPN protocols is a weak point.
Internet Protocol Security
IPsec comprises of a suite of IETF protocols and algorithms that together can
enhance end-to-end security in an IP based network. The IPsec protocol suite
contains protocols that can be employed to establish mutual authentication
between nodes at the beginning of a secure session and also to negotiate de-
tails of the cryptographic keys that will be used during the secured session
(Kent & Seo, 2005) (Hamed, Al-Shaer, & Marrero, 2005). It provides IP layer
transient data security by enabling a system to select required security re-
lated protocols and algorithms to use for the services. In the main, IPsec
is a network layer protocol that can authenticate data origin, check data in-
tegrity, perform encryption and protect against some common network data
attacks. IPsec can be implemented either in a network host, a security gate-
way (a router or firewall which is IPsec enabled) or in any independent net-
work device. Security enhancement that IPsec offers on the infrastructure
is based on the requirements defined in the Security Policy Database (SPD)
(Lian & Wen-Mei, 2007). This database can be maintained by a network user,
an administrator or some application operating within the constraints of that
network. So IPsec compares the information in the packet header with that
in the SPD, and either protects it using the IPsec mechanism, discards it, or
allows it to bypass the protection offered by the security mechanism.
The architecture of IPsec is such that it is able to provide cryptographically-
based security enhancements for both IPv4 and IPv6 infrastructures. Its var-
ious security related services operate at the IP layer and are also able to pro-
vide data protection at the upper layers of the protocol. Security Associations
(SAs) are at the core of this protocol. These define a number of IPsec re-
6.3. VPN PROTOCOLS 155
lated entities including authentication protocols, keys, algorithms and cryp-
tographic synchronisation related information. There are two modes in which
IPsec can operate, transport, and tunnel (Varadarajan & Crosby, 2014). A
host that is using IPsec has to support both modes of operation, while secu-
rity gateways in the data transmission path must only support tunnel mode.
Depending on the implementation and the combinations chosen, different
security implementations can be reached with VPN, however, IPsec in tun-
nel mode is mainly used to establish VPN.
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Host A
IPSec Server 1
Host B
IPSec Server 2
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Step 3
Step4
Router 1
Router 2
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Source Address (ISP Provider DNS) 
Destination Address (Root DNS) 
Step 3: 
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Source Address (ISP Provider DNS) 
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Step 4: 
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Figure 6.2: IPsec implementation via site-to-site connection
There are various kinds of VPN that can be established with IPsec. A Host-
based VPN between two networked hosts can be established in either tunnel
or transport mode, regardless of the type of connection that exists as long as
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a TCP/IP session is maintained between them. A gateway-based VPN can
be established between two security gateways so that it can facilitate a secure
connection between all nodes on the two, respective networks. This is more
like a network-to-network data security mechanism where data encryption
and decryption happens at the respective network gateways. A host-to-
gateway VPN scenario is generally referred to as a remote access VPN. Here,
a remote host that has access via an IP connection to the Internet, is able
to establish a secure connection to some corporates internal network. Thus,
with configurations available on various hosts and gateways, together with
the availability of the transport and tunnel modes, several configurations of
IPsec-based VPNs are possible. But there are only two commonly imple-
mented configurations : a network-to-network VPN securing data between
two networks, and a client-to-network configuration, where data between a
remote client accessing some trusted network via the Internet is safeguarded.
IPsec leverages security protocols to safeguard data that moves in its estab-
lished VPN tunnel. In the main, it uses Authentication Header (AH) and En-
capsulated Security Payload (ESP), which are both security protocols for data
in motion (RFC 1826 and 1827 respectively for the two protocols (Atkinson,
1995a) (Atkinson, 1995b)) (Adeyinka, 2008). Configuring AH and/or ESP
determines if IPsec in transport or tunnel mode is implemented. In addi-
tion to these, cryptographic keys are also used, which may simply be PSK
or can be issued a more complex means like a Certification Authority (CA).
The choice of what actually gets used and the combinations in any partic-
ular context are determined by a number of factors including security and
systems requirements of the nodes, users, applications, and organisations.
Whatever combination protocols and cryptographic keys are employed, to
the end user, the process of using the VPN created by IPsec is mainly trans-
parent.
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Figure 6.3: IPsec AH and ESP packet structure
Authentication Header Protocol : AH is used in IPsec to provide IP data-
gram integrity and an origination authentication check of the IP header and
upper level protocol data (Kent, 2005a). Whilst doing this, it can also provide
protection against replay attacks by enabling the receiver of the data to check
increments to the sequence numbers upon establishment of security associ-
ations between the sending and receiving entities. Thus, AH is primarily
responsible for providing authentication services (and not confidentiality)
when IPsec is used as a VPN protocol.
AH, when implemented, adds an additional header 24Bytes long to the IP
datagram. IANA has defined AH as protocol 51, so in the IP header field
preceding the AH, a value of 51 will be added to the 8-bit protocol field
(Kurose & Ross, 2008). Following this, the security protocol used is identi-
fied in the Next Header field. The actual length of the message (payload size)
information follows in the Payload Length field, which is then followed by
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a Reserved field (not being used). Next, Security Parameter Index (SPI) in-
formation is inscribed, which identifies the context in which SAs will be in-
terpreted. Sequence Number related to the actual session is in the next field
and finally, Authentication Data along with Integrity Value Check (IVC) in-
formation exists (Hirschler & Treytl, 2012). At the beginning of the session
establishment, AH is generated at the sender end using Hashed Message Au-
thentication Code (HMAC), which gets decoded at the receiver end. HMAC
generally uses common cryptographic hash functions, like Message Digest
5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) or may optionally be using
DES for security transformations (Younglove, 2001).
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Figure 6.4: An IPsec IPv4 packet after applying AH
Depending on the mode of IPsec implementation, AH will be placed in dif-
ferent locations during the communication process. In transport mode, AH is
placed after the IP header and before any other upper layer protocol, while in
the tunnel mode the IP header and options precede the AH header with the
original packet behind the header (Figure 6.4). For IPsec to be applied prop-
erly, different sequences of steps have to be executed depending on whether
the data is inbound or outbound. For outbound traffic, SA that calls the AH
processing is determined first, followed by the header being inserted after
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the IP header. The sequence number for application to the header is then
generated, which is followed by message integrity calculations and informa-
tion. The message integrity information is applied to the end of the AH and
just before the upper layer protocols. For an inbound process, since fragmen-
tation may have occurred during data transit, the data is reassembled prior
to processing of the AH by the IPsec mechanism. This is followed by a series
of verification steps in which the actual association of the datagram to the SA
is determined to ensure that the communication received is really from the
valid SA. While verifying, SPI in the AH and the IP address is looked up first.
This is followed by verification of the sequence numbers, as a mechanism for
anti-replay attaches, and then the data is authenticated, which is finally for-
warded to the destination based on the information in the IP header.
Encapsulated Security Payload : ESP is often used when data confiden-
tiality is a concern. When IPsec ESP is implemented, malicious attackers
will not be able to read and make sense of the data as it moves between the
source and destination. In addition to enhancing confidentiality, ESP also
provides a mix of other security related services, including authenticity and
integrity related checks. If required it can be implemented in encryption-only
or authentication-only configurations, however, security is heavily compro-
mised if only one is implemented. When IPsec is implemented in transport
mode it does not provide integrity and authentication for data in motion,
however in tunnel mode ESP protects the entire inner IP packet while the
outer header remains unprotected. ESP uses IP protocol number 50 and op-
erates on top of the IP layer.
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Figure 6.5: An IPsec IPv4 packet after applying ESP
In ESP, there are several fields in the header similar to AH, but packages in
the fields have very different configurations. Instead of having just a header,
there are now three components divided into ESP header, ESP trailer, and
ESP authentication data (Kent, 2005b) (Hirschler & Treytl, 2012). The SPI
field is the first field of size 32 bits (Figure 6.5), followed by a value that is
used to replay resistance and origin authentication (W. Liu, Jiang, & Zhang,
2006). The actual payload is next, which is a field of variable length depend-
ing on the size of the actual data being transmitted. At the beginning of
the payload there may be an Initialisation Vector (IV), which is present if re-
quired by the encryption algorithm (Younglove, 2001). The actual encryption
is not really part of the IPsec process but solely part of the used algorithm.
Then follows padding, which provides limited communication flow confi-
dentiality and also maintains encryption boundaries as required by some
encryption algorithms. The length of padding used (an optional field) is a
value mentioned in Pad Length field; this field has to exist even if the actual
pad is not being used. This field is followed by another value field (Next
Header), which notifies the recipient of the header type contained within the
encrypted payload. The final field is the authentication data, which contains
the message digest calculated against the ESP packet.
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The use and management of keys when IPsec is used as a VPN protocol
also needs some consideration. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) has the respon-
sibility to create and manage keys used during the communications process,
accommodating for the multiple variations in its implementation (Haddad,
Berenjkoub, & Gazor, 2004). In addition, IKE also plays a major role at the
beginning of the communication process where it is responsible for session
establishment between the VPN nodes (Mao, Zhu, & Qin, 2012). During
the entire process, secure keys have to be used; otherwise, irrespective of
the encryption and the authentication algorithms used, the process can be
significantly compromised. The simplest way to assign keys is manually.
This suits in small environments where there are limited dynamic changes
happening in relation to VPN implementation. Automatic key management
is desired since there is no manual intervention required, allowing VPN to
be deployed seamlessly on large scale implementations. To automatically
assign keys for IPsec VPN, three primary protocols are combined to pro-
vide the required key requirements for the process - they are Internet Secu-
rity Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), Oakley and Se-
cure Key Exchange Mechanism (SKEME) (Maughan, Schertler, Schneider, &
Turner, 1998) (Orman, 1998). The ISAKMP framework is used for authen-
ticating communicating partners and to generate the required keys, while
Oakley, provides a mechanism for an exchange protocol that is required
by the ISAKMP process (Sierra, Hernandez, Ribagorda, & Jayaram, 2002).
SKEME is a Diffie-Hellman algorithm and incorporates Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) into the process of issuing keys during IPsec authentication
process (Krawczyk, 1996). SKEME is a versatile key exchange mechanism
that provides anonymity, repudiability and quick key refreshment to the
IPsec process.
Secure Socket Tunnelling Protocol
The Secure Socket Tunnelling Protocol (SSTP) is the newest of the protocols
that can be used to establish a VPN, allowing remote users and networks to
securely connect to a corporate network. In the main, it uses a Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) 3.0 layer protocol to send either PPP or L2TP traffic between
the tunnel nodes. Data encryption and traffic integrity checks for SSTP are
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done by SSL and its mechanism allows SSTP medium traffic to pass through
commonly used firewalls, NAT and proxy implementations. Thus SSTP is
able to solve the typical VPN problem of not being able to traverse traffic
through network perimeter security enhancements.
SSTP Connection
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Figure 6.6: SSTP implementation via secure connection to the internet
For SSTP to establish a VPN tunnel between the client and the server, first a
TCP connection between the client and the server is established, where com-
munication using a dynamically allocated TCP on the client and TCP port
443 on the server are used (Figure 6.6). The client then sends a SSL-Hello
message to create a session with the SSTP server. The server on receiving
the SSL-Hello message, sends a certificate, which gets validated, the encryp-
tion method is determined and a SSL session is generated which then gets
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encrypted with the SSTP servers public key. On completing this, the en-
crypted form of the SSL session key is sent by the client to the server, which
the server decrypts with its private key. Afterwards, all communication be-
tween the SSTP client and the server is encrypted with the agreed encryption
method using the SSL session key. The SSTP client also sends over a request
for a HTTP session, and then negotiates an SSTP tunnel and a PPP connec-
tion with the SSTP server. In this negotiation, credentials are negotiated for
the PPP authentication method and finally settings are configured for an ei-
ther IPv4 or IPv6 traffic type. This completes the setup of SSTP, allowing the
nodes to send IPv4 or IPv6 traffic over the negotiated PPP link.
SSTP was originally introduced with Microsoft Windows Vista SP1 where
it provided a mechanism to encapsulate PPP traffic over a Secure HTTP
(HTTPS) link. Nowadays, SSTP is commonly available in other server and
router based operating systems, however, its dominance is mainly in the Mi-
crosoft environment. It is similar in functionality to Open VPN, however,
when implemented on a vendor platform (unlike open source), its perfor-
mance and security benefits are tremendously enhanced. Therefore SSTP is
currently the favoured VPN protocol to enhance moving data security when
safeguarding information is of utmost importance, such as credit card num-
bers and other confidential data.
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Figure 6.7: OpenVPN implementation via secure remote connection
Open VPN is an open source tool used to build site-to-site VPNs with SSL
and TLS protocols using pre-shared keys. It is a new and a desirable so-
lution to make secure VPN since it combines several advantages of prior
technologies (Kotuliak, Rybar, & Truchly, 2011). When it is needed to secure
communication between server and client (Figure 6.7), regardless of proto-
col, then open VPN is an effective solution to secure data that is in motion.
Open VPN can be implemented at layer two or three of OSI model and uses
a single TCP and UDP port when establishing connection channel (Qu, Li, &
Dang, 2012). Being client and server architecture, it must be installed on both
VPN extremities. With open VPN a TCP or UDP port on the firewall needs
to be opened (Yang, Ding, Wen, & Zhang, 2010). It can provide multiple in-
coming connections on same port and communicate through proxy servers.
Therefore, there is no need to make changes to firewall configuration.
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Figure 6.8: SSL implementation via secure remote connection
SSL provides a secure transport connection between applications. It was de-
signed to provide encrypted and authenticated channels for web servers and
clients (S. Sun, 2011) (Lakbabi, Orhanou, & El Hajji, 2012). SSL session is an
association between a client and a server. The session state includes security
algorithms and parameters. Connections of the same session share session
state (Badra & Hajjeh, 2006). A session can include multiple secure connec-
tions between servers and clients. SSL protocol uses public key encryption
for authentication (Kuihe & Xin, 2007) (Mao et al., 2012). SSL connection be-
gins with handshake (Figure 6.8), during which applications exchange digi-
tal certificates, agree on the encryption algorithms, and generate encryption
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keys used for remaining session (Kotuliak et al., 2011) (Farrell, 2010). Within
SSL, three protocols exist: handshake protocol, record protocol and the alert
protocol. At the beginning of the session, client authenticates with the server
using handshake. Following that, all messages/data encryption is handled
in record protocol phase. If there are any questionable packets that appear,
then alert protocol comes into action.
TLS is suitable for stream-oriented applications. It uses secure remote pass-
word protocol for authentication (Otrok, Haraty, & El-Kassar, 2006). This
protocol does not require trusted third party authentication and client cer-
tificates, like some of the other mechanisms do (Apostolopoulos, Peris, &
Saha, 1999). Similar to SSL, TLS utilises the handshake and record proto-
col (Rescorla & Modadugu, 2006). These protocols are used to establish the
shared key and using key to protect communication respectively.
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6.4 Key VPN Research
There are many avenues that has been researched in the area on VPNs. Many
of them has been already highlighted in this chapter. In Table 6.5 some other
key researches have been presented. The listed outputs emphasise VPN re-
lated work undertaken using test-beds analysis. This is the same approach
that has been taken in this thesis.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author(s) Title Research Focus 
Alexander Uskov and Hayk 
Avagyan (2014) 
The Efficiency of Block Ciphers in Galois/Counter 
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(2013) 
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Using Dedicated Hardware 
IPSec, 3DES DES 
and AES 
Onur Demir and Tolga 
Aktas (2013) 
Evaluation of Two Models for Securing SIP for 
Home Network Communications 
IPSec and TLS 
Antonio De Rubertis, Luca 
Mainetti, Vincenzo, and 
Stefano Pascali (2013) 
Performance Evaluation of End-to-End Security 
Protocols in an Internet of Things 
IPSec and TLS 
Merima Kulin, Tarik Kazaz 
and Sasa Mrdovic (2012) 
SIP Server Security with TLS: Relative 
Performance Evaluation 
TLS 
Alexander V. Uskov (2012) 
Information Security of IPsec-Based Mobile VPN: 
Authentication and Encryption Algorithms 
Performance 
IPSec AH, and 
ESP 
Eman M. Mohamed, Sherif 
EI-Etriby and Hatem S. 
Abdul-kader (2012) 
Randomness Testing of Modem Encryption 
Techniques in Cloud Environment 
RC4, AES, 3DES 
and DES 
Dherik Barison, Rodrigo 
Sanches Miani, Bruno Bogaz 
Zarpelão, Gean Davis Breda 
and Leonardo de Souza 
(2012) 
Evaluation of Quality in Encrypted VoIP Calls OpenVPN 
Junhua Qu, Tao Li and 
Fangfang Dang (2012) 
Performance Evaluation and Analysis of 
OpenVPN on Android 
OpenVPN 
O P Verma, Ritu Agarwal, 
Dhiraj Dafouti and Shobha 
Tyagi  (2011) 
Performance Analysis Of Data Encryption 
Algorithms 
AES, DES and 
3DES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5: Recent research on performance evaluation of VPN protocols
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6.5 VPN Test-bed Setup
SSTP or IPsec VPN Tunnel
IPv4 Address: 192.168.1.1/24
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::c0a8:101/64
D-ITG Sender
IPv4 Address: 192.168.1.2/24
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::c0a8:102/64
Windows/Ubuntu 
Server
IPv4 Address: 172.16.1.1/16
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::ac10:101/64
D-ITG Receiver
IPv4 Address: 172.16.1.2/16
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::ac10:102/64
Windows/Ubuntu 
ServerIPv4 Address: 10.0.0.1/30
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::a00:1/64
IPv4 Address: 10.0.0.2/30
IPv6 Address: 2001:0db8::a00:2/64
Figure 6.9: VPN network diagram
The test-bed used to evaluate VPN mechanisms is presented in Figure 6.9.
Two servers and two computers were connected in the configuration shown
in the figure. The two end nodes were purely setup for the purposes of gen-
erating and sending traffic through the tunnel, while the two servers acted
as end points for the VPN tunnel. Each server was configured as a router
since data sent had to traverse three networks
The two servers were then configured with various combinations of VPN
techniques and encryption algorithms. Also, for VPN network performance
analysis, the base operating systems on the servers were taken into consider-
ation, therefore, three different operating systems were configured on them.
On successfully configuring a particular configuration, D-ITG session was
initiated and performance related data was collected. This is presented and
discussed in the next section.
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6.6 Performance Metrics Measurements from IPSec and
SSTP VPN Protocols
To compare behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic type on networks with VPN,
two VPN protocols were implemented with different combinations of se-
lected associated algorithms. These combinations were implemented on net-
works with either IPv4 or IPv6, similar to the tests conducted in the previous
two chapters. However, unlike in the previous two contexts, having VPN as
the base operating system on the end servers has been taken into considera-
tion as well. Therefore, all VPN tests have been conducted on three different
operating systems (Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012 and Linux
Ubuntu 12). This has been done to see if the operating system, in addition,
to the actual VPN tunnel type, has an impact on the network performance of
TCP and UDP traffic types. For comparative purposes, the first test in each
combination was performed on a network without VPN, but with both ver-
sions of IP, one at a time.
The first performance metric presented is TCP throughput. In Figure 6.10
and the associated heat map in Figure 6.11 it can be seen that all scenar-
ios record low throughput for small packet sizes, but thereafter the values
increase in all cases, but by different degrees. Three different bands are evi-
dent, where the uppermost band has all the scenarios representing network
without VPNs. All other lines underneath are for those with VPNs, there-
fore, this shows that VPNs do reduce network throughput when TCP traffic
traverses them. The second band is comprised of lines representing six sce-
narios, the common factor between them is that all are for VPNs using SSTP
as the tunnelling protocol. These lines are distinctly separate from networks
without VPN and at the most register a throughput drop of approximately
40%. IPSec lines are in the third band with values averaging around 75Mbps
for most packet sizes. This is a drop in throughput of almost five-fold from
the same network without any VPN protocol. Also, no clear distinction can
be made between the IP versions or the operating systems or the different
algorithms in each category.
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Figure 6.10: Graph of TCP throughput with VPN implemented on different
operating systems
UDP throughput values follow a very similar pattern to that of TCP. This is
evident in Figure 6.12 and emphasised in Figure 6.13. Here, the three bands
are seen again, with the networks without VPN having the greatest through-
put. The values are low for small packets and then increment steadily as
the packet size increase. Differentiation in each band between the scenarios
is not that obvious, but, the three bands themselves can be clearly distin-
guished. As in the case of TCP, the middle band has SSTP related lines on
different operating systems and IP versions. The values average almost 20%
lower than a network without VPN. The lowest band represents all other
scenarios averaging almost 75Mbps for most packet sizes. This, again, is ap-
proximately five-fold lower than the pure networks.
Comparing TCP and UDP throughput values, it can be seen that the differ-
ence between the two traffic types is not that significant, however, in all cases
the degree to which throughput varies is dependant on the actual VPN pro-
tocol implemented. SSTP has much higher throughput readings than IPSec,
and both the graphs and the heat maps show that there are some differences.
Therefore, throughput on VPN implementations is plausible as a tool for or-
dinal ranking of the technologies.
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TCP Throughput: VPN
Figure 6.11: Heat map of TCP throughput with VPN implemented on differ-
ent operating systems
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Figure 6.12: Graph of UDP throughput with VPN implemented on different
operating systems
The next network performance metric presented is delay. In previous chap-
ters it can be seen that delay is a good differentiating entity in the other net-
work scenarios and in the case of VPN protocols it is the same. Delay is a
sensitive metric to measure since it is time dependant, therefore, the syn-
chronisation of clocks and associated accuracies plays a vital role in getting
sensible data. Since delay values are small (measured in fraction of a mil-
lisecond), and precision of inbuilt computer clocks are questionable at this
minute level, expensive external time synchronisation devices are necessary
where precise delay values are to be observed. In this thesis the focus has
been to compare delay attained in one scenario to that in another, and for
this purpose measurements have been taken that rely on the accuracy of the
inbuilt computer clock (due to non-availability of external time synchroni-
sation devices). For this reason, some of the readings presented in delay
graphs are negative values. This is acceptable for the purposes of a com-
parative study, where the focus is to evaluate the difference between various
scenarios. In the case of transition mechanisms and wireless, no negative
results for delay were measured, however this is not the case for VPN.
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UDP Throughput: VPN
Figure 6.13: Heat map of UDP throughput with VPN implemented on dif-
ferent operating systems
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TCP delay results shown in Figure 6.14 distinctly show that there is signif-
icant difference between some of the VPN technologies implemented, but
also show that some technologies cannot be differentiated based on TCP de-
lay. This is emphasised in the associated heat map presented in Figure 6.15.
The graph and the heat map also show that there are three clusters into which
the VPN scenarios are grouped. All lines have zero gradient, indicating that
TCP delay values do not change with packet size in the VPN implementa-
tions. The lowest delays are registered by two VPN scenarios, both SSTP
with IP versions 4 and 6. Also observed is that these are implemented in the
latest version of the operating system. So here it can be seen that the newest
of the VPN protocols tested gives the most favourable TCP delay. Most of
the scenarios tested are grouped together into the middle cluster, where the
difference between the lines is not that obvious. The worst reported TCP de-
lay, with values almost double that of the best readings, are that of the IPSec
VPN technique when implemented on both IPv4 and IPv6. Again, as in the
case of the best values, the worst values are registered in the latest version of
the operating systems tested.
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Figure 6.14: Graph of TCP delay with VPN implemented on different oper-
ating systems
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Figure 6.15: Heat map of TCP delay with VPN implemented on different
operating systems
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As in the case of TCP delay, UDP delay, presented in Figure 6.16 and as-
sociated heat map in Figure 6.17 shows that there is a clear differentiation
between a handful of the VPN technologies. It also shows that in most cases
UDP traffic delay is the same and therefore to some extent, UDP delay may
not be a good differentiating metric in the majority of VPN scenarios. Simi-
lar to TCP delay results, UDP delay also shows that the values attained are
independent of the actual packet transmission size.
Further, it can be seen that there are two scenarios in which there are highly
favourable delays. For UDP unlike TCP, IPsec, for both versions of IP, is
superior. SSTP, which registered the most favourable TCP delay values, is
showing the highest UDP delay values. This is the case for both IP versions.
So overall, delay as a performance metric is a good differentiator in VPN
implementations, identifying the extreme cases of the best and worst VPN
scenarios for TCP and UDP traffic. Overall, the TCP and UDP delay values
attained in all scenarios are comparable.
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Figure 6.16: Graph of UDP delay with VPN implemented on different oper-
ating systems
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Figure 6.17: Heat map of UDP delay with VPN implemented on different
operating systems
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The final metric measured on networks with various VPN technologies is jit-
ter. Most jitter values registered are low, as evident for TCP in Figure 6.18 and
for UDP in Figure 6.21. In both, the maximum value recorded was 0.0004ms.
This shows that jitter is not a significant issue on networks with VPN. How-
ever, even in these minuscule values, there are patterns that can be used to
see the differences between some of the VPN scenarios implemented. This is
highlighted in the TCP and UDP heat maps shown in Figures 6.19 and 6.20
respectively. In all graphs it can be seen that the lowest jitter values are reg-
istered by networks without any VPN implementations. Also in this band
are the SSTP lines, that is, jitter on networks with SSTP is comparable with
networks without any VPN. For all the other scenarios, there is a difference
in jitter between the small packets and the large packets, where for larger
packets jitter values increase steadily. This is the case for both TCP and UDP.
A greater level of distinction between the scenarios is seen in the case of UDP
- this is mostly true for large packet sizes. So overall, jitter as a performance
metric on VPN networks is an average differentiator of TCP/UDP behaviour
on VPN networks and can be used as a mechanism to ordinal rank different
implementations.
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Figure 6.18: Graph of TCP jitter with VPN implemented on different operat-
ing systems
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Figure 6.19: Heat map of TCP jitter with VPN implemented on different op-
erating systems
180
CHAPTER 6. TCP/UDP BEHAVIOUR IN VIRTUAL PRIVATE
NETWORKS
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
Server 2008 IPv4
0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21
Server 2008 IPv4 IPsec
0.36 0.37 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.63 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.93 0.94
Server 2008 IPv4 SSTP
0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29
Server 2012 IPv4
0.21 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21
Server 2012 IPv4 IPsec
0.32 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.80 0.80 0.86
Server 2012 IPv4 SSTP
0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Server 2012 IPv4 AES IPsec
0.32 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.66 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.71
Server 2012 IPv4 DES IPsec
0.28 0.30 0.34 0.04 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.67
Ubuntu 12 IPv4
0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.02
Ubuntu 12 IPv4 IPsec
0.37 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.66 0.73 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.96 0.90
Ubuntu 12 IPv4 SSTP
0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28
Server 2008 IPv6
0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.61
Server 2008 IPv4 IPsec
0.37 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.70
Server 2008 IPv6 SSTP
0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.32
Server 2012 IPv6
0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.26
Server 2012 IPv6 IPsec
0.34 0.39 0.40 0.47 0.51 0.57 0.62 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.81 1.85
Server 2012 IPv6 SSTP
0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.32
Server 2012 IPv6 AES IPsec
0.41 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.65 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.90 1.00 0.94
Server 2012 IPv6 DES IPsec
0.30 0.31 0.34 0.39 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.69 0.74
Ubuntu 12 IPv6
0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.38
Ubuntu 12 IPv6 IPsec
0.42 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.80 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.99 1.00
Ubuntu 12 IPv6 SSTP
0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28
UDP Jitter: VPN
Figure 6.20: Heat map of UDP jitter with VPN implemented on different
operating systems
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Figure 6.21: Graph of UDP jitter with VPN implemented on different oper-
ating systems
Finally, to see the effect different operating systems have on network perfor-
mance in a given scenario, graphs in Figures 6.22-6.24 are presented. In each
of the graphs shown, the only variable is the operating system. All the sce-
narios presented show that the operating system definitely affects network
performance metrics, but the impact each has, is to a different degree. The
set of throughput graphs (Figure 6.22) collectively show that operating sys-
tems can vary throughput by almost 50% in some network scenarios. Linux
Ubuntu is generally outperformed by a Microsoft operating system in all
cases, but to different degrees. Delay graphs presented in 6.23 represent only
IPv4 implementations, and in all cases there is a clear distinction between the
operating systems. In some of the graphs the difference between the oper-
ating systems is substantial. No one particular vendor operating system is
a winner, however, distinction between the operating systems is notewor-
thy. The same is the case in IPv6 delays (Figure 6.24) where the difference
between the operating systems is again emphasised. So overall,it is evident
that operating systems do affect network performance metrics, however, the
degree to which they impact depends on the actual metrics and the chosen
operating system.
182
CHAPTER 6. TCP/UDP BEHAVIOUR IN VIRTUAL PRIVATE
NETWORKS
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
T
C
P
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s)
Packet size (Bytes)
Server 2008 IPv6 Server 2012 IPv6 Ubuntu 12 IPv6
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
T
C
P
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s)
Packet size (Bytes)
Server 2012 IPv6 IPsec Server 2012 IPv6 AES IPsec Server 2012 IPv6 DES IPsec Ubuntu 12 IPv6 IPsec
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
U
D
P
  
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s)
Packet size (Bytes)
Server 2008 IPv6 Server 2012 IPv6 Ubuntu 12 IPv6
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
U
D
P
  
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s)
Packet size (Bytes)
Server 2012 IPv6 IPsec Server 2012 IPv6 AES IPsec Server 2012 IPv6 DES IPsec Ubuntu 12 IPv6 IPsec
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
T
C
P
 T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s)
Packet size (Bytes)
Server 2008 IPv4 Server 2012 IPv4 Ubuntu 12 IPv4
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
64 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1024 1152 1280 1378 1470
U
D
P
  
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s)
Packet size (Bytes)
Server 2008 IPv4 Server 2012 IPv4 Ubuntu 12 IPv4
Figure 6.22: Collective graphs of throughput emphasising characteristics of
various operating systems
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Figure 6.23: Collective graphs of IPv4 delay emphasising characteristics of
various operating systems
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Figure 6.24: Collective graphs of IPv6 delay emphasising characteristics of
various operating systems
6.7 Results Evaluation
The network performance of TCP and UDP traffic types on VPN implemen-
tations, along with related, performance metrics, have been presented. In
addition to ascertaining the difference between the two VPN tunnel tech-
niques (and some of the associated algorithms), there has been an emphasis
on finding out if the base operating system used on VPN servers have an
impact on the network performance. Some of the key overall observations
are highlighted herewith.
It is cleared that VPNs do have an impact on throughput. When comparing
SSTP and IPsec, the former is registering a throughput value drop by ap-
proximately 40% (from networks with VPN), while the latter has an almost
five-fold drop. This also highlights the difference between the two VPN pro-
tocols and shows that the difference is significant. TCP and UDP seem to
follow similar trends and the difference between them is minimal. Also, it
has been observed that there are three bands that can be identified in each of
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the throughput graphs.
Delay proved to be a good indicator of difference between the VPN scenar-
ios tested. This metric shows clusters of VPN scenarios in both TCP and
UDP, however, it also shows a clear distinction between individual clusters.
Negative delay has been reported in VPN tests and this is mainly due to the
precision level of the inbuilt computer levels. For TCP traffic, the lowest de-
lay is registered by SSTP with both versions of IP, while for UDP traffic it is
seen that IPsec registered the lowest values. The degree to which variance in
delays occurs is significant, however, network behaviour based on delay is
similar for both TCP and UDP traffic types.
Jitter values registered on VPN networks are interesting since all values are
comparatively small. However, even with the upper bound of approximately
0.0004ms, there are some patterns that can be identified in the presented data.
In the case of TCP, there exist two bands but this is just the case for larger
packet sizes. For smaller packets, there is no clear distinction between the
scenarios. In the case of UDP, again there are two clusters of data, however
the grouping here is different to that of TCP.
Undoubtedly various VPN technologies impact on network performance,
but to different degrees. From the graphs in this chapter, it is also evident
that the operating systems also impact on network performance. However,
taking into consideration all the different performance metrics, there is no
one clear operating system that outperforms the others. The results obtained
show that the degree to which an operating system impacts on performance
metrics is operating system dependent.
The test-bed results presented in this chapter have clearly shown that VPN
technology selection is critical when in comes to ensuring network perfor-
mance is at its optimum. The actual encryption and authentication algorithm
of each SSTP or IPsec does not have any drastic impact on the test-bed, how-
ever, the base operating system does.
Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Preamble
The focus of this thesis is to evaluate the network performance of TCP and
UDP traffic types on networks in different implementations. To achieve this,
various networks were configured on test-beds in three different contexts. In
total, 50 different networks were configured, comprising of: two with IPv4
and IPv6, seven with various transition mechanisms, nineteen with different
wireless standards and encryption techniques, and twenty-two with VPN
protocols having different algorithms on multiple operating systems. De-
pending on the actual implementation, various network performance met-
rics (throughput, jitter, delay, CPU usage and drop rate) were measured to
ascertain the network behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic types. In doing
so, the goal was to evaluate traffic behaviour in the context of that particu-
lar network and to rank various techniques for network performance within
that context.
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, data from various test-beds have been presented
as graphs and heat maps. The results attained in each context have been
explained, and key findings have been discussed. Such findings have also
been presented in various individual research papers published to date (List
of Publications).
In this discussion, based on the observations so far, and the behaviour of net-
work performance metrics, networking techniques within the contexts will
be ranked. This ranking is established by evaluating the desirability of each
performance metric, primarily by analysing all the graphs and heat maps.
This will lead to identification of key contributions in this thesis.
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7.2 Networks with Transition Mechanisms
There are many transition mechanisms that are currently being used, and of
these, seven have been subjected to test-bed analysis in this thesis. In the
doctoral work of Grayeli (2013), a selection of transition mechanisms have
been ranked based on various performance metrics. That research undertak-
ing is grounded purely in an OPNET simulation environment. In that work,
six transition mechanisms have been ranked using an ordinal value system
based on delay, jitter, and throughput. In this thesis, a similar ranking will
be done (for networks in all three contexts), however, novelty in the work
comes from the difference in primary data collection technique - in Grayeli
(2013), simulation data was used, while in this thesis the primary data source
is test-bed analysis. Earlier in Chapter 3, merits of different approaches have
been discussed.
The four metrics measured on networks with transition mechanism are thro-
ughput, jitter, delay, and CPU usage. Based on the data gathered, these met-
rics have been ranked. This ranking shows that when it comes to differen-
tiating transition mechanisms based on the criteria of network performance,
some metrics are more significant than others. In the case of networks with
transition mechanisms, delay is the best differentiator out of the four met-
rics. The rankings of performance metrics (lower number being more effec-
tive) that can be used to evaluate various transition mechanisms’ network
performance are presented in Table 7.1.
Transition Mechanisms 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP Throughput 
3 UDP Throughput 
4 TCP and UDP CPU Usage 
5 UDP Jitter 
6 TCP Jitter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 Teredo 
4 6over4 
5 Configured Tunnel 
6 ISATAP 
7 6to4 
UDP Delay 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 Configured Tunnel 
4 Teredo 
5 6over4 
6 6to4 
7 ISATAP 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 6to4 
4 
Configured Tunnel 
ISATAP 
6over4 
5 Teredo 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 
NAT64 
Configured Tunnel 
3 ISATAP 
4 
6over4 
6to4 
5 Teredo 
UDP CPU Usage 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 NAT64 
2 ISATAP 
3 6to4 
4 
6over4 
Configured Tunnel 
5 
Dual Stack 
Teredo 
TCP CPU Usage 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 NAT64 
2 
6to4 
Configured Tunnel 
3 ISATAP 
4 
6over4 
Dual Stack 
Teredo 
Table 7.1: Transition mechanism performance metric’s ranking
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Table 7.1 shows that TCP/UDP delay and jitter are better differentiators of
network performance on infrastructures with transition mechanisms than
the other two metrics that were measured in this context. Therefore, based
on this information, in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the transition mechanisms are pre-
sented in an ordinal sequence. A lower numbered rank shows that a mecha-
nism outperforms one that has a higher number.
Transition Mechanisms 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP Throughput 
3 UDP Throughput 
4 TCP and UDP CPU Usage 
5 UDP Jitter 
6 TCP Jitter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 Teredo 
4 6over4 
5 Configured Tunnel 
6 ISATAP 
7 6to4 
UDP Delay 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 Configured Tunnel 
4 Teredo 
5 6over4 
6 6to4 
7 ISATAP 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 6to4 
4 
Configured Tunnel 
ISATAP 
6over4 
5 Teredo 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 
NAT64 
Configured Tunnel 
3 ISATAP 
4 
6over4 
6to4 
5 Teredo 
UDP CPU Usage 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 NAT64 
2 ISATAP 
3 6to4 
4 
6over4 
Configured Tunnel 
5 
Dual Stack 
Teredo 
TCP CPU Usage 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 NAT64 
2 
6to4 
Configured Tunnel 
3 ISATAP 
4 
6over4 
Dual Stack 
Teredo 
Table 7.2: Transition mechanism ranking as per TCP and UDP delay
Transition Mechanis s 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP Throughput 
3 UDP Throughput 
4 TCP and UDP CPU Usage 
5 UDP Jitter 
6 TCP Jitter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 Teredo 
4 6over4 
5 Configured Tunnel 
6 ISATAP 
7 6to4 
UDP Delay 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 Configured Tunnel 
4 Teredo 
5 6over4 
6 6to4 
7 ISATAP 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 
NAT64 
Configured Tunnel 
3 ISATAP 
4 
6over4 
6to4 
5 Teredo 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 Dual Stack 
2 NAT64 
3 6to4 
4 
Configured Tunnel 
ISATAP 
6over4 
5 Teredo 
UDP CPU Usage 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 NAT64 
2 ISATAP 
3 6to4 
4 
6over4 
Configured Tunnel 
5 
Dual Stack 
Teredo 
TCP CPU Usage 
Rank Transition Mechanisms 
1 NAT64 
2 
6to4 
Configured Tunnel 
3 ISATAP 
4 
6over4 
Dual Stack 
Teredo 
Table 7.3: Transition mechanism ranking as per TCP and UDP throughput
In all cases, it can be seen that dual stack and NAT64 are ranked the highest.
The other five mechanisms’ ordinal ranking changes depending on the actual
performance metric, while TEREDO, in two of the tables, is at the bottom.
The tables also emphasises that the ranking is different if the actual traffic
type is taken into consideration. This shows that TCP and UDP traffic behave
differently on networks with transition mechanisms.
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7.3 Networks with Wireless Implementations
Networks that have wireless implementation can be based on different IEEE-
802.11 standards. There is also a choice of various encryption techniques and
for this particular reason, 19 different networks with various combinations of
wireless standards and encryption techniques were subject to test-bed anal-
ysis in this thesis. In the doctoral work of Taank (2008), wired-to-wireless
networks have been evaluated on test-beds, where the focus has been to sys-
tematically evaluate such networks end-to-end in order to establish rules that
can assist with optimal deployment of TCP traffic type. In this thesis, the
aim in evaluating wireless networks is similar, however, both TCP and UDP
traffic types have been taken into consideration and various wireless combi-
nations have been ranked based on different network performance metrics.
On networks with wireless networks, there were four performance metrics
measured, throughput, delay, jitter, and drop rate. This was done for both
TCP and UDP, however, drop rate for only UDP has been reported since
all values for TCP were zero. Based on the observations and the behaviour
of the metrics on various networks, in Table 7.4, the performance metrics
are presented, ranked in order of significance when it comes to differenti-
ating network behaviour on wireless networks. As in the case of transition
mechanisms, it can be seen that delay is the best differentiator. Drop rate,
which only registers significant values on wireless networks generally (and
not wired implementations), is not a good differentiator between wireless
combinations. This is also the case for wireless jitter.
Wireless 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP and UDP Throughput 
3 TCP and UDP Jitter 
4 UDP Drop Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WEP 
WPA2 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WEP 
WPA2 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WEP 
WPA 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WPA2 
WEP 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
TCP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WEP 
WPA 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
2 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
3 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
Table 7.4: Wireless performance metrics ranking
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Table 7.4 shows that delay and throughput are the best performance metrics
when in come to using them to differentiate between various wireless and se-
curity protocols. Undoubtedly, with the enhancement of technology, newer
wireless standards generally outperform their predecessors in terms of data
transfer rates. So obviously throughput will be a great differentiator. Based
on this and UDP/TCP delay, wireless combinations are ranked in Tables 7.5
and7.6.
Wireless 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP and UDP Throughput 
3 TCP and UDP Jitter 
4 UDP Drop Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WEP 
WPA2 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WEP 
WPA2 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WEP 
WPA 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WPA2 
WEP 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
TCP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WEP 
WPA 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
2 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
3 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
Table 7.5: Wireless standard rankings as per TCP and UDP delay
Wireless 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP and UDP Throughput 
3 TCP and UDP Jitter 
4 UDP Drop Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WEP 
WPA2 
WPA
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
PA2 
PA
UDP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WEP 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WEP 
WPA2 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2
WPA 
TCP Throughput old 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WEP 
WPA 
WPA2 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
PA 
UDP Throughput old 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WPA2 
WEP 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11ac 
PA2 
WPA 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11g 
WEP 
WPA 
WPA2 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
WPA2 
WEP 
TCP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11g 
 
 
 
2 IEEE 802.11n 
PA2 
WEP 
WPA 
3 IEEE 802.11ac 
WPA2 
WPA 
UDP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 IEEE 802.11ac 
PA2 
 
2 IEEE 802.11g 
WPA 
EP 
WPA2 
3 IEEE 802.11n 
WPA2 
WEP 
WPA 
Table 7.6: Wireless standard rankings as per TCP and UDP throughput
Here, it is seen that TCP and UDP delay give similar rankings, while the list
is slightly different in the case of throughput. In case of delay, IEEE802.11g
is superior, however, IEEE802.11ac obviously has the greatest throughput.
WPA2, the latest wireless security protocol’s network performance is better
than its predecessors.
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7.4 Networks with VPNs
There are many VPN protocols, and of these IPsec and SSTP are the latest
ones. Both are being widely used on current network infrastructures to se-
cure data in motion. Also, each has a number of algorithms that can be cho-
sen during configuration for authentication and encryption. When evaluat-
ing various VPNs for network performance, base operating systems on VPN
servers were also factored in, and for these reasons a total of 22 various com-
binations were implemented on the test-bed for performance evaluation.
In regards to VPNs, the performance metrics measured were throughput,
delay, and jitter. Their significance in relation to ranking networks that have
VPN is presented in Table 7.7. Here, as in the case of the other two net-
work contexts, delay is the best performance metric for differentiating vari-
ous VPN techniques.
VPN 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP and UDP Throughput 
3 TCP and UDP Jitter 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec AES 
IPsec 
2 Server 2008 
IPsec 
SSTP 
3 Ubuntu 
IPsec 
SSTP 
UDP Delay 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec AES 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
2 Server 2008 
IPsec 
SSTP 
3 Ubuntu 
IPsec 
SSTP 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
2 Server 2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
3 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec AES 
IPsec 
2 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
3 Server2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
TCP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 Server 2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
2 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
3 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
UDP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard Authentication Rank 
1 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
2 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
3 Server2012 
IPsec AES 
IPsec DES 
Table 7.7: VPN performance metrics ranking
The test-bed analysis in this thesis did not distinctly differentiate between all
encryption and authentication algorithms within each VPN protocol. Whilst
the initial goal was to do so, results attained show that there were hardly
any differences between most of the actual algorithms. Where distinctions
are identifiable, those results have been presented. The actual difference be-
tween the VPN techniques, and the effects of the actual operating systems
have been identified clearly.
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In Tables 7.8 and 7.9, the VPN protocols have been ranked using delay and
throughput as the performance metrics. In the tables, the operating systems
have been listed and then within each set, VPN protocols have been ranked.
VPN 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP and UDP Throughput 
3 TCP and UDP Jitter 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec AES 
IPsec 
2 Server 2008 
IPsec 
SSTP 
3 Ubuntu 
IPsec 
SSTP 
UDP Delay 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec AES 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
2 Server 2008 
IPsec 
SSTP 
3 Ubuntu 
IPsec 
SSTP 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
2 Server 2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
3 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec AES 
IPsec 
2 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
3 Server2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
TCP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
2 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
3 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
UDP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
2 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
3 Server2012 
IPsec AES 
IPsec DES 
Table 7.8: VPN protocol rankings as per TCP and UDP delay
VPN 
Rank Metrics 
1 TCP and UDP Delay 
2 TCP and UDP Throughput 
3 TCP and UDP Jitter 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TCP Delay 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec AES 
IPsec 
2 Server 2008 
IPsec 
SSTP 
3 Ubuntu 
IPsec 
 
UDP Delay 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec AES 
IPsec DES 
I sec 
2 Server 2008 
IPsec 
SSTP 
3 Ubuntu 
IPsec 
 
UDP Throughput 
Rank Operating System
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
2 Server 2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
3 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
TCP Throughput 
Rank Operating System 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec AES 
IPsec 
2 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
3 Server2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
TCP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Server 2008 
SSTP 
IPsec 
2 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
3 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
UDP Jitter 
Rank Wireless Standard 
Encryption 
Rank 
1 Ubuntu 
SSTP 
IPsec 
2 Server 2012 
SSTP 
IPsec DES 
IPsec 
IPsec AES 
3 Server2012 
IPsec AES 
IPsec DES 
Table 7.9: VPN protocol rankings as per TCP and UDP throughput
Overall, it can be seen that SSTP outperforms IPsec on all networks that have
the latest version of the Microsoft Server implemented. On the other two op-
erating systems, the top ranked VPN technology varies. It is also observed
that TCP and the UDP ranking lists are different for both performance met-
rics, which indicates that the two traffic types perform differently on VPN
networks.
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7.5 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, the network behaviour of TCP and UDP traffic has been evalu-
ated in three different contexts. In each, various networks have been imple-
mented to evaluate protocol behaviour. Resulting from this comprehensive
research, the key contributions of this thesis are:
1. Key Performance Metric Identification: There are various performance
metrics that can be measured on networks to gauge behaviour of traffic
types on infrastructures. Whilst accurately measuring all of them may be
important for different purposes, they are not all necessary when it comes
to evaluating different techniques in a network context. In this thesis, it
has been shown that in the contexts of networks with wireless, or net-
works with transition mechanisms, or with VPN technologies, TCP/UDP
delay followed by throughput are the only key differentiators between
different techniques.
2. Ranking Transition Mechanisms: A number of transition mechanisms
have been subject to evaluation in this thesis. It has been seen that their
ordinal ranking, based on TCP/UDP delay and throughput, are different.
Irrespective of the performance metric being used to rank, dual stack and
NAT64 are always the best performers. Detailed ranking based on delay
and throughput are presented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 respectively.
3. Ranking Wireless Standards with Security Protocols: IEEE802.11 tech-
nology is associated with WLANs and its usage is immense. The three
wireless standards tested with different combinations of encryption pro-
tocols show that the new standard most certainly outperforms that of oth-
ers in data rate transfers. However, it is also observed that the actual
throughput is significantly lower than the theoretical bandwidth (a 10-
fold drop is evident). Depending on the actual performance metric, ordi-
nal ranking is different. Detailed ranking based on delay and throughput
are presented in Tables 7.5 and7.6 respectively.
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4. Ranking VPN Technologies: Ranking VPN technologies shows that in
most cases, the actual security and encryption algorithms implemented
do not affect network performance. However, the choice of the actual
VPN techniques does impact on the network performance. It is evident
that SSTP has superior network performance in most cases, when com-
pared with IPsec. The base operating systems on the VPN server does im-
pact network performance. Detailed ranking based on delay and through-
put are presented in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 respectively.
5. Significant Observations on Networks with Transition Mechanisms:
When networks are implemented with transition mechanisms, network
performance will downgrade, but to different degrees. This performance
downgrading depends on the choice of the actual mechanism and in the
case of ISATAP and Teredo, throughput can be compromised by almost
30%. The case is similar for delay, whereby a 10-12 fold increase in delay
may be seen with some of the mechanisms. Jitter values attained show
that irrespective of the transition mechanism being implemented, jitter
will increase, but in most cases, this increase will be about the same. De-
tailed findings related to performance on networks with transition mech-
anisms are presented in Section 4.7.
6. Significant Observations on Networks with Wireless: On wireless
networks, the difference in throughput between TCP and UDP is almost
35% in favour of UDP. Further, it is seen that wireless encryptions re-
duce network performance further, and that the maximum drop reported
in this thesis is almost 10%. Also, it is observed that the newer of the
wireless standards and encryption protocol gives the best network per-
formance. Detailed findings related to performance on networks with
transition mechanisms are presented in Section 5.7.
7. Significant Observations on Networks with VPN Technologies: VPN
technologies dramatically impact on network performance. It can be seen
that when comparing networks with and without VPNs, there can be an
almost five-fold drop in the data transfer rate. Also, there is a significant
difference between SSTP and IPsec network performance, however, ef-
fects of the actual authentication and encryption algorithms in each VPN
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technology is indistinguishable. Detailed findings related to performance
on networks with transition mechanisms are presented in Section 6.5.
8. IPv4 and IPv6: The difference between the network performance of
IPv4 and IPv6 can be highly significant, depending on the network tech-
nologies implemented. While in some situations, the difference is insignif-
icant, on networks with wireless a performance difference of almost 40%
was observed, in favour of IPv4. In all the test-bed evaluations, IPv4 has
always outperformed IPv6, but to different degrees, depending on the
network details.
9. Impact of Operating System Choice on Networks: Operating systems
do impact on network performance, and the degree to which they have an
impact depends on the chosen operating system and the network configu-
ration. In the case of VPN technologies, it can be seen that there is no one
clear superior operating system. In all the VPN scenarios, all operating
systems gave different performance metrics.
10. TCP and UDP TCP and UDP traffic types, in some situations register
similar performance metrics, while in others, the variation between them
can be significant. In extreme cases, the difference between the two is
almost 35%. Also, it is observed that on wired networks the TCP packet
drop rate is minuscule, while that of UDP is at a maximum 70%.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis has provided many interesting insights into the network behaviour
of TCP and UDP traffic types on various networks. The contributions of the
thesis are important, and they are all geared towards understanding network
performance characteristics of infrastructures. The technologies at the centre
of the three network scenarios around which test-bed evaluations have been
conducted, are topical environments that currently exist on today’s network
implementations. Therefore, it is anticipated that contributions of the thesis
will be useful to both academia and network practitioners.
In Chapter 4, the focus was on networks with various transition mechanism
techniques. Many such mechanisms were implemented, out of which some
very useful and interesting behaviours are evident. Dual stack and NAT64
outperform the other mechanisms, however, all mechanisms impacted neg-
atively on network performance. The degree to which they downgrade per-
formance metrics depends on the choice of the actual mechanism, and it has
been observed that two mechanisms can negatively impact network perfor-
mance by almost 30%. Further, there are varying degree of impact on net-
work delay and jitter, however all transition mechanisms do have a signifi-
cant impact.
In Chapter 5, evaluation of wireless networks has shown that the choice of
the wireless standard, and combining it with the appropriate security mech-
anism, have an impact on both TCP and UDP traffic types. There is strong
evidence that TCP and UDP traffic types behave differently on wireless net-
works, which then leads to significantly different values for network perfor-
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mance metrics. This chapter has also successfully highlighted that there is
almost a ten-fold throughput drop from the theoretical bandwidth values on
wireless networks.
Chapter 6 focused on, VPN implementations on test-beds and the difference
between the two commonly used VPN techniques is evident. It has also been
observed that when comparing networks with and without VPN, there can
be an almost five-fold performance drop, depending on the combination of
VPN technology and the algorithms. The differentiation between the vari-
ous algorithms within each VPN technique has been negligible.
In Chapter 7, the results are discussed, first in the context of each of the
scenarios in which network performance have been analysed, and then the
discussion leads onto identification of the key thesis contributions. Here, ten
thesis contributions have been mentioned, highlighting ranking of various
techniques and significant observations.
In addition to exploiting TCP and UDP in three network environments, net-
work performance metrics that can be used as good differentiators within a
network context have also been highlighted. It is observed that delay and
throughput are the best metrics for performance differentiators in the three
scenarios. Also, based on these two metrics, various networking techniques
have been ranked. The novelty of this work lies in the fact that the rankings
have been based on data collected primarily from test-bed experiments.
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